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1. Preface 
The present thesis is submitted for the degree Philosophiae Doctor (Ph.D.) as a collection 
of papers. It consists of four individual papers, which are motivated, summarized and 
compared in the introduction. These papers are: 
(#1) “Mechanisms Do Not Overdetermine Their Effects”  
(#2) “Pace Burge: Some Empirical Warrant for Epiphobia” 
(#3) “Is there a Binding Problem of Behavior? E.J. Lowe on Causal Closure” 
(#4) “What’s Closed in Causal Closure?” 
Traditionally, most Norwegian theses in philosophy have been monographs. 
Nevertheless, the Faculty of Humanities accepts submissions of paper based theses; 
provided the individual papers are related to each other and these relations are accounted 
for.1
 Papers (#1)-(#4) are all thematically related insofar as they concern the so-called 
“Exclusion Argument” in the philosophy of mind. They are all largely dedicated to 
discussions of responses that have been made to this argument. Papers (#1) and (#2) 
discuss problems with the so-called “No Overdetermination” premise, which plays a key 
role in the Exclusion Argument. Similarly, papers (#3) and (#4) concern problems with 
another premise, known as “Causal Closure.” Finally, all papers share a common 
methodology and aim, insofar as they are attempts to see how considerations of 
explanatory practice, and in particular of neuroscience, can be brought to bear on 
problems like the Exclusion Argument. Their interrelations and implications are 
discussed further in the introduction. In spite of these unifying factors, the papers were 
written independently and with different aims in mind, making a paper based presentation 
natural. The following papers are all under submission to journals.  However, I have 
taken the liberty of using the format of a thesis to develop more fully some of the points 
1 Cp. the guidelines for such theses, adopted by the Faculty’s Research Committee, 30. August, 2004. 
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made in the papers, in particular with regard to the themes that connect them to each 
other. The versions of the papers presented in the thesis are therefore in some cases 
significantly longer than those submitted for separate publication in journals. 
 A complete reference list for all the papers and the introduction is included at the 
end of the thesis. The reference style is in accordance with the American Psychological 
Association’s standards, as two of the papers have been submitted to a journal which 
practices that style. All italics within quotes are from the quoted authors, unless otherwise 
indicated. Comments or substitutions in brackets (“[…]”) within quotes are mine.  
 For one source to the first page, supervenience-like claim attributed to Ralph 
Gerard, see Elliot S. Valenstein, 2005, p. 161. 
 The thesis was supervised by Professor Bjørn Torgrim Ramberg at the Philosophy 
Department, Faculty of Humanities at the University of Oslo. Funding was provided by 
the Faculty of Humanities and the U.S.-Norway Fulbright Foundation for Educational 
Exchange.

12. Introduction 
In this introduction I describe and motivate the problems discussed in the papers that 
constitute the thesis’ argumentative bulk. (2.1-2.2) These papers all concern the so-called 
“Exclusion Argument” which is described in (2.3). Aims and methods are set forth in 
(2.4-2.5). The two first papers discuss problems with the Exclusion Argument’s “No 
Overdetermination” principle, whereas the final two are dedicated to problems with the 
“Causal Closure” principle. These problems and my conclusions with respect to them are 
described and summarized in (2.6) and (2.7), respectively. The introduction ends with 
some concluding remarks about the prospects for the Exclusion Argument. (2.8) 
 There are three reasons why this introduction is relatively lengthy. First, the 
Exclusion Argument is but one part of a larger set of problems involving “downward 
causation,” that are to a certain extent also discussed in the papers. In the introduction I 
therefore spend some time situating the Exclusion Argument within a larger 
argumentative and historical context. Second, part of the thesis’ impact is 
metaphilosophical, and concerns the nature of problems of downward causation and how 
these should be approached. In this respect, the introduction serves to describe and 
motivate my methodology. Finally, while the papers display a high degree of thematic 
unity, they were written with different arguments and aims in mind. With respect to these 
aims, they speak for themselves, and the thesis’ main arguments are to be found therein. 
But in this introduction I also endeavor to spell out their interrelations and, somewhat 
more tentatively, to describe the implications they appear to have for the Exclusion 
Argument. 
  I have allowed myself a liberal use of quotes in the introduction; in the hope that 
they will add color to the problems and help the reader appreciate the varieties of voices 
and views that can be found in the debate. Tyler Burge figures prominently in my 
introduction and more so than the other philosophers I discuss later on, because the ways 
in which I agree and disagree with him are central to my approach.  
22.1. Downward Causation from Descartes to Jaegwon Kim 
The subject matter of this thesis is sometimes described by the rather gloomy-sounding 
phrase “downward causation.” This expression appears to have been coined by Donald T. 
Campbell (1974) in an attempt to understand complex biological systems. The idea has 
since been invoked for similar purposes by scientists and philosophers. (Andersen et al., 
2000; Sperry, 1986) It is however, primarily downward causation from the mental to the 
physical that will concern me here. How can mental events exercise a downward causal 
influence on underlying physical processes? How can, for instance the onset of beliefs 
and desires cause bodily movements when I act? The idea of downward causation is 
closely related to antireductionism about the mental. If mental events just are physical 
events, as reductionists would have it, the claim that they exert their influence from above
the physical level seems less natural, except perhaps in accordance with a purely 
descriptive notion of levels. And whether antireductionism about the mental is a viable 
position was in fact my chief motive for delving into problems of downward causation in 
the first place. 
 Talk of downward causation presupposes some way of imposing an upward-
downward direction on causal processes. The frequently invoked picture of the world as 
stratified into different levels of complexity, ranging from the fundamentally physical, 
via the chemical and the biological to the mental and the social does just this. (Kim, 
2002b; Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958) The ideas of levels and downward causation were 
also invoked by classical emergentists, like C.D. Broad (1925), who were arguably 
historical predecessors of today’s antireductive physicalists. (Kim, 1992) Furthermore, 
talk of levels is widespread in neurobiology, a science to which we shall have occasion to 
return. Here relevant levels include inter alia cognitive, systems and cellular/molecular 
neuroscience. (Bear et al., 2001, pp. 13-14) Whether levels-talk in science and 
philosophy should be taken with ontological seriousness or rather treated as useful 
heuristics is, however, very much debatable (Kim, 2002b) Paul Oppenheim and Hilary 
Putnam’s levels of complexity may, for example, turn out to be more like David Marr’s 
(1982, sect. 1.2) famous levels for computational psychology, that is the levels of (i) 
which function is computed, (ii) which algorithm is used to compute it, and finally (iii), 
how the algorithm is implemented physically. These are arguably mere levels of analysis 
3or description. It is at least not clear whether they correspond to levels of existence or 
anything of that sort. Indeed, “downward causation” might turn out to be just a figure of 
speech. 
 Nevertheless, situating “downward” mental causation within a hierarchy of levels 
lends vivid sense to the antireductionist idea that the mental can somehow be something 
“over and above” the physical, and yet affect the physical causally. But even setting 
antireductionism aside, macro levels are often pictured as being “above” micro levels. As 
we shall see, it may be that mental-to-physical causation involves events at the macro 
level causing effects at the micro-level. Indeed, historically scientists and emergentist 
philosophers appear to have postulated what Brian McLaughlin (1992) calls 
“configurational forces.” These are special (say, mental or vital) but fundamental forces 
that are only exercised by objects of some complexity and exert a downward causal 
influence on objects at the level of parts. For these reasons I shall stick to the phrase 
“downward causation” in this introduction. 
 As Jaegwon Kim likes to point out, problems of downward causation from the 
mental to the physical are not new to philosophers. (Kim, 1998, ch. 2 and forthcoming.) 
Contemporary problems are in important ways similar to problems that plagued 
Descartes. After arguing for substance dualism – the view that Body and Soul are distinct 
substances – Descartes found himself hard-pressed to explain how the Soul can cause 
bodily movements in actions. This question was raised inter alia in a famous letter 
princess Elisabeth of Bohemia wrote to Descartes. 
How can the soul of a man determine the spirits of his body so as to produce voluntary actions 
(given that the soul is only a thinking substance)?2
In that letter, Elisabeth worried that being non-extended the Soul could not affect the 
Body, as the causal mechanisms in Cartesian physics – in particular the mechanism of 
pushing – require both cause and effect to be extended. (In paper (#4) we shall see that 
2 Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes of May 6/16, 1643. Translated in Nye, 1999, p. 9 /  AT III 661. All 
references marked “AT” are to the Adam & Tannery (1964-1976) edition. 
4analogous ideas about the nature of neural mechanisms put constraints on what causes 
are relevant in cellular/molecular neuroscience.) This worry appears to have made her 
contemplate localizing the Soul within the spatial, physical domain after all. 
I confess that it is easier for me to concede the matter and the extension of the soul than to concede 
that a being that is immaterial has the capacity to move a body and to be moved by it.3
Although physical extension may not be necessary to thought, it isn’t repugnant to it either, and 
could derive from some other function of the soul, one not less essential to it.4
As we shall see throughout the introduction, Elisabeth’s arguments provide a striking 
parallel to the modern problems we will be considering.5 Anyway, conventional 
philosophical wisdom has it that objections like that raised by Elisabeth lead to the 
demise of substance dualism, and the rise of physical monism. Today, most philosophers 
of mind believe there is only one type of substances or things, and that these are physical
substances. All things, save perhaps abstract entities like numbers, are physical insofar as 
they have physical properties and are located within the spatio-temporal domain.   
 Physical monism may be viewed as a first step in the direction of physicalism, a 
doctrine to which we shall return repeatedly. While physicalism is a broad church, most 
of its followers, including myself, will agree upon crediting the physical domain with a 
certain ontological primacy vis-à-vis the mental and other non-physical domains. In crude 
outline, this means that every non-physical property depends wholly on physical 
properties for its instantiation, but not the other way around. (Kim, 1984a) Put slightly 
differently, all non-physical facts or phenomena etc. obtain or occur in virtue of physical 
facts or phenomena etc. (Witmer, 2001) Typically, physicalists attempt to cash in such 
claims by way of some notion of supervenience. They say, for instance, that worlds (or 
3 Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes of June 10/20, 1643. Translated in Nye, 1999, p. 22 / AT III 685. 
4 Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes of June 10/20, 1643. Translated in Nye, 1999, p. 26 / AT III 685. 
5 In particular, the arguments invoked in the Descartes-Elisabeth correspondence strongly resemble those in 
Burge’s disputes with contemporary physicalists. I discuss this more fully in a Norwegian publication of 
mine. (Galaaen, 2006) 
5perhaps things, or perhaps regions) that are indiscernible in physical respects are 
indiscernible in all respects. (Horgan, 1982; Kim, 1984a; Lewis, 1983) In a frequently 
invoked theological metaphor supervenience would have been very convenient for God 
during Genesis. Once He had fixed the physical laws and the distribution of physical 
facts, the rest of Creation, including mentality, would fall into place automatically. There 
are a number of modal twists and turns to this story, and it is not entirely clear whether 
supervenience really captures the idea of psychophysical dependencies. (Kim, 1998, pp. 
9-15) These difficulties need not concern us for present purposes. Supervenience amounts 
at least to what database theorists call a functional dependency between the physical and 
the non-physical, and this is a strong claim in its own right. (Garcia-Molina et al., 2002, 
ch. 3.4) Since physical indiscernibility guarantees non-physical indiscernibility, a 
physical description of worlds (or objects or regions) could work as a primary key in a 
database containing all information about the worlds (or objects or regions). By looking 
up the physical key for a world (or object or region), we could read all there is to know 
about that world (or object or region) from the database. 
 By assenting to the in-principle possibility of such a database, physicalists go a 
long way towards crowning physics as the queen of the sciences. Nevertheless, 
physicalism, thus understood, does not necessarily amount to reductionism about the 
mental. For instance, if one thinks of the mental in terms of properties, physicalism 
appears prima facie compatible with some things – say, human beings – having 
irreducible, but supervenient, mental properties in addition to their physical, subvenient 
properties. Similarly, physicalism is compatible with the essential need for non-physical 
methods and concepts in the non-physical sciences.  
 In fact, as Kim emphasizes, some form of antireductive physicalism about 
mentality has emerged as the mainstream post-Cartesian view. (Kim, 1998, p. 2) 
Accordingly, antireductive physicalists typically contend that supervenience is 
physicalism enough. Reductive physicalists disagree. Kim (1998; 2005), for instance, 
thinks problems of downward causation have returned to haunt antireductive physicalists; 
driving them in the direction of outright reductionism. 
 Now, there are in fact many problems of downward causation. Elisabeth’s was the 
one of finding a psychophysical mechanism for downward causation that is compatible 
6with the nature of physical causal mechanisms. Leibniz, on the other hand, argued that 
downward causation is incompatible with the laws of physics, as it would violate his 
conservation laws. (See, e.g., McLaughlin (1993) or Papineau (2001) for discussion.) 
Varieties of these and other problems of downward causation will recur later on in this 
thesis. They all threaten to render the mental epiphenomenal – that is, causally inert – 
with respect to the physical.6 I shall be focusing primarily on the incompatibility which 
Kim perceives, however. How can downward causation be compatible with the so-called 
“Causal Closure” of physics? In outline this physicalist principle contends that all 
physical effects like bodily movements have sufficient physical causes. Given such 
physical causes, and the additional assumption that physical effects are not generally 
causally overdetermined, Kim thinks there is no room for irreducibly mental causes of 
bodily movement. Unless mental events can be identified with physical events, they are 
excluded as epiphenomena. This, in a nutshell is the “Exclusion Argument.” It goes by 
other names as well, but is perhaps most befittingly described, by Kim, as “Descartes’s 
revenge against the physicalists.” (Kim, 1998, p. 28) If Kim is right, replacing substance 
dualism with antireductive physicalism will not save the causal efficacy of the mental. 
The antireductionist’s irreducibly mental events will be condemned to the very 
epiphenomenalist fate Elisabeth predicted for non-spatial Souls. Kim may well be right 
that such a turn of events would have amused Descartes. (Kim, 1998, p. 39)  
2.2. The Significance of Downward Causation 
Problems of downward causation, then, involve heavy-weight philosophical questions 
related to the time-worn, but arguably still unresolved (and un-dissolved), mind-body 
problem. (1) Can epiphenomenalism about the mental be ruled out? If so – how? (2) Does 
the mental reduce to the physical? If so – how? It is not hard to come up with reasons for 
6 “Epiphenomenalism with respect to physical events” is not the same as “epiphenomenalism period.” The 
former kind of epiphenomenalism appears at first blush compatible with mental events causing other, non-
physical events. For simplicity’s sake I shall nevertheless sometimes use “epiphenomenalism” to refer to 
the more restricted claim that mental events do not cause physical events. The context will make clear 
which sense is intended. 
7caring about these issues. First, and quite independently of the question of 
antireductionism, epiphenomenalism appears to be an immensely unattractive position. 
Consider just the notion of agency and that of its companion, moral responsibility. 
Arguably, responsible agency is in most cases dependent on bodily movements being 
caused by purported mental entities like intentions. Hence, agency would seem to 
presuppose the reality of mental causation. In epiphenomenalism, on the other hand, there 
is no room for agents that change the world through their actions. Our limbs move, but 
the impression that they sometimes move because we want them to turns out to be a 
grand illusion. The way of the world is strictly under the control of physical, non-mental 
causes. An oft-quoted passage from Jerry Fodor adds considerable drama to this, and 
makes epiphenomenalism seem even less like an option to be seriously considered. 
[…] if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my 
itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my 
saying …, if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is 
false and it’s the end of the world. (Fodor, 1990, p. 156) 
In my view, Fodor clinches the case. Any doctrine that is committed to 
epiphenomenalism has to be dismissed, one way or the other. Antireductionists – for 
whom mental causation becomes downward causation – should therefore be very much 
interested in defending the possibility of this kind of causation. They need, among other 
things, to find a loophole in the Exclusion Argument. Most reductionists, of course, are 
equally eager to salvage agency and mental causation. Kim, for one, makes this very 
clear. (Kim, 2005, p. 9) However, for reductionists there is no antecedent commitment to 
the causation being downward. For them, mental causation is just a species of physical 
causation. Nevertheless, as we shall see, some reductionists use problems of downward 
causation to motivate and/or argue for their reductionism. Accordingly, reductionists, too, 
should find problems of downward causation interesting. If antireductionism really leads 
to epiphenomenalism, that certainly counts strongly in favor of the reductionists’ 
position. 
 That is not to say that reductionism is an attractive option. In the eyes of many, 
the second question I posed above, about the viability of reductionism, is intimately 
8related to psychology’s autonomy vis-à-vis the physical sciences. (Van Gulick, 1992; 
Fodor, 1974) Suppose problems of mental causation require us to reduce the mental to 
the physical. Then the physical sciences achieve a kind of hegemony that, at least in 
principle, if not in practice may seem incompatible with the autonomy of psychology. 
Indeed, if the Exclusion Argument generalizes to other non-physical sciences, it would 
reduce even the geological and the biological to the physical. (Fodor, 1990; Block, 2003)7
Many appear to find the idea of this much concilience both unpalatable and unrealistic, 
and argue instead for a picture of a more “dappled world,” that is studied by a plurality of 
relatively autonomous sciences. (Cartwright, 1999) 
 I admit that it is not clear to me what weight the autonomy worries about 
reductionism have, nor what kind of autonomy we can reasonably hope for.8 The 
autonomy worry may be related to a slightly different set of worries. Kim portrays the 
modern mind-body problem as one of: 
 […] accommodating the mental within a principled physicalist scheme, while at the same time 
preserving it as something distinctive – that is, without losing what we value, or find special, in 
our nature as creatures with minds. (Kim, 1998, p. 2)  
He probably has in mind features like qualitative consciousness and intentionality or 
“aboutness.” These features, which are frequently attributed to the mental, appear both 
special and – at least at first blush – non-physical. Remarking on the place of 
intentionality in a physical world, Fodor may incidentally also capture one reason for 
7 This is the so-called “generalization argument.” Its proponents, like Fodor and Block, use it to argue that 
there must be something wrong with the Exclusion Argument, as the mainstream view has it that special 
sciences like biology are not reducible to physics. For the purposes of the present thesis I set this response 
to the Exclusion Argument aside. 
8 For one thing, a lot of research in cognitive psychology takes neuroscientific evidence into explicit 
account when choosing between theories about (say) the structure of working memory. (Baddeley, 2003) 
Hence, at least one branch of psychology does not appear to be autonomous in a very strict sense. On the 
other hand, it is highly likely that psychological and behavioral methods will remain essential at least as 
heuristic tools in the foreseeable future. So psychology is certainly autonomous in some sense. 
9taking mind-body reductionism to be threatening: “If aboutness is real, it must be really 
something else.” (Fodor, 1987, p. 97) Then there are putative normative features of the 
mental. John McDowell (1994), for instance, spends much time defending “the logical 
space of reasons” – in which he situates inter alia intentional states like beliefs – against 
perceived physicalist attacks. He does so because he worries that intentional states cannot 
be justified, or justify each other, if they belong wholly within “the logical space of 
nature,” where we find causal, but no reason-giving, relations. 
 Cherished features of the mental, then, appear to be at stake. Reductionism might 
be taken to deprive the mental of its special character, or perhaps eliminate that character 
altogether. In Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, Hester Prynne is forced to wear 
an “ignominious mark,” a scarlet “A,” as a punishment for her sin of adultery. Perhaps 
the mark “P,” for physical, would be a similar disgrace to the mental. Not unlike the 
prospect of neurobiological and evolutionary explanations of why we have certain moral 
intuitions,9 problems of downward causation and reductionism do appear disturbing from 
certain points of view.  
 I mention these worries because they make the reductionism question more 
engaging and exciting. They constitute possible motivations for defending 
antireductionism and downward causation. But I want to note that what weight they carry 
is highly sensitive to how one thinks of reductionism, and what kind of reductions may be 
forthcoming. If feasible, a conservative reduction, where the mental is actually identified 
with something physical, would not eliminate features like intentionality. Intentionality 
would be real, but physical. The mental would also be special in one sense, since only 
physical objects of some complexity would have it. Eliminative reductions, on the other 
hand, where features like intentionality are thrown away, would be threatening. And 
judging from historical cases of scientific reductions, there is arguably a spectrum of 
partly revisionary reductions in between these extremes. (Bickle, 1998, ch 2; 2003, ch. 1; 
Churchland & Churchland, 1991; Schaffner, 1993, ch. 9) In the case of a revisionary 
reduction, then, psychology – the science of the mental – would to some extent be 
9 Cp., for instance, Greene (2003). 
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corrected by the reducing physical theory. The mental might not be quite what we took it 
to be, but even so, it might be real and physical. If the mental is reduced, then, it is an 
open – and I take it; empirical – question to what extents its distinctive features will be 
conserved. Personally, I find great comfort in a remark made by neuroscientist Eric 
Kandel, who makes reductionism appear less disagreeable. 
For biologists working on the brain, mind loses none of its power or beauty when experimental 
methods are applied to human behavior. Likewise, biologists do not fear that mind will be 
trivialized by a reductionist analysis, which delineates the component parts and activities of the 
brain. On the contrary, most scientists believe that biological analysis is likely to increase our 
respect for the power and complexity of mind.10
Be that as it may, reductionism is a hotly debated issue both in the philosophy of mind 
and science. Attempts to motivate or arrive at reductionism by reference to problems with 
downward causation should therefore have a bearing on these debates, quite 
independently of whether we take reductionism to be a “bad thing” or not. 
2.3. Exclusion Arguments and Their Presuppositions 
I turn now to a more detailed diagnosis of the Exclusion Argument. But strictly speaking, 
there is no such thing as the Exclusion Argument. At least two different arguments with 
two different conclusions figure in the literature, the basic premises of which are 
formulated in different ways by different authors. Different versions of the argument are 
also discussed in the papers constituting this thesis.11 When the differences do not matter, 
or when the context makes clear which argument is intended, I shall nevertheless speak 
of the Exclusion Argument in the singular. It will be useful to view the problem of 
exclusion as arising from the apparent inconsistency of four prima facie plausible 
10 Kandel, 2006, p. 9. Admittedly, Kandel’s neuroscientific notion of reduction may differ significantly 
from Kim’s identities. This quote is nevertheless expressive of a rather friendlier attitude that one might 
take towards reductionism in some of its guises.  
11 Which argument is discussed in which paper will not matter for the summaries of the papers later in this 
introduction. 
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assumptions. (Cp., e.g., Hansen, 2000; Loewer, 2002, Sturgeon, 1998) We shall later 
have occasion to consider some of the many subtleties involved in formulating these 
assumptions precisely. For now, loose outlines will suffice. 
(Impact) Some mental events cause physical events12
(Antireductionism) Mental events are not identical with physical events 
(No Overdetermination) Physical effects like bodily movements are not generally 
causally overdetermined 
(Causal Closure) Any physical event that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient 
physical cause 
Let us briefly return to the rationale for (Impact) first. As we saw the prime example of 
the mental’s causal impact on the physical is that of actions. Setting aside subtleties from 
the philosophy of action, actions are bodily movements that are caused (in the appropriate 
way) by mental posits like intentions or belief-desire pairs (or something of that sort). My 
desire to finish my thesis in time and my belief that writing would be an efficient way of 
achieving that aim, cause me to write right now. (Impact), then, follows from a general 
causal view of actions, and I shall assume that some such view is viable throughout the 
thesis.13
 Second, (Antireductionism) about the mental can be motivated inter alia by 
reference to the special, and prima facie non-physical, features of the mental mentioned 
12 The terms “impact” or “impact of the mental” are due to Sturgeon (1998). I might have called this 
premise “(Downward Causation)” to make clear that this is at stake for antireductionists. But as mentioned 
above, if the reductionist conclusion is brought about by an Exclusion Argument, the causal impact of the 
mental on the physical might not happily be described as “downward.” 
13 Possible examples of mental causation that do not appear to involve actions might be “embarrassment 
causes blushing,” “psychological stress causes gastric ulcer” etc. Note that the Exclusion Argument will not 
apply to mental events that lack physical effects. Kim, however, argues that even mental events that cause 
other mental events in cognitive-cum-causal processes must do so by causing some physical events. (Kim, 
1998, ch. 2; 2005, ch. 2) According to Kim, then, mental-to-mental causation too presupposes the viability 
of downward causation. 
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above. Standard arguments against reductionism, like the “multiple realization argument” 
invoked by Fodor (1974) and others add to the evidence for (Antireductionism). I will not 
enter into detailed discussions of such antireductionist arguments in this thesis, except to 
note that reductionists have responded to them in various ways. (See Bickle (2001) for a 
summary.) Also, as mentioned above, reductionism, and by implication; 
(Antireductionism), can be cashed out in many ways. Since Kim in many ways is the 
main exclusionist I consider in this thesis, I shall for present purposes follow him in 
understanding mind-body reductionism in terms of mind-body identities. Note, though, 
that Exclusion Arguments could be reformulated in terms of a revisionist model for 
reduction. In such a case, the mental event would be replaced by a physical event, rather 
than conservatively identified with it. But as emphasized above, a revisionary reduction 
need not involve the elimination of all features of the mental. It is my impression that the 
possibility of a partly conservative, partly revisionary reduction of the mental has not 
been given the attention it deserves in the mental causation debate.  
 My focus will be primarily on the status of the two final premises, namely (No 
Overdetermination), and (Causal Closure). The basic idea behind (No 
Overdetermination) can be brought out by considering standard examples of 
overdetermination. The death of a condemned soldier is caused by the shots of two 
members of the firing squad, each of which would alone be sufficient to cause his death. 
Bodily movements are not supposed to be overdetermined like that, at least not typically. 
We shall return to the rationale for dismissing overdetermination. For now, it suffices to 
note that philosophers have found overdetermination objectionable because it is odd, or 
because it appears to make the mental cause dispensable. (Kim, 1998, pp. 44-45) 
 The formulation of (Causal Closure) – henceforth “(Closure)” – also involves 
many subtleties, but again the idea is simple. To assent to (Closure) is to credit the 
physical domain with a radical causal self-sufficiency. It will never be necessary to look 
outside the physical domain to find sufficient causes of physical effects. (Kim, 2005, p. 
16) In contrast, there are mental events, like perceptions, that lack sufficient mental 
causes, so the mental is not causally self-sufficient. But note that some physical events 
may have mental causes in addition to their sufficient physical causes. In other words, 
(Closure) does not render (No Overdetermination) redundant.  
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 Such are the building blocks of Exclusion Arguments. We can now see in outline 
how one Exclusion Argument generates a conflict between (Antireductionism) and the 
remaining three premises. Start out by picking an arbitrary mental event that has a 
physical effect (say, a bodily movement) in accordance with (Impact). By (Closure) this 
physical effect must also have a sufficient physical cause. But by (No Overdetermination) 
there cannot be any additional causes that are distinct from the physical cause. 
Accordingly, the mental cause must be reduced to the physical cause, contrary to 
(Antireductionism). This type of Exclusion Argument is discussed by, inter alia,
Papineau (2001) and Sturgeon (1998). For reasons that will become apparent shortly, I 
dub this the “Simple Argument.”  
 Kim (1998, ch. 2; 2005, ch. 2), however, does not assume that reductionism is 
possible. He only argues that if (Antireductionism) is true, then mental events are 
excluded as causes of physical events. His contention, then is that the conjunction of 
(Closure), (No Overdetermination) and (Antireductionism) yields (Epiphenomenalism).14
Here (Epiphenomenalism) should be read as the negation of (Impact). What Kim 
attempts to show is that if we assume (Antireductionism), we end up with 
(Epiphenomenalism). If we do not, reductionism becomes our only option as in the above 
argument. All in all, Kim’s argument can be viewed as posing a stark dilemma for 
antireductionists. Either mental events like the onset of beliefs and desires do not cause 
physical events like bodily movements, or they are reduced to physical events. For this 
reason I call Kim’s argument the “Disjunctive Argument.” 
 The difference between the two arguments should interest us presently, as it will 
contextualize what I am trying to do in this thesis. The “Simple” in “the Simple 
Argument” is not intended pejoratively. If sound, the argument would be powerful and 
14 Strictly speaking, Kim sometimes formulates the Exclusion Argument in an idiosyncratic manner. He 
uses the assumption of mind-body supervenience, rather than (Closure) to come up with a physical cause of 
effects like bodily movements. (Kim, 1998, ch. 2; 2005, ch. 2) But the (Closure) premise arguably plays a 
role later on in the argument. See Hansen (2000) for discussion of the role of supervenience versus 
(Closure) in Kim (1998). I shall, however, focus on the more conventional way of raising the exclusion 
problem from the four assumptions described above. 
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convenient indeed. As my high school mathematics teacher repeatedly pointed out, “a 
good mathematician knows to be indolent at the right times.” Not improbably the same 
applies to good philosophers. My point, then, is that the argument is simple in that it 
arrives at mind-body reductionism without us having to go through the laborious business 
of actually carrying out the reduction. This would be very convenient, as one might have 
expected that even a plausibility argument for mind-body reductionism would require 
detailed investigations of the physical sciences. The Simple Argument, however, would 
allow us to skip such extra-philosophical excursions. Like an existence proof, it tells us 
that mental events must reduce to some physical events. (Notably without telling us 
which. That, however, might be construed as an advantage, as the mainstream view is that 
we are a far leap from actually being able to carry out any mind-body reductions.)  
 It is perhaps no surprise then, that the exclusion debate is typically – but as we 
shall see, not always – conducted in relative isolation from considerations of science. The 
premises are only rarely assessed on empirical grounds. True, (Closure) sounds like a 
highly empirical claim. But it is widely accepted, and if it could be accepted on the basis 
of the well-known explanatory successes of the physical sciences, we might not have to 
consider detailed evidence for it. Furthermore, we shall see that some philosophers offer 
relatively straight-forward arguments for the principle without appealing much to actual 
evidence.  
 On the other hand, the Disjunctive Argument strongly motivates reductionism, 
without guaranteeing it. It leaves reductionists with work to do. Kim notably, goes on to 
provide a functionalistic model for reductionism which he hopes will be sufficient to 
reduce all mental events, save those involving qualia.15 (Kim, 1998, ch. 4; 2005, ch. 4) 
Other contemporary reductionists contend, e.g., that mind-body identities provide the best 
explanations of mind-body correlations. (McLaughlin, 2001) Others again attempt to face 
what has been called the “Put Up or Shut Up Challenge” from antireductionists, by 
arguing that reductions are actually forthcoming in contemporary neuroscience. (Bickle, 
1998; 2003) Needless to say, these arguments are all controversial, and the question 
15 I explicitly set aside problems of qualia and consciousness in this thesis. 
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whether they are successful falls outside the scope of this thesis. Note though, that in 
contrast with a reductionism that relies on the Simple Argument alone, all of these 
arguments would have the advantage of providing at least some general information 
about what the mental is reduced to.16 The Simple Argument can, of course, be 
supplemented with such considerations, but these are not required to arrive at its 
reductive conclusion. 
 I have reviewed these differences not only to show that the Exclusion Argument 
takes different forms, but also because a central claim of this thesis will turn out to be that 
there does not appear to be any simple way to mind-body reductionism. Even if one 
wants to rely solely on what I have called the Simple Argument to arrive at reductionism, 
more detailed investigations of explanatory practice – which is arguably our best source 
to questions about causation – are needed to ground the premises of that argument. I shall 
focus on problems relating to (Closure) and (No Overdetermination). Since these 
premises figure in the Disjunctive Argument as well, this also means that there is no 
simple exclusion based route to the motivation of reductionism. 
2.4. Aims and Methods: How Should We Approach Downward 
Causation? 
Before moving on to the details of this thesis, we should pause to appreciate some 
important methodological points. We have now ample reasons for caring about mental 
causation, and if we are antecedently inclined towards antireductionism we should care 
also about downward causation. But do we really have reasons to worry?
 It might appear that the problems are easily solved or dissolved. That is, already 
based on this preliminary sketch, the problems may be perceived as pseudo-problems, 
16 Kim’s model contends that functional mental properties are to be identified with the physical properties 
that realize or implement the function. McLaughlin’s identities would identify the mental with its physical 
or functional correlates. These are general stories, to be sure, but they do tell us where to look for the 
identities. The “looking for” will be a matter of empirical investigation. Bickle’s model for reductionism 
does not require identities, but since it draws on actual research it points to potential or actual reduction 
bases for mentality. 
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unworthy of our serious attention. Does not the success of psychological causal 
explanations of bodily movements speak irresistibly in favor of the causal efficacy of the 
mental? Does not the apparent paucity of actual psychophysical reductions – let alone the 
stock arguments against reductionism – recommend antireductionism as the default 
position for the nonce? Accordingly, what metaphysical reasons could possibly convince 
us into believing that mental events are epiphenomenal or else really physical, when our 
explanatory practices suggest that they are neither? Perhaps I would be wise, then, to stop 
writing at this point and set worries about downward causation, epiphenomenalism and 
reductionism aside.  
 This is, in fact, the way some philosophers like Tyler Burge (1989; 1993) view 
contemporary physicalist debates about mental causation quite generally. He thinks 
worries about epiphenomenalism “have an air of make-believe” to them (1993, p. 102), 
and contends that:  
Materialist [by which I take it he means “physicalist”] metaphysics has been given more weight 
than it deserves. Reflection on explanatory practice has been given too little. The metaphysical 
grounds that support the worries are vastly less strong than the more ordinary grounds we have for 
rejecting them. (Burge, 1993, p. 97) 
As will become clear, I think Burge’s point of view has a lot going for it, at least insofar 
it suggests that the premises of a sound Exclusion Argument need to be grounded in 
explanatory practice. This is an overall theme of my thesis. Nevertheless, I argue that his 
dismissal of our worries is a bit premature. We shall see that Burge’s and other 
philosophers’ practice- or science-based dismissals are highly sensitive to which practices 
we look at. I will hold that Burge relies on a problematic and somewhat stipulative 
account of what practices are relevant to understanding mental causation. In particular, he 
fails to appreciate the way in which neuroscience blends an explanatory interest in 
mentality with one in physical mechanisms. Thus, I shall argue that we can follow Burge 
in paying heed to explanatory practice without dismissing problems of downward 
causation altogether. 
 It is also important to notice that Burge appears to misconstrue the worries that 
plague physicalists. For most physicalists, problems about mental causation are questions 
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about how mental causation takes place, rather than problems about whether it does. 
(Dretske, 2003; Kim, 1998, p. 61; McLaughlin, forthcoming) The problem raised by the 
Exclusion Argument, for example, is best viewed as an “how”-question: Given (Closure), 
how is mental causation possible without overdetermination? Explanatory practice 
arguably tells us that mental causation occurs, but the “how”-question still appears to 
remain. Burge’s position is of little help to those of us who take an interest in this 
question.
 In the spirit of localizing our problems within a wider historical context, it is 
interesting to note that the distinction between the “how” and the “that” of downward 
causation, is also mirrored in the correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth. In his 
response to Elisabeth’s question, Descartes argued that causal interaction between Soul 
and Body could only be grasped by reference to the primitive idea of the Soul’s union 
with the Body.17 He suggested that Elisabeth abstain from metaphysical meditations and 
turn instead to sensory experience in everyday life and ordinary conversation in order to 
make this idea clear to herself. Substituting “explanatory practice” for “sensory 
experience” in Descartes’ response to Elisabeth, we have in effect Burge’s dismissal of 
problems of downward causation. Descartes may well have been right that: 
 […] people who never philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the soul moves 
the body and that the body acts on the soul.18
But of course, this is no answer to Elisabeth’s “how”-question. In fact, the princess went 
on to complain, much like Burge’s physicalist opponents, that: 
I see also that the senses show me that the soul moves the body, but that they do not show me 
really (any more than the Understanding or the Imagination does) the way in which it does.19
17 Descartes’ letter to Elisabeth of June 28, 1643. Translated in Kenny, 1970, p. 141 / AT III 690. 
18 Descartes’ letter to Elisabeth of June 28, 1643. Translated in Kenny, 1970, p. 141 / AT III 690. 
19 Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes of July 1, 1643. Translated in Nye, 1999, p. 26, my italics.  (Not reprinted 
in AT-edition.)  
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This dispute about the “how”-question, does not appear to have been resolved in the 
subsequent correspondence between Elisabeth and Descartes.20
 I have emphasized this historical parallel not only to contextualize contemporary 
problems, but also because the metaphilosophical questions it raises are central to the 
aims of the present thesis. My approach in what follows is guided by three assumptions:  
(1) I agree with Burge that explanatory practice trumps metaphysical worries 
about epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism must be dismissed.  
(2) I also agree with the Elisabethan objection that this still leaves the question of 
how epiphenomenalism is to be avoided open.  
(3) Provided, that is, that the “how”-problems themselves, and the premises 
giving rise to them, fit well with explanatory practice. 
It is important to appreciate that (3) is no trifle proviso. First, reactions to the Exclusion 
Argument – and to a certain extent; other problems of downward causation as well – 
from Burge (1993), Barry Loewer (2002), E.J. Lowe (2000) and Scott Sturgeon (1998) 
have one thing in common. These critics argue in various ways either that the Exclusion 
Argument lacks support in explanatory practice or that it is in fact incompatible with 
explanatory practice. Accordingly, each of the four papers constituting the present thesis 
concerns one of these responses.  
 Second, compatibility with explanatory practice may not be enough to counter all 
of the responses of the above-mentioned critics. For Burge, at least, who appears to be the 
critic who has the least patience with the Exclusion Argument, also questions the 
motivation of its “how”-problem. At this point, then, there emerges what may be a largely 
overlooked and substantial disagreement between Burge and physicalists like Kim. As we 
shall see, Burge appears to be thinking that many of the “how”-questions of mental 
causation in general could turn out to be bad or “inappropriate” questions insofar as they 
are not supported by explanatory practice. If so, the disagreement begins before the 
20 The remainder of their correspondence is discussed by Nye (1999). 
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“how”-questions are even asked. For instance, with respect to the call for a mechanism in 
mental causation, pressed by Elisabeth, and in a modern guise by inter alia Fodor (1990; 
1991b) and others, Burge contends that: 
I have no satisfying response to the problem of explaining a mechanism. […] What is unclear is 
whether the question is an appropriate one in the first place. Demanding that there be an account 
of mechanism in mind-body causation is tantamount to demanding a physical model for 
understanding such causation. It is far from obvious that such a model is appropriate. It is not 
even obvious why any model is needed. (Burge, 1993, p. 114, my italics) 
It will become clear that Burge is skeptical to “how”-questions largely because he takes 
them to be attempts to understand mental causation in terms of physical causation. He is 
hostile to such attempts. Given the current state of science, he thinks it is far from clear 
that physical causation – e.g., in physical mechanisms – is relevant to understanding 
mental causation. In fact, he strongly suggests that mental causation should be understood 
on its own terms, that is, by reference to psychological explanatory practices.  
 Very interestingly, Descartes appears to have been of a similar mind. Physical
causation, he contended, should be understood in terms of extended bodies and 
mechanisms like pushing. But mental causation cannot be understood in terms of such 
physical causation. Mental causation is, however, understandable in itself, with the aid of 
the idea of the Soul-Body union. This reasoning lead him to suggest that Elisabeth’s call 
for a mechanism was misguided, because she had “[…] confounded the notion of the 
soul’s power to act on the body with the power one body has to act on another.”21 Burge 
and Descartes, then, both appear to question the relevance of physical causation as a 
source to understanding mental causation.  
 What is ultimately at stake – in the Burge-physicalist debates, in the Descartes-
Elisabeth correspondence and in this thesis – is therefore not only the “how”-questions of 
21 Descartes’ letter to Elisabeth of May 21, 1643. Translated in Kenny, 1970, p. 139 / AT III 690. Note, 
though, that this dismissal of Elisabeth’s question seems to fit rather poorly with Descartes’ apparent 
attempt to offer a mechanism for mind-body causation involving the pineal gland. (See for instance 
Descartes, 1985, p. 340 / AT XI 352.) 
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mental causation, but whether these questions are well motivated. If we are to meet Burge 
on his own turf, as I shall attempt, then a strong focus on explanatory practice 
recommends itself. Not only do we need to show that the premises giving rise to 
problems like the Exclusion Argument are compatible with explanatory practice, they 
should also be motivated by reference to explanatory practice. 
 Put briefly, my overall aim is to investigate whether a sound Exclusion Argument 
can be formulated from within explanatory practice, as it where. As I explain in the 
following sections, my primary focus in this endeavor will be on (Closure) and (No 
Overdetermination). Returning to the dialectical situation in which we left Descartes and 
Elisabeth, Descartes’ advice was basically: “Turn away from metaphysics to everyday 
experience, through which you will grasp a primitive idea which in turn will solve (or 
perhaps dissolve) your problem.” But apparently this did not help Elisabeth much. 
Another way of putting my overall aim, on the other hand, is this. Can we solve or defuse 
our problems of downward causation by following Burge’s advice and turn, not to a 
primitive idea, but to explanatory practice?  
In order to avoid provoking disappointment in the reader later on I should warn 
her right now, that this question will not be fully answered by the end of the thesis. I will
suggest that the papers in the thesis jointly lend additional support to the idea that some 
model of “supervenient” mental causation could be a viable solution to the exclusion 
problem. (Cp., e.g., Fodor (1990); Jackson & Pettit (1988)22; Kim (1984b)) According to 
supervenient causation, mental events are causally efficacious only indirectly, in virtue of 
the physical causes on which they supervene. But more work no doubt needs to be done 
on this question. On the positive side, I will, however, use considerations of explanatory 
practice to show that some of the important problems raised by the above-mentioned 
critics can be bypassed. Furthermore, my discussions will have a bearing on the nature of 
22 Jackson & Pettit’s model of “programming explanation” ascribes only causal-explanatory relevance, and 
not causal efficacy to mental events. I have nevertheless included it under the rubric “supervenient 
causation” as it is in many ways similar to that of Fodor (1990) and Kim (1984b), and might usefully be 
reinterpreted as attributing causal efficacy to the mental. 
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mechanistic explanations, how the Exclusion Argument is sensitive to theories of 
causation and other matters of contemporary interest.  
2.5. “The Physical” in Downward Causation 
With all these references to explanatory practice, it is high time I said something about 
which practices are relevant to downward causation. A central contention of this thesis is 
that this should not be a matter of stipulation. Which practices are relevant to mental 
causation is itself an empirical question.  
 Notice first that folk-psychology and academic intentional psychology quickly 
spring to mind in this context, as these are practices that take an interest in the mental’s 
causal impact on the physical in actions. But problems of downward causation are just as 
much about “the physical.” Now physicalists’ use of the term “physical” quickly 
produces in the minds of many readers a question about its definition. In many ways this 
philosophical reflex is entirely legitimate, and may prove as adaptive as its physiological 
counterparts. The question about “the physical” will in fact recur throughout the thesis. In 
one guise it takes the form of the infamous “Hempel’s Dilemma.” This dilemma contends 
that physicalism is either trivial or false, depending on whether “the physical” is defined 
by reference to an idealized future theory or by reference to contemporary theories. (See, 
e.g., Crane & Mellor (1990) for a statement and Melnyk (1997), Papineau (2001), Smart 
(1978) or Stoljar (2005) for rejoinders.) This dilemma poses a challenge to physicalism in 
general.  
 The problems I have in mind, however, are for the most part specific to the 
Exclusion Argument and mental causation. As we shall see, “the physical” in the mental 
causation debate is frequently understood as the subject matter of some branch of physics.
However, neuroscience is arguably much more closely related to mental causation than is 
physics, and yet it has received relatively little attention in the philosophy of mind, and in 
particular in the exclusion debate. Of course, hardly anyone would claim that 
neuroscience – or empirical evidence in general, for that matter – is irrelevant to the 
mental causation debate. But, setting some exceptions aside, there has nevertheless been 
something of a paucity of explicit discussions of neuroscientific data in the philosophy of 
mind. In part the rationale for this disregard has been that neuroscience is allegedly yet in 
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its infancy. To the extent that neural terms like “C fibers” are invoked in the philosophy 
of mind at all, they are often intended as place holders for concepts that will be provided 
in some future, perhaps idealized neuroscience. (See Bickle et al. (2006) for discussion.)  
 At least for the purposes of debating the Exclusion Argument, I think a 
supplementary approach which explicitly focuses on current neuroscience rather than 
physics or idealized future neuroscience recommends itself. I shall argue that the 
problems raised by Burge (1993), Loewer (2002), Lowe (2000) and Sturgeon (1998) are 
naturally addressed with the aid of neuroscience rather than physics. A secondary aim of 
this thesis is therefore to investigate how current neuroscience can be brought to bear on 
the premises of the Exclusion Argument. To this end I will in fact formulate and discuss a 
“Neural Exclusion Argument” in paper (#4). This argument has the advantage of being 
about current scientific attempts to relate the mental to the physical. If neuroscience is an 
attempt “to link molecules to mind” (Bickle, 2003, p. 3; Kandel et al., 2000, p. 3), then a 
sound Neural Exclusion Argument might imply that the links currently being investigated 
by neuroscientists should be viewed as potential mind-body reductions. In contrast, there 
does not at this point appear to be any developed science like “behavioral quantum 
mechanics” or “psychological quantum mechanics.” While interesting in its own right, an 
Exclusion Argument formulated in terms of physics – or at least in terms of microphysics 
– would tell us little about how we should interpret current scientific attempts to find the 
mind’s place in nature. So if neurophilosophy is the attempt to address philosophical 
questions by drawing on neuroscientific theory, then this thesis is partly – but not wholly 
– an attempt to apply neurophilosophy to the Exclusion Argument.  
 There are of course other ways to approach the Exclusion Argument. The 
argument has predominantly been discussed as a part of the philosophy of mind, and the 
debate has often focused on questions about the nature of properties, events, causal relata, 
the modal status of its premises and so on. While I sympathize with Burge’s emphasis on 
explanatory practice as a more reliable source to questions about mental causation than 
metaphysics, I should in no way be taken to dismiss metaphysics as irrelevant. Indeed 
there are many unresolved questions about the Exclusion Argument’s metaphysical 
underpinnings that I might legitimately have discussed instead. I shall, nevertheless adopt 
a different, in some ways Burgean, approach and will as far as possible set such questions 
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aside. I hope that some readers will find this approach attractive, and I hope that my 
tentative explorations into neuroscience are sufficient to make my claims plausible.  
 The approach requires some quite delicate balancing. Some readers will perhaps 
think my discussion of scientific examples too superficial. I hope they are wrong, but I 
contend at least that I have described philosophically interesting features of neuroscience 
that are relevant to the Exclusion Argument. Others may have little patience with the 
discussion of empirical evidence, thinking perhaps that traditional metaphysical 
approaches to the Exclusion Argument will eventually prove more fruitful. To these 
readers I can only say that: given the lack of consensus on the relevant metaphysical 
matters, the seemingly inescapable appeal to more or less brute intuitions, and the 
extreme controversy surrounding the Exclusion Argument in general, I thought it 
worthwhile to try out a different – and I believe, in many ways novel – approach.  
 With these methodological assumptions in hand, I turn to the specific problems 
with (No Overdetermination) and (Closure) that will concern me in the papers.  
2.6. Overdetermination and Causal Competition 
The very idea of causal exclusion presupposes some way of generating a causal 
competition between mental and physical causes of events like bodily movements. 
Ultimately there can only be one sufficient cause. If exclusionists are right, the physical 
cause wins the contest, thus turning any irreducibly mental events into epiphenomena. 
The source of this competition is, of course, (No Overdetermination). I shall not be 
concerned with giving the principle a completely uncontroversial formulation, nor with 
providing a general answer to when (if ever) overdetermination may be acceptable. My 
question is rather this. Why should mental and physical events compete in the first place? 
Why cannot bodily movements have irreducibly mental causes in addition to their 
physical causes? Interestingly, the idea of such causal competition has drawn fire both 
from antireductive physicalists like Loewer (2002) and from antiphysicalists like Burge 
(1993). In a sense, both appear to endorse overdetermination. Their arguments are 
discussed in papers (#1) and (#2), respectively.  
 There are several interesting similarities between Burge’s and Loewer’s 
arguments. As we shall see, both think the idea of causal competition presupposes what is 
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sometimes called a “productive” view of mental causation, that is, roughly, the view that 
mental causes must literally do causal work to produce their effects. Both take this 
productive view to be a piece of objectionable metaphysics that fits ill with explanatory 
practice. Both, then, give explanatory practice primacy over metaphysical assumptions. 
And both use considerations of explanatory practice and the nature of causation to 
dismiss the threat of exclusion as a metaphysical fiction. In spite of this, in my view, 
praiseworthy methodology, I argue that Burge’s and Loewer’s arguments are 
inconclusive. I do so by questioning their interpretations of explanatory practice. Even 
though papers (#1) and (#2) were not primarily written with this aim in mind, they may 
when considered together be taken to support some model of supervenient causation as a 
solution to the exclusion problem. I sketch this possible consequence in the conclusions 
following the synopsis of the two papers. 
2.6.1. Synopsis of Paper (#1) 
Loewer contends that “Kim is thinking of causation as a relation in which the cause 
generates or produces the effect.” (2002, p. 658) He correctly points out that it is hard to 
see what Kim’s talk of productive causation amounts to, but nevertheless grants that 
overdetermination appears objectionable if causation is thought of in this way. However, 
he dismisses causation as production on the grounds that it: (a) is incompatible with 
modern physics, insofar as nothing short of a cross-section of an event’s past light cone 
will be sufficient to produce it. (b) Involves a commitment to “indigestible metaphysics” 
(2002, p. 661), insofar as productive causal relations would fail to supervene on the 
fundamental physical facts and laws of the world. Finally, he proposes an alternative, 
counterfactual theory of causation, which he thinks makes overdetermination innocuous.
 In this paper I offer an account of productive causation that is compatible with 
science, does not involve metaphysical commitments of the sort Loewer finds 
objectionable, but that nevertheless can be used to rule out at least some kinds of 
overdetermination. What, then, is productive causation? Metaphorically it is sometimes 
said that causes must be “biffy” or have a kind of “oomph” to them. Talk of causal 
“powers” and of causes doing “work” to produce their effects also looms large in the 
philosophy of mind. Presumably this kind of talk is part of what makes philosophers like 
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Loewer associate production with heavy-duty metaphysics and medieval notions of 
causation. Ted Sider, for instance, makes a nice parody of one production-like way of 
dismissing overdetermination:  
Causation is a kind of fluid divided among the potential causes of an effect. If one potential cause 
acts to produce an effect, that fluid is used up, and no other potential cause can act. (Sider, 2003, 
p. 721) 
 However, there might be another, more deflationist, way of interpreting the 
production-talk. A central assumption of cognitive linguistics is that the way people talk 
about a phenomenon like causation can reveal how they think about or construe that 
phenomenon. When Kim and others talk of causes in terms of work, powers or forces, it 
suggests that they also reason about causes as they reason about work, powers or forces. 
Given their way of conceptualizing causation, then, it is perhaps small wonder that they 
take the idea of more than one sufficient cause to be odd at best. For implicit in work-
talk, for instance, is the idea that acts of work “add up” to yield a product. Once that work 
is done, there is nothing left to do. Indeed, doing more work might yield a different 
product. If causes are analogous to acts of work, overdetermination appears almost 
incoherent. This interpretation, then, makes transparent at least one reason for thinking 
overdetermination is objectionable. 
 The big question is of course whether causation can legitimately be 
conceptualized in terms of work and the like, without committal to causation being work 
in any robust metaphysical sense. I think it can. That is, productive causation can be 
dissociated from heavy-duty metaphysics. The idea that causes “add up” like acts of work 
can be captured by ontologically innocent “productive constraints” or “principles of 
causal combination.” Such principles play important roles in causal reasoning, and can be 
given sober, even mathematical forms. I suggest a theory of causation be counted as 
productive if it puts such productive constraints on its causes.  
 I use this understanding of production to counter Loewer’s arguments. First, it is 
far from clear whether this notion of production involves any failure of supervenience. 
Second, I argue that so-called “empirical” theories of causation like the “transference 
theory” count as productive in the present sense. And yet these theories are designed to 
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be compatible with physics. Third, whatever the status of such empirical theories, 
productive causation is an important part of many mechanistic explanations. Such 
explanations are widespread in the special sciences, in particular in neuroscience. So even 
if physics turns out not to involve productive causation, an important part of modern 
science does. Put briefly, I think of mechanisms as assemblies of causal influences that 
combine to yield an effect in accordance with productive constraints. I illustrate this idea 
with examples of neural mechanisms and show how they can give rise to exclusion based 
reasoning. In a slogan; “mechanisms don’t overdetermine their effects.” 
 But this, of course, takes us right back to the Elisabeth-Descartes dispute. Why 
should mental causes be understood as mechanistic-cum-productive causes? Even though 
some physical causes are productive, mental causes may not be. For all I have said some 
model of supervenient causation where mental causes supervene on physical causes, that 
presumably do the producing, may still be viable. 
 It might therefore appear that this paper does not show much. Kim will insist that 
mental causes must be productive, and Loewer will deny this. Deadlock. But this 
description is misleading for two reasons. (1) Loewer’s arguments against production 
were entirely general. Mental causes are not productive because no causes are productive. 
But if I am right, there is nothing wrong with productive causation per se. The 
argumentative resources invoked by Loewer (considerations of physics and worries about 
the digestibility of metaphysics) therefore appear insufficient to answer the following, 
more specific question. Is there anything special about mental causes that require them to 
be productive? As we shall see in paper (#2), Burge suggests there is not. Accordingly, 
this “negative” result of paper (#1) points in the direction of what may be a fruitful 
approach to the question of productive mental causation. 
 (2) Then there are positive results. Various notions of productive causation have 
attracted interest in the philosophy of causation recently. My account of production as 
compatible with modern science is therefore interesting as a contribution to ongoing 
debates. Similarly, mechanisms are a hotly debated subject in contemporary philosophy 
of science and neuroscience. My discussions of causal combination in mechanisms 
therefore concerns the nature of a highly important scientific posit. Finally, Sider (2003) 
contends that there has been something of a paucity of convincing arguments for (No 
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Overdetermination) principles. In this respect, the idea of productive constraints provides 
at least one more explicit reason for finding some forms of overdetermination 
objectionable.  
2.6.2. Synopsis Paper (#2) 
As discussed above, Burge (1993) has little patience with physicalist worries about 
mental and downward causation. He takes these worries to arise because philosophers are 
misguided by physicalist metaphysics and fail to appreciate the essential role of 
explanatory practice in determining which events are causally efficacious. While Burge’s 
paper has been quoted often enough, I know of no systematic account of his reasons for 
dismissing these worries. This paper’s primary contribution is to offer such an account, 
by tracing the disagreement between Burge and physicalists to Burge’s own notion of 
causal powers. I describe how Burge uses his notion of causal powers to dismiss 
physicalist constraints on causal efficacy in psychology – e.g., the call for a mechanism 
in mental causation – on the grounds that it is unclear whether these constraints can be 
motivated from within psychological explanatory practice. Such constraints may, Burge 
seems to acknowledge, be appropriate in the physical sciences. But philosophers cannot 
take constraints from these sciences and apply them, at their own discretion, to the very 
different explanatory practice of intentional-psychology. Much like Descartes, Burge 
thinks than mental causation can and should be understood on its own without reference 
to physical causation. Problems for mental causation, then, must be raised from within 
psychological explanatory practice. This is important, because it shows that Burge may 
not be utterly insensitive to the “how”-“that” distinction in problems of mental causation. 
He is in fact, as I urged above, apparently skeptical about the motivation of at least some 
of the “how”-questions. 
 This paper covers a lot of material, and to the extent that I agree with Burge, it 
constitutes the methodological backbone of my thesis. In this introduction I limit my 
focus to the paper’s implications about (No Overdetermination), productive causation and 
mechanisms. Though he finds the description “overdetermination” misleading, Burge 
happily endorses the idea of bodily movements being the outcome of two “patterns of 
events” – one physiological and one mental. He finds the idea that these patterns would 
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exclude or compete with one another “perverse” (1993, p. 116). Like Loewer, Burge 
thinks the idea of exclusion depends on what I call a productive view, or on “thinking of 
mental causes on a physical model–as providing an extra ‘bump’ on the effect.” (1993, p. 
115) However, unlike Loewer, he does not object to the productive view per se, but 
contends that it is highly unclear whether a physical view of causation should apply to 
mental causes. We have seen that he is also skeptical about the demand for a mechanism 
in mental causation for the very same reason, that is, because demanding a mechanism  
[…] is tantamount to demanding a physical model for understanding such causation. It is far from 
obvious that such a model is appropriate. It is not even obvious why any model is needed. (Burge, 
1993, p. 114)  
The demand that mental causes be productive and the related call for a mechanism in 
mental causation are, then, both dismissed on the grounds that their motivation stems 
from practices that are external to psychology.  
 This brings us to my disagreement with Burge. Burge’s dismissal depends on his 
way of individuating the relevant explanatory practices, in particular on his treating 
psychology as highly independent of and autonomous in relation to neuroscience. He tells 
us that there is no causal competition, because psychology and physical sciences like 
neuroscience explain  
[…] the same physical effect [i.e., a bodily movement] as the outcome of two very different
patterns of events. The explanations of these patterns answer two very different types of enquiry. 
Neither type of explanation makes essential, specific assumptions about the other. (Burge, 1993, p. 
116, my italics) 
 Burge may be thinking primarily of folk-psychology – rather than academic or 
cognitive psychology – as the practice that describes the mental pattern of events leading 
up to bodily movements. If so, he may be right that the need for mechanisms and 
productive mental causation cannot be motivated from within (that kind of) psychology. 
Folk-psychology arguably takes an interest in describing bodily movements as behaviors,
or in bodily movements as the more or less rational outcome of a pattern of event 
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involving beliefs, desires, deliberations etc. But it does not appear to involve any 
commitment to production or mechanisms. What I want to urge, however, is that 
identifying which practices are relevant to understanding mental causation is itself an 
empirical question. Folk-psychology – or academic intentional psychology for that matter 
– need not be the only practice that can serve our explanatory interest in seeing bodily 
movements as behaviors.  
 We can appreciate this by considering what Burge’s “neural” pattern of events 
leading up to bodily movements may look like. I argue that various branches of 
neuroscience is characterized by (i) an explanatory interest in the productive mechanisms 
that lead up to bodily movements. Nevertheless, this interest is combined with (ii) an 
interest in seeing the movements as behaviors, for instance as controlled by 
representations and deliberations. By also taking an interest in mechanisms, neuroscience 
does not abandon its psychological or representational perspective any more than 
cognitive science in general does. Burge’s attempt to mutually insulate the explanatory 
aims of psychology and mechanistic neuroscience depends on his individuating these 
practices as strongly independent and autonomous. But this individuation fits ill with the 
nature of the neuroscientific enterprise. I support this claim by adopting something of a 
Burgean strategy. I sketch what kinds of causal explanation various branches of 
neuroscience appear to give of bodily movements. Furthermore, to emphasize the 
explanatory interest in mentality and rationality I also consider Patricia Goldman-Rakic’ 
theory of prefrontal cortex in some detail, as this is a region thought to be involved in 
many higher cognitive functions. This excursion into neuroscience also supports the 
claim that, pace Burge, some tight relation between mental and neural causes is needed to 
ensure mental causation.   
2.6.3. Conclusions 
Must mental causes be productive causes? Loewer and Burge both argue plausibly that 
(No Overdetermination) depends on this question being answered in the positive. But 
they both suggest that it should in fact be answered in the negative. I argue that Loewer’s 
general argument against production fails. There is productive causation in science. On 
the other hand, Burge’s specific argument that mental causes need not be productive 
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poses a stronger threat to the (No Overdetermination) and the Exclusion Argument. It is 
indeed hard to see what features of the mental should require mental causes themselves to 
be productive. However, Burge goes too far in dismissing the relevance of productive 
mechanisms to mental causation. Neuroscience combines an interest in mental causation 
with one in productive mechanisms.  The question “how do mental events cause physical 
events?” arises from considerations of neuroscience and requires an answer involving 
productive mechanisms for its answer. This motivates a “synthesis” of the productive 
view and its non-productive “anti-thesis.” Pace Loewer, there is nothing wrong with 
productive causation, pace Kim, mental causation is not productive. 
 Now, if there is little reason to believe that mental causes must be productive, but 
there is reason to believe that mental causation at the very least depends on productive 
neural mechanisms, some model of supervenient causation appears to recommend itself 
quite naturally. The idea that mental causes are only causally efficacious in virtue of 
underlying neural mechanisms might be the most plausible option available to 
antireductionists. But perhaps “supervenient causation” is nothing but a fancy word for 
epiphenomenalism? This, of course, is a worrisome question. But it appears to lose much 
of its force if Burge is right that not all causation must be productive causation. Part of 
the reason for thinking that supervenient causes are really epiphenomena is arguably the 
idea that the underlying physical causes do all the causal work in producing the effect. 
Accordingly, the problem is at least partly that supervenient causes are rendered non-
productive. But as we saw Burge’s position can potentially be used to argue that the call 
for productive mental causes is not well motivated. The intuition that mental causes must
be productive will perhaps remain, but it is not clear that productive mental causation is 
something that can be rationally wanted. If mental events are freed from the demand that 
they be productive, some counterfactual theories of causation like Loewer’s may be 
sufficient to ensure their causal, albeit non-productive, efficacy. 
 All in all, considerations of the production debate suggests that something like 
supervenient causation might be the best available antireductionist account of how mental 
causation is possible in a physical world. 
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2.7. Causal Closure and Physical Causes of Bodily Movements 
Judging from papers (#1) and (#2) it is far from clear that mental and physical causes 
compete, as demanded by (No Overdetermination). But there is also another premise of 
Exclusion Arguments with which one might take issue. Such arguments require not only 
the idea of causal competition, but also the presence of sufficient physical causes with 
which mental causes may compete. For exclusion to take place, it must be established 
that non-mental causes alone could bring about effects like bodily movements. Most 
Exclusion Arguments include some variety of (Closure) for this purpose. In one guise or 
another, (Closure) is widely accepted by physicalists. Much like (Impact), this principle 
is rarely questioned in debates about the Exclusion Argument. Indeed, (Closure) is often 
set forth without argument, or with brief arguments that do not appeal much to empirical 
evidence. For instance, Kim (1992) contends that unless (Closure) holds, the laws of 
physics will be violated, a consequence which he takes to be intolerable. However, as 
McLaughlin (1992) and David Papineau (2001) argue, such simple cases for (Closure) 
appear to fail. These authors also suggest that what they take to be convincing empirical 
evidence for the principle emerged only recently. (Closure), then, is presumably a deeply 
empirical truth, if a truth at all. My two papers on (Closure) underscore this message, 
which is in accordance with the overall aims of the present project, viz. to investigate the 
empirical plausibility of the Exclusion Argument.  
 In spite of widespread physicalist agreement about (Closure), the principle and its 
use in the Exclusion Argument may not be as unproblematic as it seems, however. First, 
the claim that (Closure) is empirically plausible has been questioned. (See, e.g., Hendry 
(2005); Sturgeon (1998)) Second, some authors, like Nancy Cartwright (1999), think of 
scientific theories as models with limited scope, and are skeptical to claims about in-
principle causal-explanatory completeness of theories. My papers will have a bearing on 
these problems, but my primary concern is with a third kind of problem raised by Lowe 
(2000) and Sturgeon (1998). They argue in different ways that (Closure) cannot figure in 
a sound Exclusion Argument, even if there is sufficient empirical evidence in favor of 
(Closure). Lowe and Sturgeon, then, question the use of (Closure) in Exclusion 
Arguments, so their arguments do not depend on actually dismissing (Closure). This 
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makes the arguments potentially very powerful. However, in papers (#3) and (#4), I show 
how the problems they raise can be bypassed.  
2.7.1. Synopsis Paper (#3) 
Lowe’s arguments (2000) are interesting in their own right, but also because they raise 
important metaphilosophical questions about the role of empirical evidence in the mental 
causation debate in general, and the debate between dualists and physicalists in particular. 
He considers various versions of (Closure) and argues that they are all compatible with 
outright dualist scenarios involving what I call “invisible mental causation.” The simplest 
scenario involves a physical effect, E, say, a bodily movement, which has a sufficient 
physical cause, P, in accordance with (Closure). However, P brings about E, at least in 
part, by causing an intermediate, but irreducibly mental event M which in turn helps
bring about the effect. This is not a case of overdetermination, as M is a necessary part of 
the causal processes leading from P to E. Importantly, Lowe contends that the causal 
contribution of the mental event would be invisible from the physical point of view. 
Accordingly, we would have the semblance of physical causal processes that account 
completely for physical effects, but the processes would in fact be partly and irreducibly 
mental. Hence, Exclusion Arguments would have no bite on invisible mental causes.  
 Lowe argues first that scenarios of invisible mental causation are possible, and 
second, that there are theoretical or metaphysical reasons for believing in their reality. 
Very interestingly, he contends that this kind of dualism cannot be dismissed on 
empirical grounds. I argue that he is wrong, and offer empirical reasons for dismissing 
invisible mental causes. 
 First, I argue that the mere possibility of invisible mental causation does not cut 
any philosophical ice. Neuroscientists enjoy an a posteriori entitlement to believing that 
effects like bodily movements can in normal circumstances be fully accounted for by 
causal processes that are neural through and through.  While the “normal circumstances” 
include many non-neurobiological factors, what we know about them does not suggest 
that they include invisible mental causes. So as far as the possibility argument is 
concerned, invisible mental causes can be dismissed inter alia on the grounds that their 
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postulation is ad hoc. (Notably, this dismissal does not depend on a general (Closure) 
principle of the physical domain, though it is compatible with such a principle.) 
 But the ad hoc postulation could be perfectly acceptable if there were theoretical 
reasons for believing in mental causation. Lowe actually suggests that there is an 
intriguing binding problem of behavior, analogous to the binding problem in perception 
studies. He suggests that this problem might require invisible mental causes for its 
solution. It is, unfortunately, a little hard to see what this binding problem consists in, but 
it suggests that neural processes leading up to voluntary bodily movements must 
somehow be “integrated” or “organized.” Briefly, Lowe worries that in the absence of 
invisible mental causation neural causes would render bodily movements “coincidental.” 
Lowe takes an effect to be coincidental if its “immediate causes are the ultimate effects of 
independent causal chains.” (Lowe, 2000, p. 579) He seems to imply that chains of neural 
causes leading up to bodily movements are somehow too chaotic and independent, and 
thus render bodily movements coincidental. Thus, he argues that the chains could be 
bound by invisible mental causes that link the otherwise independent causal chains. I 
accept this theoretical motivation for the sake of argument, though it is in my view not 
sufficiently developed to motivate invisible mental causation. 
 However, when Lowe says that invisible mental causation cannot be dismissed on 
empirical grounds he fails to appreciate that his argument depends on an empirical
premise: namely, that neural causal chains do in fact render bodily movements 
coincidental. Lowe does not really argue for this, but suggests that neural causation takes 
place in what he calls a “neural maze.” (Lowe, 2000, p. 581) This argumentative failure 
is doubly instructive. First, it shows that empirical evidence can in principle be used to 
answer what Lowe takes to be a purely philosophical question. There is nothing in 
Lowe’s definition of non-coincidental effects that suggests that they could not be brought 
about by neurophysiological causes. Second, Lowe would have to undertake more 
detailed investigations of neural causation than he actually does to argue for his claim. So 
Lowe’s argument is inconclusive, even if we accept his theoretical motivation for 
invisible mental causation. This is the main conclusion of the paper. 
 Finally, and somewhat more speculatively, I offer reasons for thinking that 
Lowe’s empirical assumption may be false. I suggest that Lowe’s characterization of 
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neural causation involves a serious, but characteristic, misinterpretation of the 
neuroscientific enterprise. Thus it is far from clear that neural causes render bodily 
movements coincidental in Lowe’s technical sense. A variety of experimental techniques 
have allowed neuroscientists to discover considerable structure in the nervous system, 
and to reveal how bodily movements are the outcome of a carefully orchestrated interplay 
between neural subsystems. Neural causes, then, do not necessarily appear to render 
bodily movements coincidental. At the very least, given my arguments Lowe needs to 
make more explicit the job he pictures for invisible mental causes, and argue that neural 
causes are disqualified for that job. That, presumably, will only be possible by 
considering neuroscience in more detail. 
2.7.2. Synopsis Paper (#4) 
Sturgeon’s (1998) aim is to show that the Exclusion Argument is not supported by 
current scientific knowledge. His line of attack is to consider what the physical domain 
referred to in (Closure) and (Impact) – i.e., the premise stating that mental events have 
physical effects – is. He suggests that “the physical” could mean the broadly physical 
domain consisting of macroevents like cars colliding and arms moving. Or it could mean 
the narrowly physical or microphysical domain, which he equates with the domain of 
quantum mechanics. First, Sturgeon argues that the Exclusion Argument equivocates 
between these senses of the physical. He thinks that (Closure) is plausible, if at all, only 
for the quantum mechanical domain. On the other hand, he takes it that (Impact) is 
plausible only for the broadly physical domain, since the claim that mental events cause 
quantum mechanical events is not part of explanatory practice. Hence, the only plausible 
(Closure) and (Impact) premises involve different readings of the physical, making the 
Exclusion Argument invalid. Second, Sturgeon uses various interpretations of the so-
called “measurement problem” in quantum mechanics to argue that (Closure) may fail 
even for the quantum mechanical domain. So there may be no (Closure) principle to be 
used in the Exclusion Argument. 
 Sturgeon considers ways of amending this equivocation problem under the 
assumption that physical events are composed of – i.e., have as their parts – quantum 
mechanical events. Consider, for instance, a bodily movement which is composed of 
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narrowly physical events. If (Closure) holds for the narrowly physical domain these 
events would have sufficient narrowly physical causes. In addition, it might seem that if 
you cause the parts constituting an event, you eo ipso cause that event. But then, narrowly 
physical causes would also be sufficient causes of the bodily movements. If so, bodily 
movements would have sufficient (narrowly) physical causes with which mental causes 
could compete, after all. 
 Sturgeon, however, denies that causal influence can flow from the micro to the 
macro so easily. He does so by arguing for a (Cause & Essence) principle, according to 
which to cause an event is to bring about the essence of that event. Furthermore, he 
appeals to special features of quantum mechanical reality like “superposition” and 
“projection” to argue that it is far from clear that quantum mechanical events are essential 
to broadly physical events. We cannot tell whether they are, he contends, because there is 
a huge conceptual gap between the quantum mechanical and the broadly physical. But if 
the quantum mechanical is not essential to the broadly physical, then, according to the 
(Cause & Essence) principle, causes of quantum mechanical events are not causes of 
broadly physical events. So, once again, there would be no sufficient physical causes with 
which mental causes might compete. 
 Sturgeon’s challenge is interesting for several reasons. It raises important 
questions about which, if any, physical domain is closed. As it turns out, some 
physicalists do appeal to a (Closure) principle for the broadly physical domain, whereas 
others appeal to the narrowly physical. The confusing variety of (Closure) principles at 
play in the literature will have to be sorted out by considering the empirical plausibility of 
(Closure) for various physical domains. Second, Sturgeon illustrates that formulating the 
Exclusion Argument in terms of physics can lead to difficult metaphysical questions 
about part-whole relations and causation, as well as equally difficult questions from the 
philosophy of physics. These problems are interesting and may be resolvable. But 
Sturgeon is surely right to argue that microphysical causation is conceptually remote 
from mental causation. This motivates a shift of attention to a physical domain that bears 
a closer relation to mental causation. I therefore show how Sturgeon’s challenge can be 
bypassed by formulating exclusion in terms of neuroscience rather than physics properly 
speaking. 
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 This may appear ill-advised. The neurobiological domain is rather obviously not
closed in the absolute sense of (Closure). It suffers causal input from the outside in 
phenomena like perception, and, furthermore, neural causation depends on a variety of 
non-neurobiological background conditions. However, the Exclusion Argument does not, 
as Sturgeon and many others appear to be implicitly assuming, depend on a general 
(Closure) principle, which provides us with absolutely sufficient causes from any 
particular physical domain. Rather than appeal to (Closure) principles of this sort, I 
expand on the idea I invoked against Lowe, and argue for a neurobiological “(quasi-
Closure).” Setting aside causal input to the organism, and letting circumstances be 
“normal” for neural causation, neural events have neural causes that are sufficient in the 
circumstances. Given the additional assumption that there are no irreducibly mental 
factors lurking in a minimal characterization of the “normal” circumstances, this principle 
is apt for figuring in the Neural Exclusion Argument I formulate.  
 This may sound trivial, but it is not. That is, the argument is not an off-hand 
appeal to in-principle neural explanations of bodily movements, because its plausibility 
derives from actual and detailed models of neural causation. These provide us with a 
good, and partly quantitative, theoretical grasp of: (i) the “connectionist” structure within 
which neural causation is situated, (ii) what kinds of events are causally relevant within 
that structure and (iii) the cellular/molecular mechanisms through which such causes 
must work. The theoretical picture provides us with a good model of neural causation at 
the cellular/molecular level in general, and of bodily movements in particular. Many 
background conditions are needed for the picture to do its explanatory work, of course. 
And as is always the case in the special sciences, these conditions are not fully 
specifiable.  Furthermore, they are of a theoretically quite heterogeneous nature. Hence, 
the appeal to (quasi-Closure) does not depend on the idea of a particular, privileged 
theory being causally complete or closed. Nevertheless, I argue that the success of the 
theoretical picture, and what we do know about the background conditions, entitles us to 
believe that no irreducibly mental causes figure in the background conditions. 
 However, that irreducibly mental causes are not needed has not always been clear. 
We have not always had good neural models of neural causation. Until quite recently, the 
theoretical picture of neural causation was rather crude and detailed knowledge of the 
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relevant causes and mechanisms were absent. Indeed, early versions of the picture 
included things like irreducibly mental or vital forces as putative causes. To show that the 
present picture is something of a historical contingency I adopt a historical perspective. I 
sketch how evidence for something like “quasi-Closure” emerged gradually along with 
the acceptance of central theoretical assumptions like Ramón y Cajal’s “Neuron 
Doctrine” and discoveries about the nature of neural signaling. I tentatively suggest that 
these discoveries can, in retrospect, at least, be viewed as the gradual causal exclusion of 
putatively necessary vital or mental causes of neural events.  
 The idea that we can appeal to neural causes in an Exclusion Argument is 
therefore not trivial or obvious. But perhaps it amounts to explanatory hubris? It would 
be naïve to assume that the theoretical picture of neural causation may not be 
revolutionized in certain ways, and indeed I mention ways in which it may currently be 
changing. However, some theoretical doors do shut as science moves forward, and I 
argue that forthcoming changes to the picture are not likely to include the reentry of 
irreducibly mental or vital causes. 
 Anyway, if sound, my argument shows that the problems Sturgeon raises can be 
bypassed. (1) Whatever the status of general (Closure) principles for the broadly or the 
narrowly physical domain, exclusionists can use neuroscience to point to causes with 
which mental causes will – provided (No Overdetermination) is also accepted – compete. 
(2) Sturgeon’s considerations of part-whole relations and the (Cause & Essence) principle 
have no bite on the Neural Exclusion Argument. For neural events cause contractions of 
muscle fibers and – perhaps unlike quantum mechanical events – such contractions 
compose into bodily movements in a well-understood way. There is no problem with 
saying that a minimal number of fiber contractions are essential to a bodily movement. 
Finally, (3) my argument has the advantage of appealing to detailed and extant scientific 
models. Thus it avoids worries about in-principle explanations harbored by philosophers 
of science like Cartwright (1999). 
2.7.3. Conclusions 
I think the conclusions with respect to (Closure) are more clear-cut than those involving 
(No Overdetermination). In accordance with the basic aims of the thesis I have 
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emphasized the deeply empirical nature of (Closure) principles. I have argued that the 
problems raised by Lowe and Sturgeon can be addressed empirically. In particular, by 
appealing to neuroscience rather than physics, I have argued that a Neural Exclusion 
Argument can avoid these problems. This argument does not depend on a general 
(Closure) principle, as most Exclusion Arguments do. While the idea of formulating 
exclusion without (Closure) and with reference to neural causes is not entirely novel – 
see, e.g., Kim (2005, ch. 6)23 – it has received relatively little attention. My attempt to 
work out the details of such an argument and present what evidence there is for it should 
therefore be of value to the exclusion debate. Whatever problems there are with 
Exclusion Arguments, they do not appear to involve our inability to come up with 
physical causes with which mental causes may compete. This, of course, is what most 
physicalists think anyway, but notably, sound reasons for thinking so are far more 
empirical in nature than one might have expected, given the above-mentioned, relatively 
simple arguments for the principle.  
2.8. Concluding Remarks on the Prospects of Exclusion Arguments 
The four papers constituting this thesis all concern, among other things, Exclusion 
Arguments. I will not pretend to have settled the status of such arguments once and for 
all. But I think their prospects are rather bleak. What I have called the Simple Argument 
promises an easy route from just three premises to mind-body reductionism. It solves the 
mind-body problem with a pen stroke. The Disjunctive Argument would provide an 
equally convenient and simple motivation for mind-body reductionism, as the alternative 
of epiphenomenalism is almost too horrible to be contemplated. A central contention of 
this thesis is that this appearance of simplicity is misleading. There is neither a simple 
exclusion-based route to reductionism nor to its motivation.
 This will hardly surprise anyone who has followed the exclusion debate, for 
judging from that debate the exclusionist’s path appears to be cluttered with metaphysical 
23 Note that this argument of Kim’s differs from the version of the Exclusion Argument in which he starts 
from supervenience, rather than (Closure). In the latter argument, mentioned in a footnote above, (Closure) 
arguably plays an important role, in the former it does not. 
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obstacles. But the apparent simplicity I have in mind is of a different kind. As I urged 
earlier, the arguments would also be convenient because their premises seem to be 
assessable without much explicit consideration of explanatory practice and empirical 
evidence. It is this appearance of simplicity that I hope to have shown to be misleading. 
The plausibility of (Closure) and (No Overdetermination) does in fact hinge crucially on 
features of explanatory practice and empirical evidence. In this respect I have urged that
a focus on neuroscience in connection with Exclusion Arguments is both natural and 
fruitful.
With respect to (Closure), the problems seem avoidable. One way of avoiding 
them is to appeal to neuroscience. This is possible because Exclusion Arguments do not 
depend on a general (Closure) principle. Focusing on neuroscience has the further 
advantage of relating causal exclusion to current scientific attempts at understanding the 
mind’s place in nature.
 With respect to (No Overdetermination) the situation is less clear-cut. We have 
little reason to believe that mental causes must be productive as that premise arguably 
requires. The idea that mental and physical causes compete does indeed appear to be 
deeply problematic. Furthermore, considerations of productive causation may be taken to 
lend support to supervenient causation as a viable antireductionist response to Exclusion 
Arguments. But importantly, that is not to say that productive causation and the idea of 
causal exclusion are inherently problematic. I have argued that we do find productive 
causation in neuroscientific mechanisms, and that the demise of vital and mental causes 
in the theory of neural signaling may perhaps be viewed as a case of causal exclusion in 
scientific practice.
 Finally, the thesis tells us something metaphilosophically interesting about the 
nature of problems of downward causation and epiphenomenalism. Practically everybody 
will take for granted that mental causation takes place. Some of us are interested in 
finding out “how.” Burgean “that” answers are of no interest to us. Nevertheless, there is 
a lesson to be learnt from Burge. We should take care to formulate our “how”-questions 
so that they are well motivated given explanatory practice.
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3. Paper (#1): Mechanisms Do Not Overdetermine 
Their Effects 
ABSTRACT: The upshot of Jaegwon Kim’s Exclusion Argument is that antireductionism about 
the mental leads to epiphenomenalism about the mental. Roughly, since physical events like 
bodily movements must have physical causes, and physical events are not causally 
overdetermined, there is no room for additional, non-reducible mental causes. In response, Barry 
Loewer has claimed that a “productive” view of causation is required to rule out 
overdetermination and that such causation is both metaphysically objectionable and incompatible 
with modern science. I show that Loewer’s arguments are inconclusive. Furthermore, I offer an 
account of productive causation which only commits us to ontologically innocent “principles of 
causal combination.” Productive causation in this sense is invoked in mechanistic explanations 
which are of central importance in modern science, especially in neuroscience. However, it is still 
an open question whether mental causation must be productive or whether some antireductionist 
model of supervenient causation is viable.   
Force is the causal principle of motion and rest  
– Isaac Newton24
3.1. Introduction  
If sound, Jaegwon Kim’s Exclusion Argument should strongly motivate the philosophy 
of mind community to join forces with scientists in an attempt to reduce the mental. For 
Kim’s take-home message is stark indeed. Antireductionism entails epiphenomenalism. 
Either mental events do not cause anything – which is to say that they are not very real at 
all – or they are identical with physical events, which some may find equally disturbing. 
The following is a condensed version of Kim’s argument (see, e.g., his (1998) or (2005) 
for details): 
24 Newton (1962, p. 148), quoted in Creary (1981, p. 156n1) 
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(E1) Causal Closure: Any physical event E that has a sufficient cause occurring at 
t has a sufficient physical cause P occurring at t 
(E2) Antireductionism: Mental events are not identical with physical events 
(E3) No Overdetermination: If a physical event E has a sufficient cause P 
occurring at t, then it has no other distinct causes occurring at t 
(C) Epiphenomenalism: Mental events do not cause physical events 
Physicalism on the one hand, and intentional-psychological practices on the other, 
compel us to postulate physical25  and mental causes of bodily movements, respectively. 
But (E3) generates a competition between these causes, and, alas, it only allows for one 
winner. (E1) guarantees the presence of a physical cause, and (E2) rules out identifying a 
possible mental cause with this cause. Hence, the physical cause wins the contest, turning 
mental events into epiphenomena; which is well nigh intolerable.26
 The precise formulation and justification of these premises has been debated 
extensively in the literature. Here I focus on the No Overdetermination Principle, or the 
Exclusion Principle as it is sometimes called. My concern is not with the possibility of a 
completely uncontroversial formulation, nor with providing conditions that determine 
when (if ever) overdetermination is acceptable.27 I will for the most part set these general 
25 Unless otherwise specified the physical domain should presently be understood widely as encompassing 
the biological domain. 
26 Kim (1998, p. 42; 2005, p. 40) thinks that antireductionism rules out even mental-to-mental causation 
(e.g. in cognitive-cum-causal processes), because that kind of causation allegedly presupposes mental-to-
physical causation. Anyway, as is often remarked, the weaker conclusion that mental events cannot cause 
physical events would be devastating enough for antireductionism. 
27 A variety of nonequivalent formulations of such principles exist, cp. Kim (1989); Lowe (2003); Menzies 
(2003). Sometimes what counts as overdetermination or objectionable overdetermination is left more or 
less implicit. (Sturgeon (1998); Papineau (2001)) My (E3) is consonant with one of Kim’s recent 
formulations (2005, p. 17). But see Kim (2005, p. 42) for a different formulation. There is no consensus 
about the conditions under which overdetermination is objectionable, see Bennett (2003) for discussion and 
a suggested test. Sometimes overdetermination is considered from a more metaphysical angle. Does, for 
example, a baseball and its parts objectionably overdetermine the breaking of a window? (Sider, 2003) I do 
not know whether such cases amount to overdetermination, or whether such overdetermination might be 
[Footnote continued on next page]
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and abstract questions aside, and rely instead on more concrete considerations of actual 
causal explanations, in assessing overdetermination.  My worry about principles like (E3) 
is rather this. Why should mental and physical events compete for the status of being 
causes of bodily movements? To be sure, proposed causes sometimes do compete. That 
happens, for instance, when the explanatory success of invoking one kind of cause, 
threatens to make the other kind of cause disreputable. Thus, the bacterial (or more 
recently; the viral) causes proposed to explain the Black Plague competes with, and 
ultimately excludes, God the punisher, who was once supposed to have brought the 
pandemic down upon the sinners of the time. The example is not meant to lessen religion. 
The point is simply that medicine has driven the explanatory practice which invoked God 
as a direct cause of diseases out of business. But God contrasts sharply with mental and 
physical events, both of which are explanatorily potent vis-à-vis bodily movements, and 
firmly engrained in healthy and successful explanatory practices. Neither of them will be 
excluded easily. As Burge (1989; 1993) has persuasively argued, if you want to know 
which events or properties are causally efficacious, your best guide is going to be which 
events or properties figure in healthy explanatory practices. For reasons like these people 
have found the idea that mental and physical causes compete misguided, or even, as 
Burge puts it, “perverse” (1993, p. 116). Summing up, it might seem like Kim’s 
insistence with (E3) that we ultimately only get to keep one cause is over-restrictive. 
Accordingly, antireductionists might find it natural to respond by dismissing the culprit, 
i.e., the instigator behind the competition – (E3). Here is a generic way in which they 
might do just that: (R1) Overdetermination is only problematic under a “productive” view 
of causation, where causes literally do causal work to bring about their effects. (R2) But 
mental causes are not productive causes, hence overdetermining mental causes are, 
contrary to (E3), unproblematic. (C) Hence, the Exclusion Argument fails.   
 Interestingly, this line of reasoning has been pressed in different ways by Tyler 
Burge (1993), who is an avid antiphysicalist, and Barry Loewer (2001b; 2002 and 
forthcoming), who is an equally avid, but antireductive, physicalist. Burge’s argument for 
acceptable. But even if it is acceptable, arguments are needed to show that mental causes can 
overdetermine their effects in this way. 
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(R2) is roughly that mental causation should not be construed along the lines of physical 
production, hence mental causes are not productive. (See, e.g., Burge, 1993, p. 115) 
Loewer on the other hand argues quite generally that: (1) the productive view is 
incompatible with modern physics. (2) Its metaphysics are objectionable, because 
productive causal relations might fail to supervene on basic physical facts. In contrast, he 
takes overdetermination to be innocuous given a counterfactual theory of causation. Now, 
I think Loewer misconstrues the situation and that we need to divorce productive 
causation from theories of causation with major metaphysical commitments to non-
supervenient causal relations and the like. When properly understood such causation only 
commits us to ontologically innocent principles of “causal combination” that constrain 
how causes add up to yield their effects. Given this understanding Loewer’s arguments 
are inconclusive. Furthermore, we need productive causation in causal mechanisms. 
Since such mechanisms are important parts of the special sciences – neuroscience will be 
our case in point – a significant portion of modern science does presuppose productive 
causation. Pace Loewer, productive causation per se is not a problem. However, the 
question posed by Burge – why should mental causes be productive? – still remains. 
3.2. Loewer’s Case against Production  
Loewer claims that causes must somehow “generate” or “produce” their effects if 
overdetermination is to be ruled out: 
Kim is thinking of causation as a relation in which the cause generates or produces the effect. I am 
not sure what these metaphors come to, but they suggest that in some way, E [i.e., the effect] 
grows out of C [i.e., the cause]. In any case, if we think of causation in this way then each of the 
reasons that Kim gives against overdetermination appears more convincing. (Loewer, 2001b, p. 
320)  
Whatever the meaning of the productive metaphors, Kim used to think that causal 
exclusion did not depend on heavy-duty assumptions about causation (1989; 1998, p. 67), 
but recently he seems to rest more of his case against overdetermination on a productive 
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view. (2002a; 2005, p. 17-18, p. 38n6 and forthcoming) Loewer appears to offer two 
arguments28 against this view, the first of which I dub the “Argument from Science.” He 
tells us that “causation as production fits ill with contemporary physics.” (Loewer, 2002, 
p. 661) Now there certainly are many problems with causation in physics, see Field 
(2003) for a review. Loewer first appeals to Russell’s claim that causal concepts are not 
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental laws of physics. (Loewer 2002, p. 612; Russell 
1912) So presumably we do not need causal notions to do physics. Second, he argues that 
fundamental laws like the Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics, (Loewer, 2001b, 
p. 323; 2002, p. 661), relate the total state of a system at one time to the total state at a 
later time. Accordingly, nothing short of the total state at some earlier time will be 
sufficient to produce an effect.29 He presumably takes this to be a specific problem with 
the productive view, since that view allegedly cannot pick out parts of states as causes. In 
contrast, counterfactual theories of causation are supposed to fare better, because they can 
single out the events that “make a difference to E’s [i.e. the effect’s] occurrence.” 
(Loewer, 2002, p. 661)  
 Loewer’s second argument, which I call the “Metaphysical Argument,” is based 
on worries of a broadly Lewisean kind. He worries that productive causal relations might 
fail to supervene on the fundamental physical facts. That is, two worlds could be 
physically indiscernible and yet differ in what produces what. (Loewer, 2002, p. 661) The 
failure of supervenience would indeed be an extra burden for the productive view, 
perhaps it would even amount to what Loewer calls “indigestible metaphysics” (2002, p. 
661). But it is hard to see why proponents of the productive view must be saddled with 
this burden. Rather than argue for this, Loewer refers to Michael Tooley’s theory as an 
28 I am not sure whether he takes the arguments to be independent. 
29 According to Loewer it would be more accurate to say that nothing short of a cross-section of an event’s 
past light cone will be sufficient to produce it. (Loewer, 2002, p. 661n12) Events outside an event’s past 
light cone are after all supposed to be incapable of affecting the event causally, because causal influence 
allegedly cannot travel faster than the speed of light. (Whether this claim about causal influence is 
compatible with instantaneous causation, and hence with L.G. Creary’s (1981) causal interpretation of 
Newton’s second law – see below – is another matter.)  
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example of a productive theory where supervenience fails. (Loewer, 2002, p. 661n13) 
The real argument, then, is presumably to be found in the examples of remote possible 
worlds that Tooley (1990) takes to violate supervenience. Tooley uses these examples to 
motivate a kind of non-supervenient necessitation relations. But while his view may be a
productive view, it is, as we shall see, not clear that all productive views are committed 
to the failure of supervenience. 
 To replace the productive view Loewer proposes a revised version of David 
Lewis’ (1986) counterfactual theory of causation, which he thinks makes 
overdetermination “innocuous” (Loewer, 2002, p. 661). Prima facie this may seem right: 
Why should a “physical” counterfactual dependency P Ƒĺ E rule out a “mental” 
dependency M Ƒĺ E? Would not Kim’s problem vanish if only he revised his theory 
of causation? But things may not be quite that simple. In addition to their familiar 
problems with preemption etc.30 it is not clear that counterfactual theories are compatible 
with symmetrical overdetermination,31 nor with causal closure.32  However, these may be 
largely technical problems, and I shall set them aside to consider issues I take to be more 
pressing. 
3.3. Characterizing the Productive View  
I think Loewer’s arguments against the productive view are inconclusive and that we 
need productive causation to do science. Showing this requires me to get clearer about 
the elusive notion of production, however. It is sometimes said that productive causation 
is an “intrinsic” relation, or informally that causes must have “oomph” or be “biffy” (See 
Hall (2004) on production; Lewis (2004) on “biff.”) Kim distinguishes between 
30 Such problems are discussed in, e.g., Collins et al. (2004a). 
31 A standard case of symmetrical overdetermination is that of two soldiers firing their weapons at the 
victim at the same time where each of the bullets alone would suffice to kill the victim. In this case a 
counterfactual theory might imply that neither of the soldiers’ shots causes the death, because the death 
does not depend counterfactually on either of them. (See, e.g., Collins et al. 2004b, pp. 32-33) 
32 Kim (1998, p. 45; 2005, pp. 46-50) argues that overdetermination would violate causal closure in at least 
some possible worlds. 
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“productive and generative causal processes” and “noncausal regularities” that are 
“parasitic on real causal processes.” (Kim, 1998, p. 45)   But apart from a brief reference 
to Salmon’s (1984) process theory, Kim (1998, p. 45, p. 45n28) offers no account of what 
the distinction amounts to. Talk of causal work and causal powers also looms large in the 
debate. Here is Kim again: “Given that [the physical event] p has a physical cause p*,
what causal work is left for [the mental event] m to contribute? The physical cause 
therefore threatens to exclude, and preempt, the mental cause.” (Kim, 1998, p. 37) In a 
similar vein, Jackson contends that dispositions are not causes, because “there is no 
causing left to be done by the relevant dispositional properties” (1996, p. 394) that has 
not already been done by the dispositions’ categorical bases. Prima facie, this kind of talk 
does appear to involve major metaphysical commitments that are apparently absent in 
Loewer’s own counterfactual theory of causation. It is therefore easy to see why Loewer 
associates production with “indigestible metaphysics.” 
 But there is a better way of understanding production. In general, the way people 
conceptualize or talk about a domain like causation can reveal how they reason or think 
about that domain. (Lee, 2001) When Kim and Jackson talk about causes as forces, as 
powers, or in terms of work, they also reason about causes as they reason about forces or 
work.  There is, as it were, a transfer of ways of reasoning from one cognitive domain 
(that of forces/work) to another (that of causes). (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, ch. 11) This 
explains why overdetermination does – as Loewer (2001b, p. 320 and forthcoming) 
apparently acknowledges – seem objectionable when causation is construed as 
production. For in the domain of forces or work, talk of there-being-no-work-left-to-do 
has a legitimate application. As an initial, trivial and everyday illustration, imagine that 
you are a factory owner, paying workers to the extent to which they contribute to the 
daily production. If the claims made by your workers at the end of the day add up to more 
than the measured production, you will engage in exclusion-style reasoning and look for 
the wretched proletarian whose alleged toil is fictitious or “epiphenomenal.” A second 
example involves forces in Newton’s second law, F=ma. For any object x, and time t, 
the vector sum of all forces F1, F2,…, Fi acting on x at t equals the product of x’s mass, 
m, and acceleration, a at t. This law, then, constrains how the forces combine to yield 
accelerations. The Fi’s must add up to a specific sum to yield any particular acceleration 
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of x, lest we get a different measurable a. If we add more forces we must take care not to 
thereby change the net force F.33
 This illustrates how forces and acts of work are subject to principles that constrain 
how they add up to yield their results. I call such principles “productive constraints” or 
“principles of causal combination.” These are strikingly similar to No Overdetermination 
Principles. Given a particular measure of acceleration or a particular effect there are non-
trivial limits on what forces or acts of work we can postulate to explain that acceleration 
or effect. Kim’s exclusion-based reasoning consists in applying analogous constraints to 
mental causation. It is almost as if Kim “measured” the effect – a bodily movement – and 
found that given its known or hypothesized neural causes, adding an additional mental 
cause would yield an effect different from the one he measured. Not only are irreducibly 
mental causes not needed, they would distort the effect. This should be compared to 
another, and spatial, metaphor sometimes used to describe exclusion. There just is no 
“room” for such causes. Interestingly, neuroscientist Eric Kandel implicitly portrays the 
history of theorizing about neural signaling from Luigi Galvani to Alan Hodgkin and 
Andrew Huxley as involving the gradual exclusion of vitalistic causes in favor of 
physical causes. He concludes using just these metaphors. “There was [eventually] no 
need or room for ‘vital’ forces or other phenomena that could not be explained in terms 
of physics and chemistry.” (2006, p. 83, my italics) There being “no room left” is in fact 
crucial to distinguish productive causation from joint causation. Practically any theory 
will want to allow for joint causation where several causes combine to yield a sufficient 
cause. But a productive theory will rule out adding overdetermining causes to this set of 
causes, even if we were so inclined for theoretical reasons.34
33 Obviously, this law should not be read as excluding earlier causes of the acceleration, i.e., forces that are 
exercised at earlier times. A similar lesson applies to other productive constraints. In fact Kim (1989) 
incorporates this in his Exclusion Principle, according to which only complete and independent causes 
compete. In causal chains later causes depend causally on earlier causes, so there is no competition. 
34 For instance, John L. Mackie’s (1993) account of causes as “INUS conditions” allows for joint causation 
without being productive. If A, B, and C all occur and are insufficient (but necessary) parts of a sufficient 
(but unnecessary) condition for E, they jointly cause E. Suppose, however, that C correlates with D, as 
neural events may correlate with mental events. Then D is also an INUS condition for – and hence; a cause 
[Footnote continued on next page]
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If one thinks of mental causation in this productive manner, then, causal exclusion is a 
natural consequence. The big question is of course whether applying productive 
constraints like those from the force/work domains to mental causation is legitimate.
Setting the big question aside until the final section, I think principles of causal 
combination are important in many areas of scientific causal reasoning. Knowledge of 
what causes are at play in a given context is important, but must often be supplemented 
with knowledge of how the causes act together, whether they oppose each other and so 
on. L.G. Creary’s (1981) distinction between “laws of causal influence” and “laws of 
causal action,” (my “principles of causal combination”) illustrates this. In mechanics 
Creary’s laws of causal influence become force laws like that of Coulomb or Hook, 
which determine the causal influences from charged objects and springs respectively. But 
in typical mechanical problems objects are influenced by several forces. That is why we 
need a law of causal action like Newton’s second law to relate these influences to 
resulting accelerations. As we shall see similar causal principles (whether they are “laws” 
or not) are needed in mechanisms more generally. I therefore suggest that a theory of 
causation counts as productive if it includes principles of causal combination that 
constrain how causes add up to yield their effects.35 This has three virtues. First, it fits 
well with the way Kim and others think and talk about causation. Second, it explains why 
exclusion-type reasoning seems natural to them. Third, it dissociates productive causation 
from major ontological commitments. Productive constraints are simply rules of causal 
combination that can take sober, even mathematical forms. That such constraints apply to 
causation is at least prima facie compatible with a deflationist reading of talk of causal 
work, causal powers and the like. That some productive theories may ground the 
of – E. Under a productive theory, on the other hand, D – the mental event – could be ruled out because its 
addition would yield a different effect E 
35 Clearly, not all principles governing how quantities add up are causal principles. For instance, the mass 
of two objects equals the sum of their individual masses, and yet this is not a matter of causation.  I have no 
general way of distinguishing causal from non-causal combination to offer. However, my arguments below 
will only depend on principles we are antecedently inclined to label “causal.” 
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productive constraints in, e.g., non-supervenient necessitation relations is no argument 
against productive constraints as such.36
3.4. First Response to Loewer: Empirical Theories of Causation  
With this understanding in hand I turn to Loewer’s arguments. The first thing to note is 
that a number of “empirical” theories of causation threaten to undermine Loewer’s 
Argument from Science. These projects set conceptual analysis of causation aside and 
investigate the physical nature of causation in our possible world. Here are some rough 
outlines: (1) Transference theories: causation is the transference of some quantity like 
kinetic energy or momentum from the cause-object to the effect-object. (Aronson, 1971; 
Fair, 1979; Kistler, 1998) (2) Process theories: cause and effect are linked by spatio-
temporal causal processes, where a process is causal if and only if it is capable of 
transmitting changes to its structure that arise from a single interaction. (Salmon, 1984) 
(3) Conserved Quantity theories: a causal process is a world line of an object that 
persistently possesses (or perhaps transmits) a conserved quantity like charge. (Dowe, 
2000; Salmon, 1994) We have already seen Kim’s appeal to Wesley Salmon’s theory, 
and recently he has also expressed sympathy with the transference theory, which will be 
my focus here: “[…] it might be that efficacious/productive causality is ‘implemented’ or 
‘realized’, in this and nomologically similar worlds, by the flow or transfer of a certain 
physical quantity.” (Kim, 2002a, p. 677, see also 2005, p. 47n12 and forthcoming) As a 
response to Loewer this is perfectly to the point. While there are all sorts of problems 
36 Two analogue cases come to mind: First, it is a nice question in the philosophy of physics whether we 
should reify forces as ontological entities, or treat them merely as handy middle terms mediating between 
ontologically “innocent” claims about charges, positions etc. and claims about accelerations. (Jammer, 
1957, ch. 11-12) But whatever we decide, worries about reifying forces obviously do not rule out that 
force-laws may legitimately be applied. Second, Ayer (1954) contended that the alleged conflict between 
freedom and determinism depends on a naïve animistic and anti-Humean conception of causation. (Note 
the similarity with Loewer’s criticism of exclusion.) But then van Inwagen (1975) raised a problem for 
freedom using a formulation of determinism that did not invoke any conception of causation. These cases 
illustrate that sometimes philosophical problems can be raised independently of whether our principles or 
constraints are grounded in heavy-duty metaphysical notions. 
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with the transference theory, it is at least a theory that is (a) productive and (b) designed
to be compatible with science.  
 Take (a) and its productivity first. Kim actually says that overdetermination 
“makes little sense” (2005, p. 47n12) when causation is understood in this way. A 
classical example from mechanics brings out why he is right. Train carriage A collides 
with carriage B, which is of equal mass, but at rest. In the collision the carriages connect 
and move on as one. According to the transference theory A causes B to move by
transferring some of its momentum to B. The explanation of B’s acceleration appeals to 
the conservation of linear momentum for the system:  mAvA, before + mBvB before = mAvA, after
+ mBvB after. Accordingly, A’s velocity is reduced by a half.  vB, after = vA, after = 0.5vA, before.
Again, we have causal influences (momenta) combining to yield an effect. The principle 
of combination is the conservation of momentum, which puts clear limits on what causes 
– notably only causes qua momentum-instantiating objects – we can add to explain a 
given acceleration. It is no accident, then, that there is a tradition dating back to Leibniz 
that appeals to conservation laws to rule out mind-body interactionism. (McLaughlin, 
1993; Papineau, 2001) So at least under Max Kistler’s (1998) assumption that the 
quantities transferred must be conserved quantities, the transference theory counts as 
productive. 
 What about (b)? Are empirical theories like the transference theory incompatible 
with modern physics? Though this question is perhaps best left for philosophers of 
physics like Loewer, I want to make two points about it. First, the theories are based on, 
and designed, to be compatible with physics. So at the very least they pose a challenge 
that Loewer must face. Second, I suspect that Loewer is conflating “sufficient to produce 
an effect” with “nomologically sufficient for an effect” when he says that nothing short of 
a cross-section of an event’s past light cone will be sufficient to produce it. (Loewer, 
2002, p. 661n12) We certainly need something like the light cone story to rule out 
possible interfering causes and get a cause that is nomologically sufficient for the 
acceleration of carriage B above. But many of the empirical theories of causation are, or 
can be construed as, singularist theories of causation, according to which causation is not 
constituted by law-like regularities. And in a singularist sense of production (Anscombe, 
1993) all that matters is that this time there were no interferers, so carriage A did indeed 
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make carriage B move. This is a general point from the philosophy of causation and is 
independent of specific questions about physics. I hasten to emphasize that my aim is not 
to defend the transference theory. My message is simply that Loewer appears to disregard 
important productive theories and the possibility of a singularist notion of production. 
 As we saw, Loewer also offered a Metaphysical Argument according to which 
productive causation might fail to supervene on fundamental physical facts. But it turned 
out that this argument rested on an appeal to the failure of supervenience in Tooley’s 
(1990) theory of causation. Does the point generalize to all productive theories? As Kim 
(2002a) points out it is hard to see why the problem should apply to production 
understood as, e.g., transference. In fact, Kistler (1998) explicitly takes his transference 
theory to be opposed to that of Tooley. More generally, if production is understood in 
terms of causal combination as I suggest, worries about supervenience seem misplaced, 
and it is hard to see wherein the indigestible metaphysics lie. Arguments are needed to 
show that productive causation understood in this way is metaphysically objectionable. 
All in all, I suspect that Loewer has over-focused on the problems with heavy-duty 
metaphysics. This metaphysical focus prevents a more neutral understanding of 
productive causation. For these reasons I take Loewer’s arguments to be, at best, 
inconclusive. 
3.5. Second Response to Loewer: Mechanisms  
Whatever the case may be in physics I think productive causation is needed in 
mechanistic explanations. Such explanations are of central importance in special sciences 
in general, and in neuroscience in particular. The case of neuroscience is especially 
important, since its claim to relevance for mental causation is at the very least as strong 
as that of physics. Here, then, are six quick reasons for the importance of mechanisms, 
see the papers cited for details.  
 (M1) Mechanistic explanations are widespread in special sciences like biology, 
geology and perhaps even in the social sciences. (Elster, 1989; Fodor, 1990, 1991b); 
Glennan, 1996, 2002; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Machamer et al., 2000; Woodward, 
2002) Assuming we want our account of causation to be consonant with scientific 
practice this alone should make us want to account for mechanisms.  
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 (M2) Mechanisms are important for distinguishing spurious from causal 
generalizations. Whether or not we infer a causal relationship from a correlation in 
science depends on whether we know, or are inclined to believe that the proposed causes 
and effects are linked by a mechanism. (See, e.g., Glennan, 1996)  
 (M3) Mechanisms play a similar psychological role in ordinary causal inference.
Subjects tend not to infer causation from mere probabilities like P(sun-rising/rooster-
crowing)>P(sun-rising/rooster-crowing), because they do not believe there are 
mechanisms connecting ordinary sounds and astronomical objects. (Cheng, 1997) 
 (M4) Mechanisms are needed for manipulation purposes. Knowledge of 
mechanisms can add to our manipulative capacities, e.g., by allowing us to increase or 
decrease the causal outcome of a process or to repair mechanisms that are broken. It is no 
accident that medicine is a science of mechanisms and not just correlations.  
 (M5) Mechanisms are needed to explain correlations. More controversially, we 
need mechanisms to explain why regularities hold in the special sciences.  
 (M6) Mechanisms are needed because it is their components that do the causing.
Many find attractive the idea that regularities are symptoms of causation rather than 
constitutive of it. An example is “methodological individualism” in the social sciences 
according to which population-based regularities do not causally explain unless they are 
traceable to the acts of individuals in social mechanisms. (Elster, 1998; Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998)  
 All in all, I take it to be an undeniable descriptive point that mechanisms do in 
fact figure prominently in special sciences, and there are additional reasons for regarding 
them as more or less the heart and soul of those sciences. But then it is surely a plausible 
constraint on anyone’s theory of causation that at the very least (C1) it should enable us 
to offer a workable account of mechanisms. What is more, (C2) that account should be 
conservative of scientific notions of mechanisms. It is perhaps conceivable that 
philosophers can discover metaphysical reasons for reforming scientific mechanism talk, 
but pending knock-down arguments for this, we should set scientific practice first. Since 
Loewer intends his case against productive causation to be partly grounded in science, 
this is a constraint that he too should accept. Here, then, is a potential problem for 
Loewer. If mechanistic explanations invoke productive causation, then our philosophical 
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account should too. If mechanisms do not overdetermine their effects, then that is 
something we will just have to accept. To turn this into a real challenge I must show that 
mechanisms are productive in the sense that they are governed by productive constraints.  
 But what is a mechanism? As many have remarked, mechanism is prima facie an 
anti-Humean notion. Mechanisms are often supposed to be a link or “secret connexion” 
between cause and effect (Glennan, 1996; Psillos 2004), the existence of which Hume 
denied according to standard interpretations. Salmon (1984, p. 155) explicitly took his 
mechanistic process theory to answer Hume’s challenge and actually “shew us” (Hume, 
1978, p. 159) such a link.37 Mechanisms are also frequently introduced to avoid the 
shortcomings of Humean deductive-nomological theories of explanation. (Elster, 1989, 
ch. 1) Now, the notion of a mechanism is (at least) ambiguous between how causes bring 
about their effects and how computational and other functions are implemented. In the 
first case we may wonder how pressing a button causes the doorbell to ring, and find out 
by directly investigating the causal chains linking the two events. In the second case we 
proceed indirectly, for instance by first specifying a function to be computed. (Say, to 
compute depth from 2D retinal images). Then we descend through David Marr’s famous 
levels by finding out how, i.e., by which algorithm, that function is computed, and finally 
how that algorithm is implemented by neural causes in the visual system.38  But in both 
cases I contend that we can view knowledge of mechanisms, at least in part, as 
knowledge of how causes bring about their effects. 
 Given this characterization a mechanism description is what you get when you 
ask “How did X cause Y?” And one need only be mildly sympathetic to mechanisms to 
agree that (perhaps setting aside the fundamental level of causation if there is one) it must 
always be possible to fill out a claim “X causes Y” with possibly nested “by ȥ”-clauses 
describing how X caused Y. How did Peter cause the kettle to explode? Answer: by 
37 Though he accepted Hume’s ban on causal language in that account. (Hume, 1978, p. 157); Salmon 
(1984, p. 155) An account of mechanisms need not be anti-Humean in the sense of being conceptually non-
reductive. 
38 Marr, 1982, sect. 1.2. Note, though, that actual research arguably goes on at several of these levels 
simultaneously. (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992, pp. 18-19) 
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clogging it and expanding the water inside. How did he cause the water to expand? 
Answer: by heating it. How does death of dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra 
cause hypokinesia or diminished movements in patients with Parkinson’s? Possible short 
answer: by decreasing the rate of firing of neurons in motor cortex which normally 
stimulate muscle fibers to contract.
 This reveals a very interesting connection between mechanisms and causal verbs. 
Mechanisms are naturally expressed by causal verbs, because these verbs can tell us how 
causes bring about their effects. In fact, the applicability of different kinds of causal verbs 
(say, lexical versus periphrastic causatives) varies with the way in which the cause is 
brought about. (See, e.g., Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2002.) This is a lesson from cognitive 
linguistics, but the main idea goes back to G.E.M. Anscombe who took causal verbs to 
encode ways in which effects “derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes.” 
(Anscombe, 1993, p. 92) The connection is all the more interesting since Kim has 
recently appealed to Anscombean derivativeness in characterizing his own productive 
view. (Kim, 2005, p. 18) Furthermore, Peter Machamer et al. take Anscombe and causal 
verbs as a starting point when characterizing mechanisms as “entities and activities 
organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or 
termination conditions.” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3) Their examples illustrate how 
neuroscientists actually use causal verbs like phosphorelate, depolarize, inhibit and 
activate. Given that even scientific mechanisms are naturally expressed by verbs 
encoding work and production in science, it should perhaps come as no surprise that 
productive causation is invoked in mechanistic explanations. In fact, verbs of creation 
like write appear to have productive constraints as part of their application conditions. 
Suppose we are ignorant of Wittgenstein’s family relations and are being told first, that 
“Ludwig wrote the blue book,” and, then, that “Margarete’s brother wrote the blue book.” 
We would be puzzled much in the same way that Kim intends us to be puzzled by the 
presence of mental and physical causes of bodily movements. And, much in the spirit of 
Kim’s (1989) Exclusion Principle, we would not accept the two writing-claims without a 
story about how Ludwig and Margarete’s brother are related with respect to writing. Did 
they co-write the book? Was Ludwig an “epiphenomenon” who used Margarete’s brother 
as a ghost writer to do the real writing work for him? Are the two writers identical? A 
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positive answer to any of these questions would remove the tension between the two 
claims. This is revealing with respect to how we conceptualize and think about work. 
 But I do not think we have to consider causal verbs to appreciate the productivity 
of mechanisms. For constraints on causal combination are important parts of mechanistic 
explanations. I base this claim on the following general idea. To describe a mechanism 
for a causal process is to show how various causal influences are combined so that the 
process comes about. Similarly, to build a mechanism by which X causes Y from scratch, 
we would start by collecting causal influences, and connecting them together so that X 
does in fact lead to Y. To achieve this we must harness and control the causal influences, 
and this requires that we exploit principles of causal combination. This abstract idea 
certainly needs elucidation, but I hope that can be achieved by considering concrete 
examples of neural mechanisms. I note in advance, however, that my description appears 
consonant with three recent accounts of mechanisms, which, despite their differences, all 
stress the complexity of mechanisms. We have already seen Machamer et al. (2000, p. 3) 
on the “organization” of acts and entities in mechanisms. Stuart Glennan thinks a 
mechanism for a behavior is “a system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a 
number of parts.” (2002, p. S344) Similarly, James Woodward’s account invokes “an 
organized or structured set of parts or components.” (2002, p. S375) I think the role of 
complexity in mechanisms is a key to understanding their productivity. 
 I start by briefly considering a recent argument for “ectopic neurotransmission.” It 
is well known that neurons communicate via specialized synapses, where 
neurotransmitter is released from presynaptic “active zones” onto “postsynaptic 
densities.” But it has also been suggested that in some cases “ectopic” release of 
neurotransmitter at sites distinct from the above-mentioned specialized regions might 
play a role in neurotransmission. (“Ectopic” means out of place.) To investigate this 
Coggan et al. (2005) developed a biologically realistic computational model of a specific 
type of excitatory synapse in chick embryos. (See Luþiü & Baumeister (2005) for general 
discussion.) They found that the simulated postsynaptic effect did not conform to the 
actually measured effect, unless ectopic transmission was included in the model. What 
interests me presently is not the mathematical and biological details of the model – many 
of which escape me – nor its correctness, but rather the nature of their argument. They 
56
argue for the presence of an additional mechanism (involving ectopic release) in certain 
cases of neurotransmission, on the basis that unless this mechanism is included we cannot 
explain measured effects (excitatory postsynaptic currents). This way of reasoning 
appears similar to Kim’s idea that causes must add up to produce their effects. The causal 
influences, then, are synaptic and ectopic release of neurotransmitter respectively. How 
these influences combine depends on many factors including membrane topology, how 
transmitter molecules diffuse, the number and distribution of various receptor subtypes 
and so on. These constraints on combination are given a mathematical form in the model, 
and play an essential role in its predictions. Knowledge of causal combination is as 
important as knowledge of causal influences, and can give rise to exclusion-type 
reasoning.
 Consider next the mechanisms responsible for maintaining the resting membrane 
potential in neurons. This is a paradigmatic example of a neural mechanism and is laid 
out in varying degrees of detail in text books such as Bear et al. (2001, ch. 3) or Kandel et 
al. (2000, ch. 7). The explanandum is simply that the outside of a neural membrane is 
normally (e.g., when no action potential is taking place) positively charged with respect 
to the inside. The difference is due to uneven concentrations of ions (most importantly 
Na+, K+, Ca2+, Cl– and organic anions) in intra and extra cellular space. In fact, there is a 
potential difference of –65 mV across a typical neural membrane. As in many neural 
mechanisms the explanation is in terms of ion flow across the membrane. Two factors, or 
causal influences, affect ion behavior and determine whether there will be a net influx or 
efflux of a given ion through its ion channels. (I disregard the influence of active 
transport mechanisms in ion pumps.) First, ions are subject to a diffusion force pushing 
them along their diffusion gradient from areas of high concentration to areas of low 
concentration. Second, being charged, ions are also subject to an electrical driving force, 
since opposite (equal) charges attract (repel) one another. Again, to get the explanation 
going, we must consider how the influences combine. Imagine that the concentrations of 
K+ and some anion A– are high on the inside of the cell, and low on the outside. Making 
the membrane selectively permeable to K+, but not to A–, by inserting potassium selective 
channels will have the following result. First, K+ will flow out of the cell along its 
diffusion gradient. But as the inside becomes more negative than the outside the 
57
electronic driving force comes into play and begins to pull K+ ions back inside. When 
these two forces balance each other an equilibrium state is reached where there is no net 
flow across the membrane and K+ ions have an equal probability of flowing in or out. 
The equilibrium potential (EP) for K+, which would result if neurons were (like glial 
cells) only permeable to potassium, is typically –80 mV. We can formulate the influences 
à la Machamer et al. in terms of acts of entities, of charges attracting each other and so 
forth. And we can describe the principle of combination as balancing. These descriptions 
make intuitive sense, because they are borrowed from everyday language and experience. 
But the constraints can also be written into a quantitative description of the equilibrium 
potential known as the Nernst equation: 
EPion =  (RT/zF)ln([ion]outside/[ion]inside)
Here R is the ideal gas constant, T is the absolute temperature, z is the ion’s valence, F is 
Faraday’s constant and the subscripted brackets represent ion concentrations. At body 
temperature, then, EP is determined by the valence (z) and concentration gradient 
([ion]outside/[ion]inside) for an ion. Importantly, the combination is productive. Suppose we 
measure a particular EP to, say, –80 mV, but do not know the valence of the ion or its 
concentrations. The equation constrains the causal influences we can postulate to explain 
that EP.  We can of course change the postulated causal influences, e.g. by switching to 
an ion with a different valence z or by swapping the values of [ion]outside and [ion]inside – 
but that will typically change the EP as given by the equation.  
 However, actual neurons are more complex, since they are permeable to several 
ions. So the principle of combination underlying the actual resting potential (RP) must 
also be more complex and interesting. In fact RP is approximated by the Goldman 
equation, which I provide for potassium, sodium and chlorine ions. (Bear in mind that I 
include technical details like these because they illustrate a philosophical point about the 
productivity of mechanisms.) 
RP =  (RT/F)ln((PK[K+]outside + PNa[Na+]outside + PCl[Cl–]Inside)/ (PK[K+]inside + 
PNa[Na+]inside + PCl[Cl–]outside)) 
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Here, Pion is a measure of the membrane’s relative permeability for an ion at resting 
potential, and depends on the number of open ion channels for that ion. RP therefore 
results from constraints on causal influences that are partly determined by valences and 
concentration gradients, and partly by the structural make-up of the membrane. Using 
everyday language we can metaphorically view the ions as competing, each ion striving
to reach its EP. The result of the battle will depend on the degree to which the membrane 
lets the various ions pass through. In this particular case few would take the distinctively 
anti-Humean causal metaphor seriously. Even so, it may be cognitively useful, by 
allowing us to think of the mechanism in terms of concrete experiences we are familiar 
with. In other cases, e.g. in the opening of ion channels, everyday causal verbs may be 
literally applicable. But nothing hinges on this way of expressing the mechanism. For the 
causal combination is written into the ontologically sober Goldman equation. The value 
of Pion determines the degree to which an ion contributes to the actual RP. At resting 
potential PNa and PCl are much smaller than PK, i.e., the membrane is more permeable to 
potassium. Therefore, in a typical neuron the actual RP = –65mV, which is close to EPK,
(–75mV).  But things might have been otherwise (and does actually vary across neurons). 
If we want to postulate increased permeability for an ion, or add the influence of more 
ion types, we must take care not to get a different RP-value than the one we actually 
measure, for given that value there may not be any work or influencing “left to do” for 
that ion. To appreciate how influences combine to yield RP it is instructive to vary 
concentrations and permeabilities in online computer simulations of the Goldman 
equation. 
 The study of neural plasticity provides a third, less quantitative example of a 
productive mechanism, which is intimately related to cognition and mentality. It is 
nowadays almost a commonplace that many processes involving learning or memory 
formation require changes in synaptic strength. (Synaptic strength is the efficiency with 
which one neuron excites or inhibits another.) One important type of such change is long-
term potentiation (LTP), and is believed to be crucial in inter alia hippocampus-involving 
memory processes. LTP is particularly interesting for our purposes because proposed 
models of its mechanisms are to some extent still controversial, so it makes sense to say 
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that mechanism hypotheses compete. LTP is subject to an enormous amount of empirical 
research, and has received attention from philosophers of neuroscience like John Bickle 
(2003, ch. 2), Patricia Churchland and Terrt Sejnowski (1992, ch. 5), Carl F. Craver 
(2002; 2003) and Craver and Lindley Darden (2001). In comparison, my treatment here 
must needs be dramatically simplifying and tuned to a very specific philosophical interest 
in causal combination. I will argue that different proposed mechanisms must either 
combine to yield LTP or they must exclude one another. In other words, LTP research is 
subject to what I call productive constraints. But what is LTP?  Interestingly, it seems to 
be involved in some physical implementations of Hebb’s famous rule. Donald Hebb 
proposed on theoretical grounds already in 1949 that learning might depend on activity-
dependent changes in synaptic strength. In a slogan, his rule states that “neurons that fire 
together wire together.” More precisely, if neuron A stimulates neuron B when B is 
already firing (due, for example, to other excitatory inputs from neurons C, D,…), then 
the A-B synapse should be strengthened. Strengthening an excitatory synapse A-B means 
to increase A’s excitatory influence on B, making it more likely that B will fire when A 
fires. One of several quantitative measures of LTP is therefore an increase in the 
amplitude of the excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) A causes in B. (Neurons 
compute whether they should fire or not based on spatial and temporal summation of 
EPSPs – caused by excitatory inputs – and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (IPSPs) – 
caused by inhibitory inputs.) Tim Bliss and Terje Lømo, working in Per Andersen’s lab 
in Oslo, famously brought about this effect at synapses in the rabbit hippocampus 
experimentally and published their results in 1973. They delivered a high-frequency 
electrical stimulus (a tetanus) to presynaptic neurons, and then measured the postsynaptic 
neuron’s response to subsequent normal stimulations from the presynaptic neuron. The 
resulting EPSPs in the postsynaptic neuron displayed an increased amplitude when 
compared to measurements prior to the LTP inducing tetanus. (See fig. 1) The effect can 
last for hours and days, thus making LTP a potential player in, inter alia, hippocampal 
memory mechanisms. 
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Fig. 1. Top: Test stimuli and LTP inducing tetanus delivered to postsynaptic neuron. Bottom: 
Measurements of EPSPs reveal a long-lasting increase in EPSP amplitude (a measure of LTP) subsequent 
to tetanus. (Adapted from Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992, fig 5.10)
How might one build a mechanism producing this effect? That is, how might causal 
influences be combined so as to yield LTP? One way would be to insert a “co-firing 
detector” in the postsynaptic neuron that is sensitive to whether the membrane of this 
neuron is strongly depolarized (which it would be inter alia when it is firing) while 
simultaneously being stimulated by the presynaptic neuron. Such an indicator would 
“light up” if the pre and postsynaptic neurons fire together, as in Hebb’s rule. Then one 
could hook that detector’s influence up with a process leading to the strengthening of the 
synapse. In the hippocampus, and in many other places in the central nervous system, 
nature appears to have chosen NMDA receptors for the detector job. These are actually 
Ca2+ channels that can open and let Ca2+ stream into the cell. However, they will only 
open if two conditions are fulfilled. First, glutamate – an excitatory neurotransmitter 
released by the presynaptic hippocampal neuron – must bind to the receptor. Second, 
since the channel is normally clogged by large Mg2+ ions, the receptor must also change 
its spatial configuration to let the magnesium clog pop out. (Mg2+, then, is a preventing
influence.) Now the NMDA receptors are in fact also voltage gated, so they will only 
change their configuration (and let out the clog) as a result of the nearby membrane being 
depolarized. Given this set up, then, an increased value of [Ca2+]inside, due to the calcium 
influx, signals co-firing of the pre and postsynaptic neurons. So from the point of view of 
information flow we have a story about how synapses can come to “know” when they 
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should initiate LTP. From a causal point of view, we can say that the structural make-up 
of Hebbian synapses is such that calcium can causally influence the LTP process when 
allowed to do so. Now synapses can be strengthened in numerous ways. Here are some 
hypothetical mechanisms that might occur downstream from Ca2+ influx in the case of 
LTP.39 (H1) Postsynaptic change: AMPA-receptors are made more sensitive. AMPA 
receptors respond to released glutamate from the presynaptic neuron by opening and 
letting sodium ions flow into the cell, thus depolarizing the membrane. Making AMPA 
receptors more sensitive by adding a phosphate (PO3) group to them would thus increase 
glutamate’s depolarizing influence. (H2) Postsynaptic change: increasing the number of 
AMPA receptors. More AMPA receptors are inserted into the membrane. (H3) 
Postsynaptic change: creating more synapses. In a process involving the activation of 
genes and subsequent protein synthesis the structure of the dendritic spines is changed so 
that more synapses are formed. (H4) Presynaptic change: increasing the amount of 
glutamate released. A retrograde messenger, perhaps gaseous nitrous oxide (NO), 
diffuses backwards across the synaptic cleft and increases the amount of glutamate 
subsequently released. LTP mechanisms like these have been a matter of some 
controversy (Craver, 2002, p. S86), and several mechanisms may plausibly combine. My 
claim is that they are productive, insofar as they must add up to explain LTP effects like 
increased amplitude of EPSPs. If we had a good computational grip on LTP, then, we 
could imagine, say, (H4) being excluded on the grounds that, say, (H1) and (H2) are 
well-confirmed and account for the LTP effect alone. Adding (H4) would presumably 
give an even stronger synapse. I hasten to make two provisos about this. First, different 
mechanisms may be involved in different types of LTP, e.g., in short-lasting “early LTP” 
versus long-lasting “late LTP.” Second, I do not mean to imply that neuroscientists’ 
choice between the hypothetical mechanisms is always governed by the constraint that 
actual mechanisms must add up. (Though the reasoning in Coggan et al. (2005) appears 
to be partly of this type, and controls in some neuroscientific experiments may perhaps 
39 Discussions of LTP mechanisms can be found in neuroscience text books like Bear et al. (2001, ch. 22), 
reviews like Malenka & Bear (2004) or in the philosophy of neuroscience literature mentioned above. 
Bickle (2003, ch. 2), in particular, considers the biochemical processes in considerable detail. 
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play a similar role.) Computational models are only one of several methods invoked in 
neuroscience’s search for mechanisms. Rather, I take the productive constraint to be a 
reasonable background assumption. For the mechanisms culminate in changes in 
synapses (e.g., in increased neurotransmitter release or the insertion of more receptors) 
that affect the presynaptic neuron’s causal influence on the postsynaptic neuron. 
 Summing up, I have argued that principles of causal combination play an 
important role in mechanistic explanations. These constrain what causal influences we 
can postulate to explain the outcome of mechanisms, so productive causation is in fact 
invoked in mechanisms. This is something that our account of mechanisms should 
respect whether we opt for an account like that of Machamer et al. (2000) – which does 
appear to involve major metaphysical commitments – or (say) some variety of a 
regularity account like Glennan’s (1996; 2002) or of a counterfactual account like 
Woodward’s (2002). The relevant sense of production does not involve absolute 
nomological sufficiency or cross-sections of an event’s past light cone. In fact, only 
causes of a specific kind are excluded, e.g., only additional ions are excluded as causes of 
membrane potential. I do not think this is a problem for the Exclusion Argument, 
however, because I do not think that argument must presuppose that bodily movements 
have absolutely sufficient physical causes. I take it to be a background assumption of 
neuroscience that ceteris paribus neural events have neural causes of the broad kind that 
we have been considering. The fact that neural causes are in the circumstances sufficient 
for bodily movements is sufficient to generate an exclusion problem, even without 
invoking a general causal closure principle according to which bodily movements have 
absolutely sufficient causes. (See paper (#4) and Bickle, 2003, p. 60; Kim, 2005, p. 155) 
So even though many neural mechanisms add up to produce bodily movements, bodily 
movements are not causally overdetermined by mechanisms.40
40 A natural objection to the claim that mechanisms do not overdetermine their effects is the following. 
Current models of neural mechanisms are multi-level insofar as they involve entities from several levels of 
decomposition. (See, e.g., Craver, 2002; Schaffner, 1993, ch. 6) That is, the relevant mechanism 
descriptions include vocabulary from, e.g., the organismal, cellular and molecular levels. Does this mean 
that there actually are several overdetermining mechanisms at work corresponding to each of these levels? 
[Footnote continued on next page]
63
3.6. Conclusions  
Let us recapitulate. If Loewer is right, as I think he is, Kim’s Exclusion Argument 
requires that there be productive causation. In particular, it requires that mental causes be 
productive. Lower’s anti-productive arguments are entirely general and do not rely on 
any specific features of mental causation. Mental causes are not productive because no
causes are productive. But this is too quick. If productive causation is understood in terms 
of principles of causal combination, we can see that productive causation, and with it 
exclusion-based reasoning, can indeed be based on science. Furthermore, productive 
causation thus understood need not be cashed in terms of heavy-duty metaphysical 
notions. There appears therefore to be nothing wrong with productive causation per se.
This is interesting in its own right. But it does not help much with respect to the 
Exclusion Argument, for Burge’s above-mentioned challenge still remains. Why should 
mental causes be productive?41 Mental causes, presumably, must rationalize, but it is not 
clear that they must produce. Why should beliefs and desires produce muscle 
contractions as action potentials in motor cortex do? Now, Kim does appear to offer a 
kind of Argument from Agency in favor of productive mental causation: 
Why do we care about mental causation? Because, first and foremost, we care about human 
agency. To save agency, however, we need the productive concept of causation; we want agents, 
in virtue of the beliefs and desires and intentions they hold, to cause their limbs to move in 
appropriate ways and thereby produce changes in their physical surroundings. I don’t think the 
This does not appear to be Craver’s and Kenneth Schaffner’s intention, however. Rather they seem to be 
emphasizing that mechanism descriptions currently available in neuroscience are typically partial, and that 
methodologically neuroscience proceeds simultaneously at several levels. Furthermore, I take there to be a 
very real sense in which there is only one mechanism involved here, albeit one that can to a certain extent 
be described at multiple levels of composition.  So it is not clear to me whether such cases really amount to 
overdetermination, nor whether any such “multi-level overdetermination” would be acceptable. This 
question is certainly worthy of further investigation. 
41 Loewer (forthcoming) actually appears to agree that there might be a non-heavy-duty account of 
production, perhaps something along the lines of Hall (2004). But, like Burge, he now questions the 
specific assumption that mental causes must be productive. 
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kinds of dependencies that can be captured by counterfactuals alone would be enough for the job. 
(Kim, 2002a, p. 675, see also Kim forthcoming.) 
His motivation for reductionism, then, boils down to this. (1) Agency requires productive 
mental causation. (2) Productive mental causation requires reducing the mental. (3) 
Hence, we had better reduce the mental. Now (2) is weaker than the claim that mental 
causation period requires reducing the mental, and seems to me to actually be supported 
by the Exclusion Argument. But on closer inspection (1) lacks independent support in 
what Kim says.42 Philosophers like Burge and Loewer, who apparently do not share 
Kim’s intuitions, will therefore be quick to charge him of begging the question. For all he 
has told us some model of “supervenient causation,” where non-productive mental 
causation supervenes on physical productive causation might still be a viable 
antireductionist response to the exclusion problem. (Fodor, 1990; Jackson & Pettit, 1988; 
Kim, 1984b; Loewer & Lepore, 1987) Are we, then, back where we started? Loewer will 
deny that mental causes are productive, and Kim will go on to insist that they must be. 
While debating the validity of intuitions is unlikely to resolve this deadlock, I think 
considerations of explanatory practice might help. Consider Burge’s claim that neural and 
psychological explanations of bodily movements describe “the same physical effect as 
the outcome of two very different patterns of events. The explanations of these patterns 
answer two very different types of enquiry. Neither type of explanation makes essential, 
specific assumptions about the other.” (Burge, 1993, pp. 115-116, my italics)  Now, I am 
not convinced that Burge’s quick appeal to explanatory differences will make the 
antireductionist’s day.43 But it does point in the direction of a new, and potentially 
friutful, way to approach an old question. Is “supervenient causation” just 
epiphenomenalism in disguise? I think we should approach this question anew, by 
42 Kim (forthcoming) does offer additional considerations in favor of this claim. He seems to appeal partly 
to well-known problems with counterfactual theories in general and partly to the idea that counterfactual 
theories allegedly make mental causation “too easy,” because it turns omissions into actions. Suffice it to 
say that it is unclear whether these considerations have much force. Kim admits that they do not constitute 
a “knock-down argument,” and Loewer (forthcoming) remains unconvinced by them. 
43 Cp. paper (#2). 
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considering our psychological explanatory practices to see whether there are any specific 
features of mentality that requires mental causation to be productive. If there are no such 
features, we might have a before us a very attractive Burgean synthesis of the productive 
view and its non-productive anti-thesis. Pace Loewer, there is nothing wrong with 
productive causation, pace Kim, mental causation is not productive. 
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4. Paper (#2): Pace Burge: Some Empirical Warrant 
for Epiphobia 
ABSTRACT: Many physicalists think that some tight relation like supervenience or identity 
between mental and physical events as well as the presence of neural mechanisms underlying 
mental causation is required to rule out epiphenomenalism about the mental. Tyler Burge has 
argued that worries like these arise only because physicalists are misguided by metaphysics, and 
fail to appreciate the essential role of explanatory practice in determining causal powers. I 
explicate Burge’s notion of causal powers and his anti-physicalist arguments. While his notion of 
causal powers is valuable, his use of it to argue against physicalism presupposes a strong 
autonomy of psychology vis-à-vis neuroscience. By considering the neuroscience of voluntary 
behavior in general and Patricia Goldman-Rakic’ theory of prefrontal cortex in particular, I show 
that Burge’s way of individuating scientific practices is deeply problematic. It fails to appreciate 
that neuroscience combines an explanatory interest in cognition with an interest in neural 
mechanisms. My discussion serves to motivate the physicalist call for mechanisms in mental 
causation as well as the need for some tight relation between mental and physical causes. 
Importantly, this is a motivation from within explanatory practice, and accordingly a motivation 
that Burge should accept. 
How can the soul of a man determine the spirits of his body so as to produce voluntary actions (given that 
the soul is only a thinking substance)? 
 – Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia44
4.1. Introduction. Physicalist Constraints on Causal Relevance in 
Psychology 
An interesting feature of mainstream philosophy of mind is that many of its problems 
arise because physicalists hold views about mental causation like the following. (These 
views and the corresponding problems will be clarified below.) 
44 Letter to Descartes of May 6/16, 1643. Translated in Nye, 1999, p. 9 / AT III 661. 
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(P1) Mental causes of bodily movements must depend in some suitably strong 
sense on the movements’ physical causes. 
(P2) Mental causation must involve mechanisms. 
(P3) Mental causation requires “narrow” or locally supervenient mental content. 
(P4) Mental causation must be backed by laws. 
An interesting feature of Burge’s philosophy of mind is that he is very skeptical of these 
claims about mental causation. He seems to take the corresponding problems to be 
pseudo-problems that arise only if we are misguided by the physicalist metaphysics of 
(P1)-(P4) instead of paying attention to explanatory practice. Once we realize the 
essential role of explanatory practice in determining causal relevance it becomes clear 
that (a) in general, depending on their explanatory purposes, different practices can give 
explanations that may or may not conform to constraints like (P1)-(P4); (b) in particular, 
it is far from clear that psychological explanations must conform to these constraints. I 
call this Burge’s Pluralistic Attitude to Causal Explanation. (PACE, for short.) 
 This paper has two parts. First, I offer a detailed analysis of Burge’s reasons for 
skepticism about (P1)-(P4), by focusing on his notion of causal powers.45 (Section 4.2-
4.3) I think his framework is valuable and useful, and that his emphasis on explanatory 
practice as the reliable source to knowledge about causation constitutes sound advice. 
Second, I argue that, in spite of the attractions of Burge’s position, his dismissal of (P1)-
(P2) fails, because his individuation of practices fails to capture the multidisciplinary 
nature of cognitive and neuroscience. (Section 4.4) I will not take a stand on (P3) and 
(P4), as they fall outside the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, I describe Burge’s 
arguments against these constraints to show that his disagreement with physicalism is 
quite general. 
 Let me start by quickly sketching how (P1)-(P4) give rise to central problems in 
the mental causation debate. More details will be provided below, but note that I will to a 
certain extent abstract away from differences between various physicalists to emphasize 
45 Burge typically formulates his arguments in terms of “causal powers.” For the purposes of this paper I 
use this and alternative expressions like “causal efficacy” and “causal relevance” interchangeably. 
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how Burge’s position differs from that of physicalism in general. The problems of (P1) 
are clustered around causal exclusion: given that bodily movements have sufficient 
physical causes – and given that bodily movements are not to be causally overdetermined 
by more than one sufficient cause – is there really any room for additional mental causes? 
Will not putative mental causes be excluded and rendered epiphenomenal? This is the 
threat of the so-called Exclusion Argument. (Kim, 1998; 2005) Physicalists have 
suggested that exclusion can be avoided since the mental and physical causes are related 
by, e.g., supervenience, type-identity or token-identity.  But whether any of these 
relations are satisfactory or viable remains controversial.  
 (P2) – the request for a mechanism – is motivated inter alia by the idea that since 
mental causation cannot be fundamental causation, it must be mediated by mechanisms. 
The problem, then, is to offer a model for mental causation that involves mechanisms. 
(Fodor, 1990; 1991b) 
 The problems with (P3) arise because the received view has it that ordinary 
mental content is wide, that is, individuated with reference to states that are external to 
the organism. Content is also supposed to play a role in causing bodily movements. But if 
it is wide, how can content play a causal role locally, via the brain? Since causation must 
run locally, mental causal explanations require a different sort of content, narrow content, 
that is locally supervenient. (Fodor 1987, ch. 2; 1991a) Whether some notion of narrow 
content is viable remains controversial, however. 
 Finally, (P4) seems problematic because there arguably are no strict laws of the 
mental. So if mental events are to be causally efficacious, that requires something like a 
redescription of them in terms of the vocabulary of physics which according to many 
does allow for the formulation of strict laws. (Davidson, 1980) However, it remains 
controversial how this solution differs from epiphenomenalism, as mental events only 
seem to be causally efficacious in virtue of their physical properties. 
 Notice that these hard problems arise because principles like (P1)-(P4) put 
constraints on the causal relevance of mental properties. If mental properties are to be 
causally relevant, then they must satisfy the constraints of being appropriately related to 
other kinds of properties, being mediated by a mechanism, being locally supervenient or 
being apt for entering into laws. Burge, on the other hand, wants us to stop worrying
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about these constraints. For instance, with respect to (P1) and the Exclusion Argument, 
he claims that mental and neurophysiological explanations of the same movement can 
coexist happily and independently, and that there is no apparent reason why we should 
have to invoke some tight relations between mental and physical causes to rule out 
epiphenomenalism. I call this Burge’s compatibilism, since he takes overdetermination to 
be a misleading description (Burge, 1993, p. 101n3). Compatibilism is supposed to 
follow from the interesting, but somewhat unclear, idea of different explanations citing 
different patterns of events.
A man’s running to the store is explained by his believing that his child would suffer without the 
needed medicine and by his decision not to wait on a doctor. […] It would be perverse to think 
that such mental events must interfere with or alter, or fill some gap in, the chain of physiological 
events leading up to and including the movement of his muscles in running. It would be perverse 
to think that the mentalistic explanation excludes or interferes with non-intentional explanations of 
the physical movement. I think these ideas seem perverse not because we know that the mental 
events are material. They seem perverse because we know that the two causal explanations are 
explaining the same physical effect as the outcome of two very different patterns of events. The 
explanations of these patterns answer two very different types of enquiry. Neither type of 
explanation makes essential, specific assumptions about the other. (Burge, 1993, pp. 115-116, my 
italics) 
I shall return to this quote and the idea of patterns of events repeatedly. The quote shows 
that Burge and most physicalists alike take epiphenomenalism (the view that mental 
causes are excluded and rendered causally impotent by physical causes) and interactionist 
dualism (the view that mental causes interfere with or alter physical causal processes) to 
be perverse or unacceptable. They differ, however, inter alia when it comes to constraints 
like (P1) and the question whether tight relations are necessary to avoid exclusion and 
interference. 
 Burge is equally skeptical to (P2) and the question about mechanisms of mental-
to-physical causation. He says that it is unclear “whether [this] question is an appropriate 
one in the first place” and that it is “not even obvious why any model [for mental-to-
physical-causation] is needed”. (Burge, 1993, p. 114) Physicalists on the other hand, 
typically think that a mechanism is needed. They feel that at least some of the questions 
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raised by (P1)-(P4) are perfectly good questions, and that it is incumbent upon us as 
philosophers of mind to attempt to answer them. However, this is not necessarily because 
they take epiphenomenalism to be a real possibility – most physicalists do not. It is 
important to distinguish between the following flavors of what Jerry Fodor (1990) called 
“epiphobia”: (i) one can worry about epiphenomenalism and take it to be a real 
possibility; (ii) one can be convinced that epiphenomenalism is false, and yet think that 
constraints like (P1) and (P2) must be satisfied, despite the difficulties involved in 
accounting for how they come to be satisfied. I contend that most physicalists are type-
(ii) epiphobics. Fred Dretske (2003) makes much the same point against Burge, but the 
latter (2003) remains unsympathetic to type-(ii) epiphobia. 
 Be that as it may. We should get clear about Burge’s reasons for dismissing our 
problems as pseudo-problems. I argue that his notions of “causal relevance” and “patterns 
of events” are the keys to understanding these reasons. While Burge’s 1993 paper has 
been quoted often enough I know of no systematic discussion of how these notions are 
supposed to ground, for instance, his compatibilism regarding mental and physical 
explanations. This is unfortunate, since we cannot assess his claims before we understand 
their foundations. I aim to amend this by presenting one systematic way of laying out a 
Burgean view of causal relevance and explanatory pluralism. To anticipate one of my 
main conclusions, Burge appears to dismiss the need for (P1)-(P4), because in his view 
constraints on causal relevance in a given science or explanatory practice must be 
motivated from within that practice. Burge, then, seems to be questioning the motivation
for type-(ii) epiphobia. 
 Before I move on, however, some, qualifications are in order. Because Burge is 
not particularly revealing about the structure of his arguments, I am not sure whether my 
account is in all respects an accurate description of his views. I do, however, think my 
exposition captures the general Burgean spirit of his 1993 paper. Whether I get all the 
details correct is nevertheless of secondary importance, as I believe that structuring the 
arguments in this way illuminates the nature of Burge’s dispute with the physicalists. 
Furthermore, I think the general Burgean position I am describing is interesting in its own 
right. My objection is directed solely at Burge’s use of the framework discussed here (or 
something very much like it) to dismiss the need to relate different types of explanation 
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to each other (P1), as well as his skepticism about the need for mechanisms in mental 
causation (P2). Put briefly, my point is that Burge’s arguments against (P1)-(P2) appear 
to fail, not because his general view of the role of explanatory practices in determining 
causal relevance is flawed, but because his way of individuating the relevant practices is 
problematic. In short, it is highly unclear whether Burge’s views can be justified in 
accordance with the internal standards of those practices, that is, by the very standards he 
himself acknowledges as decisive. 
4.2. Burge’s Theory of Causal Explanation and Causal Relevance 
We have seen that Burge is a compatibilist – i.e., he thinks that mental and physical 
explanations of an action can coexist happily without us having to relate them 
metaphysically – because the action is explained as the outcome of “two very different 
patterns of events.” (Burge, 1993, p. 116) To understand this claim I will also rely on 
Burge (1989), where he offers a more detailed account of his notion of causal powers. 
Based on the above quote, in addition to others we will encounter below, it seems clear 
that causal explanation for Burge is a matter of describing effects as the outcome of 
patterns of events.  
View of Sciences and Causal Explanations: Different sciences such as psychology 
and neuroscience study and describe different patterns of events in their causal 
explanations. 
In fact, patterns seem to determine causal relevance by putting constraints on which 
properties are relevant relative to the pattern. 
The causal powers of a kind of event are to be understood in terms of the patterns of causation that 
events of that kind enter into. Such patterns are identified as explanatory in causal explanations. 
And the properties that ‘determine’ the causal powers of an event are those that enter into causal 
explanations. (Burge, 1993, p. 100) 
Burge’s favorite example is taken from physiology. 
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Not all the causal powers of an entity, considered in the abstract or from the point of view of 
physics, are relevant to typing it. The heart has numerous “causal powers” that are irrelevant to its 
being a heart. It will [for example] color a surface red if dropped from a given height; [...]. None 
of these powers is relevant to typing something as a heart. None are causal powers recognized by 
biology or physiology. What are relevant are those causal and receptive powers exercised by the 
heart that yield the patterns of causation studied in physiology – the powers exhibited when it 
carries out its basic function, pumping blood in the circulatory system of an organism. (Burge, 
1989, p. 316) 
Unfortunately, Burge does little to characterize the operative understanding of patterns of 
events. Here is one way of explicating the notion that seems to fit with his examples. 
Pattern of Events: A pattern of events is a causal interplay between kinds of 
events that are described by a science, which in turn is characterized by an 
explanatory interest in this particular type of interplay.  
So events may be causally related to each other in many different ways (say, 
physiologically, psychologically or geologically). That explains why there are different 
sciences which study different patterns of events, or, if one prefers, different “networks” 
generated by causal relations among kinds of events. The take-home message of the heart 
example is that in order to explain an object’s or event’s role in a pattern, a given science 
only needs to refer to a proper subset of the object’s or event’s causal/receptive powers. 
Causal relevance of a property, then, is relative to some particular science with its 
characteristic explanatory aims and purposes. Switching to another science may make the 
same property causally irrelevant. Accordingly, “pattern-contribution” appears to be both 
necessary and sufficient for causal relevance in a science or explanatory practice. 
Causal Relevance: A property P is causally relevant to an explanatory practice if
and only if citing P contributes to the description of a causal pattern of events 
which is of interest to that practice. Otherwise, P is causally irrelevant to the
practice. 
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Now, given Burge’s way of thinking of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of the 
mental appears to be guaranteed by psychological explanatory practices like folk-
psychology. The action explanations offered by folk-psychology are typically taken to be 
causal explanations. These explanations arguably appeal to intentional properties 
expressed by phrases like “believing that p” and “desiring that q.” Since such properties 
endow folk-psychology with tremendous predictive powers (Fodor, 1987, ch. 1), there 
can be little doubt that they are causally relevant, according to Burge’s criterion for 
causal relevance. If a property figures in explanations that are widely acknowledged as 
successful and causal, there appears to be little or no reason for thinking it 
epiphenomenal. (Note that it is not always clear whether Burge has folk-psychology or 
academic/cognitive psychology in mind as a source to knowledge about mental causation. 
I shall at any rate be drawing on both in what follows.) 
 Psychological explanatory practices, then, provides a positive answer to the 
question “is the mental causally efficacious?” But as we saw above, few physicalists 
would dispute this, even though they are also interested in finding out how
epiphenomenalism can be ruled out, given additional constraints on causal relevance like 
(P1)-(P3). (Dretske, 2003; Kim, 1998, p. 61; McLaughlin, forthcoming) In fact, 
physicalists need not dismiss Burge’s notion of causal relevance. This notion is, after all, 
compatible with there being further constraints like (P1)-(P4) that must be satisfied if a 
property is to be causally relevant. (These constraints might, for instance, help determine 
the conditions under which a mental property contributes to pattern-description.)  
 Why, then, does Burge have so little patience with the “how”-questions? I will 
suggest that Burge is not just being insensitive to the “how”/“that”-distinction. Rather, he 
appears to question the motivation of the constraints and the “how”-questions they give 
rise to. Burge is in general hostile to using standards of one particular scientific practice 
in other contexts. As an example consider his ironic remark that proponents of narrow, 
i.e., locally supervenient, mental content think that “cognitive psychology (unbeknownst 
to itself) needs [conceptions of narrow content] as surrogates for more ordinary, non-
individualistic conceptions”. (Burge, 1989, p. 304, my italics) The implicature being that: 
psychologists do not need philosophers to lecture them about the type of content to use. 
We shall see several illustrations of this attitude below. While I am aware of the danger 
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of over-generalizing from Burge’s claims, I believe the following principle captures at 
least a broadly Burgean attitude to explanation. 
Principle of Responsible Practices: Demands, criteria and standards for 
explanation in an explanatory practice must be justified internally to the practice, 
not externally, i.e., roughly, not with reference to standards that belong in other 
practices or in pure philosophy. 
As we shall see, this principle fits well with Burge’s way of criticizing constraints (P1)-
(P4). He dismisses the idea that constraints like these must be satisfied to rule out 
epiphenomenalism, because he questions whether they can be motivated from within
psychological explanatory practices. The principle and Burge’s arguments, then, have a 
slightly Carnapian flavor to them. Just as there are good (internal) and bad (external) 
existence questions according to Rudolf Carnap’s famous distinction (1950), there are 
good (internally justified) and bad (externally “justified”) constraints on causal relevance 
according to Burge.  
 But what does independence mean here? The quotation I have been focusing on, 
taken from Burge (1993, p. 116), hints at the way in which Burge takes psychology and 
neuroscience to be independent. He dismisses the need to relate them because they (i) 
study very different patterns of events, (ii) their explanations answer very different types 
of enquiry and (iii) they do not make any essential assumptions about each other. If we 
want to move on from what Burge explicitly says here to a general account of internal 
justification we may say that:  
Internal Justification means justification by reference to standards belonging to 
the practice itself or to a related practice. Here two practices are related if one 
makes essential assumptions about the other or they express a related explanatory 
interest. 
The Principle of Responsible Practices, then, gives rise to what I call PACE, or Burge’s 
Pluralistic Attitude to Causal Explanation. Constraints on causal relevance may vary 
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across practices, and practices are free to set their own explanatory standards in relative 
isolation from other practices. In particular, I propose that this attitude – rather than sheer 
insensitivity to the “how”/“that”-distinction – is what makes Burge skeptical to the 
application of constraints like (P1)-(P4) to psychology. 
 But why should we believe in the Principle of Responsible Practices? Fortunately, 
Burge has at least one explicit line of argument leading to something like the principle. 
Burge’s primary interest in his 1989 and 1993 articles is in causal explanation in 
psychology. In this connection he often makes remarks like the following. 
Our understanding of mental causation derives primarily from our understanding of mentalistic 
explanation, independently of our knowledge – or better, despite our ignorance – of the underlying 
processes. Materialist accounts have allowed too wide a gap between their metaphysics of mental 
causation and what we actually know about the nature and existence of mentalistic causation, 
which derives almost entirely from mentalistic explanation and observations. (Burge, 1993, p. 
103) 
If this argument is intended to apply more generally to other practices, as I think it is, we 
can view it as an instance of a general epistemic primacy strategy: (i) knowledge of 
causation and explanation in any given practice stems primarily from that practice. (ii) 
Therefore, explanatory demands, criteria and standards from other practices simply 
cannot tell us much about causation and explanation in the given practice, much less 
force it to reform its explanatory standards. (iii) Therefore, practices are themselves 
responsible for determining their standards.  
 The idea of patterns of events might also be used to formulate a direct argument, 
based on a more general Burgean worry that external constraints on explanations may 
distort the practice’s distinctive character. We shall see that Burge’s dismissal of (P3) and 
the call for narrow content, for instance, is based on a worry that wide content is required 
to capture the patterns of interest to psychology. Similarly, we saw that he thinks 
physiology must focus on a certain set of properties of the heart if it is to capture the 
pattern of events in which the heart functions to pump blood.  
 To explain its characteristic patterns, then, a given science must focus on certain 
properties. If this focus is pushed in other directions – for example if psychology is 
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forced to use narrow content –  it might loose its pattern, and instead end up describing 
some other pattern. The subject matter of the science may not turn out to be the same if 
external constraints on causal relevance are allowed. I.e., roughly, Threat of elimination:
(i) if practices cannot set their own explanatory standards, they cannot explain their 
characteristic patterns. (ii) Sciences must explain their characteristic patterns. (iii) 
Therefore, sciences must set their own standards.  
 By formulating the argument in this manner we can see why constraints (P1)-(P4) 
might seem threatening to someone like Burge; for one might worry that a Davidsonian 
“change of subject” or eliminativism is lurking behind these constraints. (See Donald 
Davidson, 1980) This threat is, I take it, very real. But it is not clear that changing the 
subject is always something to be feared. We should not forget the positive take-home 
message of thinkers like Paul K. Feyerabend (1988) and Thomas Kuhn (1964). Setting 
aside worries about whether scientific progress is a matter of replacement rather than 
accumulation, history appears to tell us that progress involves conceptual change more 
often than not.  
4.3. Burge’s Arguments Against Physicalist Constraints on Causal 
Relevance
We are now in a position to see how Burge argues against physicalist constraints on 
causal relevance in psychology. By denying these physicalist constraints Burge is 
exemplifying what I have called PACE. PACE potentially gives rise to a plurality of 
explanations that differ across the sciences depending on the nature of the patterns to be 
explained. Since our theory of causal relevance determines the set of properties we are 
allowed to play with in our causal explanations, I view Burge’s theory causal relevance 
as the crucial element in his arguments against the need for (P1)-(P4). For Burge, the 
question whether these constraints must be satisfied hinges primarily on whether their 
satisfaction is necessary for pattern description. He argues that it is far from clear that 
they are needed to describe the patterns of events that psychology tracks. 
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4.3.1. (P1) and the Call for Tight Relations between Mental and Physical Causes 
One statement of this constraint is Kim’s (1989) Principle of Causal-Explanatory 
Exclusion. According to this principle there cannot be two complete and independent 
causes of the same effect. It is hard to make perfectly explicit what “complete” and 
“independent” should mean, but I am not convinced that we have to do so or indeed buy 
completely into the controversial principle, in order to appreciate the weaker kind of 
advice it gives us. If we have reasons to believe that voluntary bodily movements 
systematically have two kinds of causes, one physical and one mental, we should try to 
relate the causes somehow. Whether they are motivated by the Exclusion Argument or 
not, philosophers like Kim seem to find the presence of two explanations intuitively 
puzzling and even suspect a certain amount of tension between the two causes, lest they 
are tightly related. Suggested relations that might remove this tension include the 
following. Supervenient causation. Mental causes supervene in some strong, perhaps 
mereological/constitutive, sense on the neurophysiological causes that do the “causal 
work” of bringing about the effect. (Fodor, 1990; Kim, 1984b) Token-identity. We do not 
really have two causes here because the mental cause = the physical cause at the level of 
tokens. (Davidson, 1980) Type-identity. The same, but the mental cause = the physical 
cause at the level of kinds (Kim, 1998, ch. 2; 2005; ch. 2). Overdetermination. The bodily 
movement is overdetermined by two sufficient causes, but that is acceptable since the 
covariation between the two causes is systematic and non-accidental due to some 
dependency relation like supervenience, suggesting again a model of supervenient 
causation. (Loewer, 2002)  
 Another motivation for relating the two causes is that many of us have antecedent 
physicalist expectations to the effect that mental causation must occur via more 
fundamental physical mechanisms (see below). This also calls for an account of how 
mental and physical causes are related metaphysically. So, setting aside details, there are 
reasons for thinking it a necessary condition on the causal relevance of mental properties 
that they be appropriately related to physical properties. (Or, if not strictly speaking a 
necessary condition, then a relatively strong requirement.)  
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 Let us look at the mereological (part-whole) relation since in Burge’s thinking 
this is the “critical one” (1993, p. 113n14), and since I shall argue contra Burge that this 
one does seem to be relevant to bridging psychology and neuroscience. Mereology is 
attractive because it promises both a general account of the way in which the mental 
depends on the physical, and a schema for physical explanations of mental causation. As 
for dependency, it has been suggested that objects that are indistinguishable with respect 
to physical micro-structure must also be indistinguishable with respect to mental 
properties. (Mereological supervenience, Kim, 1998, p. 17)  More importantly, we may 
be able to explain how mental causation is implemented physically by reference to the 
behavior of the parts constituting the nervous system. 
 With respect to models like supervenient causation, Burge admits that such 
“projects can be interesting,” but he denies that they are needed to account for causal 
relevance of mental properties. (Burge, 1993, p. 102) And even if part-whole relations are 
sometimes relevant for explanatory purposes, that need not always be so because 
[…] the relations of identity and physical composition are relations that have specific scientific 
uses. For example, we explain the behaviour of a molecule in terms of the behaviour of its 
component parts. It is far from clear that these compositional relations have a systematic scientific 
use in bridging psychology and neurophysiology […] They are guesses about what sort of relation 
might obtain. (Burge, 1993, p. 116)  
In a footnote he elaborates his skepticism to the relevance of mereology in bridging 
psychology and neuroscience: 
There are forms of materialism that maintain that all objects are decomposable into inorganic 
physical particles. […] they make a claim for the relevance of physical composition to our 
understanding of mental entities that seems to me (so far) quite unsupported by anything we know. 
(Burge, 1993, p. 113n14)46
46 Note that Burge in this quote is talking of decomposing mental entities into physical entities, whereas in 
the quote above he is talking about explaining the behavior of wholes in terms of the behavior of parts. His 
skepticism about the usefulness of part-whole relations to understanding the mental and mental causation 
appears quite general. When I defend the use of part-whole relations in understanding mental causation, 
[Footnote continued on next page]
79
Despite the relative merit of appealing to mereological relations in some scientific 
contexts, Burge argues that we do not, at least not at present, know whether it would be 
fruitful to apply them in relating psychology and neurophysiology. And we are even less 
entitled to make such relatedness a criterion for causal relevance. In the final section I 
shall argue that we do know enough to believe that part-whole relations are relevant to 
bridging psychology and neurophysiology. Some tight relation like perhaps mereological 
supervenience is required to understand how physical and mental causes are related. Part-
whole relations are also needed to understand how mental causation is implemented 
neurally. For now, however, I shall simply yield to the call of generality and recast what 
Burge explicitly says in a general Burgean principle: 
PACE1 Freedom of Metaphysical Relatedness. In different sciences the 
interesting metaphysical relations between causally relevant properties may vary; 
in particular the part-whole and identity relations may only be relevant in certain 
scientific contexts. 
4.3.2. (P2) and the Call for Mechanisms 
According to a popular and attractive idea causation requires causal mechanisms that 
mediate between cause and effect. While many different accounts of mechanisms have 
been proposed, it is often claimed that they must involve causation at some physical 
level. (Cp., e.g., Fodor, 1990) Especially in the philosophy of mind there is a lively 
discussion about causation as production, and of causes doing causal work to bring about 
their effects, and this work is often implicitly or explicitly construed as physical work. 
(Cp., e.g., Jackson, 1996, p. 394; Kim, 1998, p. 37; 2002a; 2005, p. 18) If one is thinking 
of causation in this way, it becomes pressing to account for how mental causation is 
related to the physical mechanisms that bring about bodily movements. Must mental 
causes themselves be productive causes, as Kim appears to require? Or is it sufficient that 
what I have in mind is the use of part-whole relations in mechanisms, to explain how mental causation is 
implemented physically. 
80
they supervene on underlying physical mechanisms? (Fodor, 1990) A less committal 
motivation for causal mechanisms is the following. Psychology simply is not a 
fundamental science, so mental causation cannot be basic or fundamental causation. 
Hence, mental causation requires underlying, presumably neurophysiological, 
mechanisms. 
 Not unexpectedly, Burge is skeptical of making mechanisms a constraint on 
causal relevance, because he thinks the call for mechanisms originates in practices which 
he takes to be very different from psychology. Looking for a mechanism “that would 
make possible causal interaction between two such different things as a physical event (or 
substance) and a mental event (or substance)” (Burge, 1993, p. 114) amounts to 
demanding a physical model of causation, and he questions the applicability of the 
physical model to psychology. In fact he goes as far as to question the need for any model 
of mental to physical causation: 
I have no satisfying response to the problem of explaining a mechanism. […] What is unclear is 
whether the question is an appropriate one in the first place. Demanding that there be an account 
of mechanism in mind-body causation is tantamount to demanding a physical model for 
understanding such causation. It is far from obvious that such a model is appropriate. It is not even 
obvious why any model is needed. (Burge, 1993, p. 114) 
From the point of view of mainstream philosophy of mind this is a rather puzzling and 
radical claim. How can we account for mental causation in a physical world, without 
invoking some notion of a mechanism? We should, however, note that Burge is not 
necessarily against all mechanistic explanation, as he thinks there are “underlying 
physical processes” on which mental processes depend. (Burge, 1993, p. 116) So 
presumably neuroscientists are free to discover mechanisms, but their mechanisms will 
not provide a model for mental causation. Perhaps, then, the mechanisms explain how 
physiological events (like retinal events, in perception) produce other physiological 
events (like muscle contractions). They do not, however, explain how mental events 
cause physiological events.  
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 The notion of a mechanism is arguably closely related to that of productive causes 
that is, roughly, of causes doing causal work to yield their effects.47 (Kim, 1998, p. 37; 
2002a; 2005, p. 18) Burge, in fact, thinks the Exclusion Argument and its idea that 
irreducibly mental causes and physical causes of bodily movements exclude one another, 
depends on a productive view of mental causes, that is on “thinking of mental causes on a 
physical model–as providing an extra ‘bump’ on the effect.” (1993, p. 115) However, he 
questions whether mental causation should be understood by reference to physical 
causation: “But whether the physical model of mental causation is appropriate is, again, 
part of what is at issue.” (1993, p. 115) Mental causes, presumably, must rationalize, but 
the claim that they must produce their effects as physical causes appear to do, seems hard 
to motivate from within psychology. In the more general Burgean position I am 
formulating, the mechanism critique is based on: 
PACE2 Freedom of Mechanism. Causation in different sciences may involve 
different causal mechanisms or perhaps they need not involve any mechanisms at 
all. 
In contrast with Burge I think we do need an account of mechanisms in mental causation 
to rule out epiphenomenalism, and below I shall argue so on a scientific basis that Burge 
should accept. 
4.3.3. (P3) and the Call for Locally Supervenient Properties 
As another illustration of Burge’s pluralistic attitude, consider more briefly his critique of 
narrow content. Conventional philosophical wisdom has it that (i) content properties like 
the property of believing that p are causally relevant to behavior. But (ii) content 
properties are not intrinsic to the organism. They depend on relations between the 
organism and its physical environment and linguistic community, and therefore fail to 
supervene locally on the organism’s non-relational physical properties. (Burge, 1979) 
47 Cp. paper (#1) for more details on the productive view of mental causation and its relation to 
mechanisms. 
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The much discussed problem of combining (i) and (ii) can be viewed as arising from a 
view about causation, claiming roughly that: (iii) causation is a local phenomenon that 
runs via the organism’s intrinsic properties, so causally relevant properties must be 
intrinsic or locally supervenient as well. Since ordinary (“wide”) content is causally 
irrelevant by (i) and (iii), psychology should appeal to some non-ordinary (“narrow”) 
content that is locally supervenient.  (Fodor, 1987, ch. 2; 1991a)  
 Given Burge’s view of causal relevance the debate boils down to the following 
question. Are properties that fail to supervene locally sometimes necessary for 
description of, e.g., intentional psychological patterns? Burge’s answer is a clear “yes.” 
This of course rests on his famous arguments for externalism about mental content 
(Burge, 1979), but he also thinks that externalism48 is required for pattern description in 
physiology (the heart-example), geology (continental drift) and social sciences 
(interactions between persons). (Burge, 1989) Generalizing, this Burgean attitude can be 
captured as follows: 
PACE3 Freedom of Property Kind. Different sciences may use different kinds of 
properties in their causal explanations; in particular causally relevant properties 
may or may not supervene locally. 
4.3.4. (P4) and the Call for Psychological Laws 
Finally, consider Burge’s argument against the need for psychological laws, which 
follows the same pattern. According to the Humean orthodoxy causation requires that 
there be some regularity or law relating cause and effect. Some philosophers, like 
Davidson (1980), think this regularity must be a strict law. Since there arguably are no 
strict psychological laws, Davidson suggested that mental events must be redescribed in 
the vocabulary of physics, which he assumed does allow for the formulation of strict 
laws. But it is at best unclear whether this strategy can live up to his critics’ demand that 
48 The reference to environmental factors may not be explicit, as Burge is eager to emphasize. What is 
meant is that the environment plays an essential role in individuation, i.e., in determining what the relevant 
entity is. (Burge, 1989, p. 313)  
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mental causation must be causation in virtue of the events’ mental properties. (See the 
papers on Davidson in Heil & Mele, 1993.)  
 Burges’ critique is a different one. He accuses Davidson of using a priori
reasoning outside its proper domain. “I think that we do not know, and cannot know a 
priori, that causal statements entail the existence of laws or explanatory systems that have 
such specific properties.” (Burge, 1993, p. 112) Elsewhere (1992) he makes it even 
clearer against Davidson that questions about the presence and nature of laws in causal 
explanations are empirical through and through: 
I do not think it a priori true, or even clearly a heuristic principle of science or reason, that causal 
relations must be backed by any particular kind of law. I think that we learn the nature and scope 
of laws (and the variety of sorts of “laws”) that back causal relations through empirical 
investigation. It is not clear that psychophysical counterfactual generalizations – or nonstrict 
“laws” – cannot alone “back” psychophysical causal relations. (Burge, 1992, p. 35, see also his 
1989, p. 318)  
This open attitude to the question of laws is perhaps all for the best, given the apparent 
paucity of strict laws in the sciences (Woodward, 2000), and given that many scientific 
explanations appear to depend more on descriptions of mechanisms than they do on laws. 
(Machamer et al., 2000, Woodward, 2002) Anyway, it seems clear that Burge dismisses 
the call for psychological causal laws because it is not motivated by reference to 
psychology itself. In general: 
PACE4 Freedom of Explanatory System. Different sciences may apply causal 
explanatory systems of different kinds; in particular it is not necessarily the case 
that all causal explanations be backed by strict laws. 
Summing up, Burge’s attitude to causal explanation is pluralistic. Depending on the 
patterns which are to be described causal explanations in different practices may vary 
along the axes of (PACE1-4). In particular, he thinks it is far from clear that causal 
relevance in psychology must be constrained by (P1)-(P4). In fact he thinks that some of 
these constraints – like (P3) and the call for narrow mental content – are misguided. His 
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arguments against the necessity of constraints (P1)-(P4) all follow the same pattern. 
Many physicalists are concerned with finding out how such constraints can come to be 
satisfied. But Burge thinks it is not clear that the constraints can be motivated by 
reference to psychology and the patterns of events it takes an interest in, and accordingly 
it is not clear that the corresponding problems of mental causation are real problems. As I 
said above, considerations of Burge’s explicit arguments against physicalists like 
Davidson, Fodor and Kim lend support to my interpretation of his theory of causal 
relevance. Given this view of causal relevance, and the Principle of Responsible 
Practices, it is not clear whether the “how”-questions the constraints give rise to are well-
motivated. If this interpretation is right, his lack of patience with “how”-questions would 
appear less abrupt.  
4.4. Causal Relevance in Psychology and Neuroscience 
With this general diagnosis of Burge’s position in hand we see that it is not an efficient 
response to Burge to dismiss his dismissiveness, and insist that the “how”-questions 
raised by (P1)-(P4) are interesting in their own right. If we are to counter Burge on his 
own turf, what is called for is rather a motivation of these problems from within 
explanatory practice. In my response to Burge I shall focus on (P1) and (P2). I argue that 
these constraints can be motivated from within an explanatory practice that is relevant to 
understanding mental causation, namely neuroscience. In this enterprise, mental 
causation is understood as involving underlying mechanisms, and some tight relation 
between mental and physical causes is needed. Burge’s arguments against (P1) and (P2) 
depend on treating the explanatory interests in mental causation and mechanisms as 
strongly independent. But in neuroscience these interests are combined. In particular, 
given what neuroscience tells us, I contend that part-whole relations are relevant to 
bridging psychology and neurophysiology. To this end I first offer descriptions of the 
“neural” and “mental” patterns of events in Burge’s example of the man running to the 
pharmacy, and extract an account of what kinds of events are causally relevant in these 
patterns. Second, I consider Patricia Goldman-Rakic’ theory of prefrontal cortex to show 
that neuroscience does take an interest in rational behavior, and not just in mere bodily 
movements.  
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 Since (P1) and (P2) can be motivated by reference to explanatory practice, it is at 
best unclear whether Burge can dismiss them as unwarranted without stipulating that 
neuroscience is not a relevant explanatory practice when it comes to understanding 
mental causation. But which practices are relevant to mental causation is, I contend, itself 
an empirical question.  
4.4.1. Neural and Psychological Patterns of Events 
Let us now analyze Burge’s case of the neurophysiological and the psychological pattern 
of events both of which lead to a man’s running to the pharmacy in more detail. This will 
provide us with a further illustration of patterns of events and causal relevance, and tell us 
what kinds of properties are causally relevant in psychology and neuroscience. This 
should interest us presently, as it will turn out that rational/cognitive properties are 
causally relevant in many neural explanations. Perhaps most importantly, we will be in 
no position to assess Burge’s claims that the patterns are very different and that we 
should feel no obligation to relate them unless we have some grasp of what they look like.
Accordingly, there is no way round looking at psychology and neuroscience to see what 
kinds of patterns they describe. I am aware that these are perilous and difficult grounds 
for a philosopher, but the alternative is in my view even riskier. Merely quantifying over 
physical properties and giving them names like “P” is hardly illuminating when what we 
are investigating is the nature of physical explanations. Burge would surely agree. I 
emphasize, though, that since he does not describe the patterns he is referring to it is 
impossible to tell whether the following story is the one he had in mind.  
 I want to start by setting aside some of the subtleties originating in the philosophy 
of action while offering a rough description of the psychological pattern, framed at the 
level of intentional psychology. I shall be relatively brief here, since I am drawing on 
conventional philosophical wisdom, and since philosophers of mind have typically 
devoted more time to intentional than neuroscientific explanations. Consider the 
following psychological pattern. The man’s perceiving that his son is ill, and his belief 
that people who are ill normally benefit from medicine, cause him to recognize that he 
has to lay his hands on the proper type of medicine if he is to relieve his son’s sufferings. 
In conjunction with his wanting to help his son, and his believing that running to the 
86
pharmacy would be more efficient than waiting for the doctor, this event causes the man 
to decide that he should run. That decision in turn causes the actual running.  
 The philosophical significance of this description is that it makes us see the 
running as the rational outcome of a pattern of events involving cognition and perhaps 
also considerations of normative constraints to the effect that one should help ones 
nearest and dearest. Arguably, a great number of psychological explanations express the 
same interest in patterns of events that exhibit (or fail to exhibit, as the case may be) 
rational and normative features.  
 Now, which properties are causally relevant to folk-psychology and the parts of 
academic psychology that study this kind of deliberation and action? That is, which 
properties are such that citing them facilitates the description of, e.g., the running as the 
outcome of a rational pattern of events? We can say at least that the properties to which 
the psychological verbs I italicized above refer must be causally relevant. After all, these 
are building blocks of propositional attitudes such as believing that p, desiring that q etc. 
Propositional attitudes are in turn typically taken to be part of the explanans in action 
explanations. More importantly, it is relatively uncontroversial that the verbs have the 
desired features of rationality and normativity. (Davidson, 1980) It is hard to spell out 
exactly what these features are and why the verbs must exhibit them. But there is no 
special mystery about how these descriptions single out properties that are causally 
relevant in the study of rational and irrational patterns of events.  
 More controversially, philosophers like Davidson (1980) and John McDowell 
(1994) claim that the vocabulary of the physical sciences inevitably fails to capture the 
rationality-features, so rationality-talk is conceptually irreducible to physical-talk. Let us 
acquiesce in this, at least for the time being, as it provides an illustration of causally 
irrelevant properties. If we cite only physical properties in our explanation of the running 
we will not be able to describe the relevant pattern. For the pattern will be non-rational
rather than rational or irrational. Rationality simply does not apply to it. (Or so Davidson 
and McDowell would probably claim.) 
 Secondly, we shall need at least a philosopher’s sketch of the neurophysiological 
pattern of events. Here I base my exposition primarily on text book introductions to the 
neuroscience of voluntary movement (Bear et al., 2001, ch. 14; Kandel et al., 2000, ch. 
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19 & 33; Rains, 2002, ch. 9 & 12). I shall turn to the details of one part of the pattern 
below when considering Goldman-Rakic’ view of prefrontal cortex.  
 The first thing to notice about our pattern is that neuroscientific analysis is much 
more fine-grained than the corresponding folk-psychological explanations. This is to be 
expected, insofar as neuroscience studies the control of movement at several levels, 
ranging from strategy (the goal of movement and choice of movement strategy) and 
tactics (how the goal is to be reached by way of spatial and temporal coordination of 
muscle contractions and relaxations) to execution (direct causing of 
contractions/relaxations). Psychology, or at least folk-psychology, on the other hand, is 
almost exclusively concerned with strategy. Within Burge’s framework, however, this 
difference does nothing to lessen the explanatory value of folk psychology as such value 
must always be measured relative to the explanatory aims of a given explanatory practice. 
For most folk-psychological purposes, a coarse-grained analysis is sufficient to describe 
the relevant patterns of events. If what we are interested in is why people run, we can 
leave the explanation of how they run to neuroscientists. 
 On the other hand, one might have thought that that neuroscience is not concerned 
with how goals, wants and strategies control behavior, and that it is therefore really a 
different and independent explanatory game. On closer inspection this turns out to be a 
mistake. Neuroscience does take an interest in this kind of control of behavior. In this 
respect, I contend, neuroscience and folk-psychology are on the same explanatory 
ground. This warrants some skepticism toward Burge’s claim that psychology and 
neuroscience “answer two very different types of enquiry.” (Burge, 1993, p. 116) Of 
course, the enquiries are different in some sense, but whether that sense serves to 
mutually insulate their respective explanatory aims is just the point at issue. It cannot be 
assumed.   
 A second thing to notice about the pattern is that neuroscience aims to describe 
how control of movement goes on as the action, e.g. the running, is carried out. Folk-
psychology typically appears to treats actions as simple two-step causal processes. An 
intention is formed, a bodily movement performed. Once again, this can be construed as a 
minor short-coming given folk-psychology’s explanatory aims. What is interesting, 
however, is the overlap in the explanatory interests between neuroscience and 
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psychology, so that prima facie it seems possible that explanatory competition or 
exclusion may arise unless (P1) is satisfied.  
 With the distinctions between tactics, strategy and execution in hand we can turn 
to the pattern of events that neuroscience tracks. While superficial and simplified in many 
ways, my description of this pattern nevertheless includes some details, for two reasons. 
First, I want to emphasize that the idea of a “neural pattern of events” is not an off-hand 
appeal to future idealized neuroscience, and that there is significant evidence for what we 
think we know about this pattern. (On the other hand, I should not be taken to imply that 
we have anything like a complete neurophysiological explanation of human behavior, 
that current models are immune to revision, or that the neural pattern of events could 
replace the psychological pattern just described.) Second, I want to bring out the nature
of the neural explanations at hand. Nevertheless, some readers may wish to read through 
these paragraphs relatively quickly. 
 (1) Perception of course comes first, and also plays a crucial role throughout the 
action. But it is not our primary interest here. So let me just say that it involves the 
extraction of inter alia visual information and plays a role in the formation of the man’s 
belief that his son is ill. 
 (2) The strategic part of the pattern is, on the other hand, highly relevant to us. 
This higher-level of control involves the goal of movements, and the choice of movement 
strategies to be used to reach that goal. Structures that are central to this level of control 
include the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the basal ganglia. PFC receives highly processed 
information about the world from the association areas for the five sensory modalities, 
and possibly also information about the organism’s motivational state from limbic 
structures. Furthermore, it can probably access long-term memory via its connections 
with hippocampal regions. These information-bearing connections alone suggest that 
PFC is in a position to integrate knowledge and motivation in the planning of strategies to 
reach relevant goals. This view of its function is supported inter alia by lesion studies, 
which show that damages to PFC can lead to failure in the rational guiding of behavior by 
motives and plans. We shall return to this in the next section. For now, let us just say that 
PFC is involved in the man’s decision to run.  
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 (3) Our example of the man’s running involves complex sequences of 
movements, so tactical areas of the brain must be involved in controlling how these 
movements are to be coordinated in space and time and in preparing the motor system for 
movement. This level of control may appear irrelevant for psychological purposes, but I 
have included it to emphasize that neuroscience, in apparent contrast with psychology, 
offers fine-grained and multilevel models of the control of bodily movements. 
Downstream from PFC goals and strategies seem to affect such areas in an indirect, 
roundabout way. A cortical-subcortical-cortical loop, running via the basal ganglia 
connects PFC strongly with the premotor (PMA) and the supplementary motor (SMA) 
areas. Several lines of evidence indicate that PMA and SMA areas play this kind of 
tactical role. Anatomically, they receive input from PFC via the basal ganglia, as just 
mentioned. They are also connected with parietal regions involved in storage of motor 
engrams, so they can probably access pre-programmed information about movement 
sequences. In their turn, PMA and SMA project to primary motor cortex (M1), which is 
the cortical region most directly involved in causing muscle contractions. Such 
anatomical considerations are supported inter alia by measurements of regional cerebral 
blood flow (rCBF) in human subjects during simple and complex movements. The 
measurements demonstrate increased activity in SMA in addition to M1 and primary 
somatosensory cortex (S1) during complex tasks, whereas the increase in activity during 
the simpler tasks is limited to M1 and S1. Microstimulation of PMA and SMA typically 
causes coordinated movements at more than one joint, whereas stimulation of M1 
typically yields only simple one-joint movements. And while it is not entirely clear how 
the tactical function of PMA and SMA is realized by representations at a cellular level, 
single cell recordings shed some light on this. Individual neurons in monkey PMA 
display activity that  (a) increases during periods where the monkey has received 
information about the direction of movement, but is waiting for an external “go” signal; 
(b) is normal or absent during the actual movement; and (c) is selective for the direction 
of the planned movement. In other words, some neurons are active prior to a movement 
to the left, but not prior to movements to the right, whereas the converse holds for other 
neurons. This kind of representational hypotheses formulated at the level of tactics should 
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interest us presently. It suggests that even at this level, neuroscience may not be 
completely a-cognitive.  
 Whatever the coding-scheme of PMA and SMA, M1 seems to some extent to take 
over as the most direct cortical cause of most movements. M1 is “somatotopically” 
organized, that is, it forms a kind of body-map. Stimulating different regions within it 
yields movements of different limbs. As for its coding-scheme it seems to represent 
movements and not individual muscle contractions, which means that M1-neurons affect 
groups of muscles. Specifically, M1 does not seem to code for displacement of the limb, 
but rather for force and direction of movement. Single cell recordings reveal that the 
firing rates of M1-neurons increase when we add weights in resistance of movement 
(making more force necessary), but decrease when weights facilitate the movement 
(making less force necessary). So at least to a first approximation we can say that force is 
proportional to firing rates.  
 In contrast, the coding-scheme for direction of movement appears to be an 
exquisite example of distributed and partially superposed representation, i.e., the relation 
between neurons and the movements coded for is many-many. First, recordings reveal 
that many neurons fire in the case of movements in a given direction. More intriguingly, 
the same neurons are involved in many directions of movements. They are, however, 
tuned to a preferred direction of movement – in the case of which they fire maximally – 
with the firing rates diminishing as the actual direction of movement deviates from the 
preferred direction. Each neuron thus “votes” for its preferred direction of movement, 
with its firing rate determining the weight of the vote. The activities of all neurons in the 
population thus add up to yield the actual direction of movement. 
 (3) The lowest level of control, execution, is concerned with the direct causal 
control of muscle fibers. This is achieved by the spinal cord and brain stem, which 
enervate the muscles.  The story does not end here, however. As already mentioned, 
neural control of movement goes on as complex actions are carried out. For instance, at 
the strategic level – the level describing how a movement sequence is to be carried out – 
the cerebellum plays a regulatory role. Lesions to the cerebellum cause disruptions in the 
coordination and flow of complex movements, and sufficient amounts of liquor will yield 
similar effects. (The cerebellum is highly sensitive to alcohol.) Anatomical considerations 
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also support this view of the cerebellum. It receives input from sensory areas and from 
PMA, SMA and M1 and projects back to these motor areas. Planned movements can thus 
be compared with actual movements, and appropriate corrections can be signaled back to 
motor areas. 
 What is the philosophical significance of this sketch? What does it tell us about 
the nature of the “neural pattern of events”? In summary, our simplified neuroscientific 
pattern involves an ongoing process of perception, strategy, tactics and execution. In 
particular it is noteworthy that there are actually several patterns of events at various 
levels of descriptive granularity. The causing of the man’s movement can be described as 
(a) the outcome of the interaction of several neural systems, the functions of which are 
described in a representational/information processing language. (Notice again that 
already now the distance between psychological and neuroscientific patterns appears to 
have diminished somewhat.) Parts of the pattern are also describable at (b) the neural 
circuit level, say, in terms of the distributed coding of M1 instructions. Finally, 
etiological characterizations can be produced at (c) the cellular/molecular level in terms 
of events that constitute the causing of individual neurons to fire. (I.e., a pattern of events 
involving events like ion channels opening, membrane potential reaching threshold, the 
releasing of neurotransmitter into the synaptic cleft etc.) Our pattern thus fits well with 
Kenneth Schaffner’s (1993, ch. 6) view of neuroscientific models as multi-level, or as 
spelled out in terms of events ranging from tissue to molecular levels.  
 As we might have expected, the whole thing turns out be quite complicated, even 
when simplified for philosophical purposes, which, of course, is not to say that it does not 
offer a promising model of behavior. Talk of a “neural pattern” of events leading up to 
bodily movements is not an off-hand appeal to future or idealized neuroscience.  Now, 
Burge is concerned with what kinds of properties are causally relevant to the explanation 
of bodily movements. Given this sketch of the neural pattern of events I think we can 
extract an account of what broad kinds of properties are causally relevant in the 
neuroscience of behavior. First, I take it that a central aim of many neuroscientists who 
take an interest in cognition and behavior is to discover biological mechanisms that show 
how the components of the neural system produce – in a suitably robust physical sense – 
behavior and mental phenomena ranging from thoughts to after-images. Furthermore, 
92
many of them aim to do so at increasingly lower levels of complexity. Aptness for 
figuring in mechanistic explanations, then, is arguably a central constraint on causal 
relevance in neuroscience. 
 But for present purposes it is just as important to note that this theoretical interest 
in mechanisms is for many neuroscientists combined with an interest in cognition and 
rationality. In the following quote, aimed at a popular audience, neuroscientist Goldman-
Rakic expresses just this combination of interests: 
Until recently, the fundamental processes involved in […] higher mental functions defied 
description in the mechanistic terms of science. Indeed, for the greater part of this century, 
neurobiologists often denied that such functions were accessible to scientific analysis or declared 
that they belonged strictly to the domain of psychology and philosophy. Within the past two 
decades, however, neuroscientists have made great advances in understanding the relation between 
cognitive processes and the anatomic organization of the brain. As a consequence even global 
mental attributes such as thought and intentionality can now be meaningfully studied in the 
laboratory. 
 The ultimate goal of that research is extraordinarily ambitious. Eventually researchers 
such as myself hope to be able to analyze higher mental functions in terms of the coordinated 
activation of neurons in various structures in the brain. (Goldman-Rakic, 1992, p. 73) 
As John Bickle (2003, p. 3) emphasizes, Kandel et al.’s (2000) influential text book, 
Principles of Neural Science, expresses a similar interest in cognition and mechanisms. 
Such methodological manifestos by neuroscientists appear to be radically at odds with 
Burge’s view that neuroscientific explanations of behavior are very different from, and 
make no essential assumptions about, psychological explanations of that behavior. 
(Burge, 1993, pp. 115-116) To a certain extent – given neuroscience’s interest in strategy 
– this criticism of Burge remains valid even when psychology is construed as folk-
psychology. 
 But so much for the ambitions of neuroscientists. Are their methods up to their 
explanatory aims? Perhaps the methodology Kandel et al. recommend does in fact 
involve what Davidson (1980) aptly called a “change of subject”? Will we inevitably lose 
the mental/cognitive perspective by looking for cellular and chemical mechanisms? Does 
the attempt to “understand the mental processes by which we perceive, act, learn and 
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remember” (Kandel et al., 2000, p. xxxv) in terms of biological mechanisms of necessity 
become the explanation of something else? Again, someone like Eric Kandel would deny 
this. His Nobel Prize lecture tells us that while beginning his groundbreaking memory 
research in the late Fifties he felt dissatisfied with the psychoanalytical view of the brain 
as a black box.  
From the beginning, my purpose in translating questions about the psychology of learning into the 
empirical language of biology was not to replace the logic of psychology or psychoanalysis with 
the logic of cell and molecular biology, but to try to join these two disciplines and to contribute to 
a new synthesis that would combine the mentalistic psychology of memory storage with the 
biology of neuronal signaling. (Kandel, 2000, p. 393, my italics. See Kandel, 2006, for more 
details on his “synthesis” of psychology and biology.) 
Presumably a Davidsonian explanatory “change of subject” takes place just in case a 
change of explanatory interests, e.g., from “rational patterns” to “productive patterns,” 
takes place. But Kandel and, as we shall see, Goldman-Rakic, are quite explicit that their 
explanatory interest have not changed; despite the added interest in productive 
mechanisms they are seeking the same quarry as the psychologists. Most importantly, 
they have been quite successful. A philosopher once told me that neuroscience can only 
trace causes of bodily movements to the periphery of the brain (to the motor cortex?), so 
psychology is needed to find earlier causes of behavior. But given the above description 
about the neuroscience of behavior, this kind of claim seems dubious. We know a great 
deal about how neural systems upstream from motor cortex play a role in the strategy and 
tactics of movement. We shall see that Goldman-Rakic’ results add to the evidence that 
neuroscience is relevant to matters psychological.  
 Apart from this kind of success in discovering cognitive mechanisms, there is 
another reason why even cellular/molecular neuroscience – let alone higher-level 
cognitive neuroscience – does not necessarily abandon the psychological perspective. It 
seems to me that often, e.g., in the pattern description we are considering, an interest in 
productive mechanisms is combined with an interest in viewing these mechanisms as 
ways of processing information. There is at any rate much (admittedly unsystematic) talk 
in neuroscience of “signaling,” “representing,” “encoding,” “processing” and 
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“transference” of information. But this is the very perspective that has been prominent 
among (cognitive) psychologists ever since they bid farewell to behaviorism.  Similarly, 
this broad perspective is shared with philosophical attempts to naturalize mental content. 
(E.g., Dretske, 1988)  
 Notably, the link between an interest in cognition and the methodology of 
adopting an information processing perspective is not arbitrary. If the explanandum in 
neuroscience really is to be ultimately cognitive, as Goldman-Rakic and Kandel suggest, 
notions like information and its cognates are experimentally useful, perhaps even 
essential. Neuroscientific hypothesises about mechanisms are frequently formulated in 
terms of, say, possible coding-schemes that neural systems might utilize. Whether the 
information talk is ultimately simply an exercise in heuristics, I do not know. But I think 
we can safely say that to the extent that neuroscience is concerned with events like 
parents running to pharmacies, it is also interested in viewing these events as the outcome 
of (a) productive biological mechanisms in the neural system that (b) involve information 
processing.
 Having described neuroscientific patterns of events we must proceed to track 
down properties that are causally relevant to this kind of pattern. Interestingly, what we 
find will depend on the level of descriptive granularity at which the pattern is described. 
If we remain at the cellular-molecular level the relevant properties will be properties like 
those that affect whether a given neuron will fire, and at what frequency it will fire, or 
properties that affect neural plasticity (“synaptic strength”). Accordingly, causally 
relevant properties will include the connectivity among neurons, the presence and number 
of ion channels of various sorts, the amount of neurotransmitter released, the rate of 
neurotransmitter reuptake, the various genetic and biochemical factors that can affect 
synaptic strength and so on and so forth. These causally relevant properties seem 
increasingly to be describable purely in the language of biochemistry. (Or so Bickle 
(2003) argues.)  
 What about higher levels like cognitive neuroscience and the study of how, e.g., 
different neural systems interact? As we saw in our brief sketch of a pattern, talk about 
representations of goals and plans etc. is prominent at this level of discourse. Hence, 
relative to this level, straightforwardly intentional properties come out as causally 
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relevant according to Burge’s criterion. This should interest us in the present context. 
One might have thought that the only concepts relevant to describing the 
neurophysiological pattern would be rendered in a purely chemical, non-cognitive 
language. But it seems clear that cognitive/psychological language is “Burge-relevant” to 
the causal explanation of the neuroscientific pattern, given the current state of 
neuroscience. The significance of this is that neuroscience is not as independent of 
psychology as Burge appears to envision. Neuroscience aims to understand cognitive 
processes, and how they are implemented neurally, and invoking mechanisms is a crucial 
part of this enterprise. 
4.4.2. Patricia Goldman-Rakic’ Theory of Prefrontal Cortex 
Throughout this discussion I have suggested grounds on which Burge’s treatment of 
psychology and neuroscience as being strongly independent could be challenged. Here I 
offer a more detailed example which demonstrates that this treatment is in fact deeply 
problematic, by considering the theory of prefrontal cortex (PFC) that was developed by 
the late neuroscientist Goldman-Rakic and her co-workers.49  This line of research is a 
natural example, because it represented a major breakthrough in the study of higher 
cognitive functions, and because even many neuroscientists at one point thought PFC and 
its role in higher cognition to be beyond their explanatory powers. (Arnsten, 2003) We 
have already seen that PFC is critically involved in the strategic control of behavior. I aim 
to show that (i) Goldman-Rakic’ work combines an interest in cognition and rationality 
with an interest in underlying productive mechanisms at the cellular and sub-cellular 
levels; and that (ii) part-whole relations are critical in understanding how these 
mechanisms give rise to cognitive processes. Thus her work is an example of an 
explanatory practice that is interested in rationality and yet respects constraints (P1) and 
(P2). This renders Burge’s dismissal of (P1)-(P2) implausible, for reasons he himself 
should accept. 
49 For an exposition of much of the same work with a view to consciousness, see Bickle, 2003, ch. 4. 
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 Lesion studies going back at least to the famous case of Phineas P. Gage in 1848 
(Damasio, 1994) tell us that damage to PFC can lead to a confusing variety of cognitive 
and motivational disorders. Different subjects with PFC lesions display a multitude of 
symptoms including apparent lack of motivation, deficits in control of motivation, and 
inability to carry out plans to reach goals. (For an overview see Rains, 2002, ch. 12.) For 
instance, subjects with PFC deficits may seem apathic and unable to initiate action, or 
they may act uncritically and in socially unacceptable ways on whims of the moment. In 
their attempts to reach goals they may initiate procedures that would have been effective, 
only to become distracted and initiate different and unrelated procedures instead. These 
deficiencies may be due to a general dependence on environmental cues for determining 
what to do, rather than relying on plans that remain stable in spite of environmental 
changes. (“Environmental dependency syndrome,” LHermitte (1986).) Furthermore, 
evidence from inter alia imaging studies implicates PFC in the cognitive deficits 
characteristic of diseases like schizophrenia and Parkinson’s. What this shows is that 
failure of PFC functioning can cause failures in rationality, motivation and agency, which 
belong in Burge’s rational/cognitive patterns of events. These deficits have inspired 
several theories of PFC-functioning, of which Goldman-Rakic’ is a prominent example. 
(I am in no position to assess its merits relative to other theories, but there can be little 
doubt that it represents a mainstream theory that combines an interest in cognition with 
an interest in productive mechanisms, and that is strictly speaking all the present 
argument requires.) According to Goldman-Rakic’ hypothesis the essence of PFC-
function is the “regulation of behavior by representational knowledge”. (1987, p. 374) In 
an often used metaphor, PFC keeps information “on line” in the absence of a direct 
information flow from the environment. She therefore appealed to what many cognitive 
psychologists, like Alan Baddeley (2003), call “working memory,” or metaphorically the 
mind’s “blackboard” or “sketch pad” in several later papers on PFC. Now, if we can take 
this representational language at face value Goldman-Rakic’ explanations seem 
straightforwardly cognitive and rational. True, much PFC research has targeted lower-
level psychological phenomena like spatial working memory. And it is by no means 
obvious that the most fruitful notion of representation for neuroscientific purposes must 
be propositional or sentential representation, though that is typically taken to be the 
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representational notion implicit in folk-psychology. So it may very well be that mature 
neuroscientific explanations of behavior and folk-psychological explanations answer 
“two very different types of enquiry” (Burge, 1993, p. 116) insofar as they differ along 
the sentential/non-sentential axis. But even the “eliminativist” non-sententialist view does 
not entail that the neuroscientific explanandum is non-representational, non-cognitive or 
non-rational. To reach that conclusion we would have to follow Davidson (1980) who 
seems to reserve terms like “rationality” and “cognition” for sentential modes of 
representation. Given this restricted use of rationality, adapting a non-sentential notion of 
representation will count as a change of subject. However, this is probably not an option 
available to someone like Burge, who must insist on individuating cognition as cognitive 
scientists do if he is to retain the primacy of explanatory practice.50  Also, he should have 
some sympathy with the kind of argument that Patricia Churchland urged already 25 
years ago. Insisting on a sentential mode of representation for philosophical reasons may 
actually hinder progress in neuroscience. (Churchland, 1980) Returning to the relevance 
for personal level psychology, we should note that Goldman-Rakic, for one, was 
unwilling to rest content with the simple and experimentally well-behaved case of spatial 
memory. Rather she speculated that “the evolution of a capacity to guide behavior by 
representation of stimuli rather than by stimuli themselves introduces the possibility that 
concepts and plans can govern behavior.” (Goldman-Rakic, 1987, p. 378, my italics.) 
This is exactly what we want from rationalizing action explanations. In fact, it may no 
longer be mere speculation. Quite recently (Genovesio et al., 2005) claims have been 
made about PFC neurons that appear to represent which strategy an experimental animal 
is currently using, much in the same way as other PFC neurons appear to represent spatial 
locations, as we shall see shortly. Even more intriguingly with respect to neuroscientific 
50 Even for Davidson, adopting the restricted notion of cognition/rationality comes at a high price. Most, if 
not all, animals, and even prelinguistic children, would be deprived of their status as cognizant, leaving 
mature humans as the only thinking creatures. That, however, is arguably implausible from a biological and 
evolutionary point of view. Furthermore, the notion of cognition would be at odds with that generally used 
in cognitive science.
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explanations of actions, it has been suggested that PFC neurons might encode the 
subjective value of offered and chosen options. (Wallis, 2006) 
 The cognitive deficits discussed so far are best measured by behavioral tasks like 
delayed response tasks (DRT) and the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCS) that require 
working memory. I shall only consider DRTs here, since they have been instrumental to 
the discovery of neural mechanisms. In a classical DRT, devised as far back as the 
Thirties, a monkey is first showed that a food reward is varyingly placed in one of two 
possible wells and covered by a lid. A screen is then lowered for a given time, thus 
disrupting the sensory input from the wells to the monkey. When the screen is raised after 
the delay the monkey must respond by choosing the correct well, based solely on its 
internal representation in spatial working memory. (E.g., “this time the food is hidden in 
the left well.”) Monkeys with appropriately induced PFC lesions are severely impaired in 
this task. But they succeed in alternative tasks where they can rely on associative memory 
plus environmental cues present at the time of choice. (For instance if the food is always
hidden in the left well, the monkey can rely on an association between left and food.) 
These experiments therefore demonstrate that simple associative memory is singly 
dissociable from working memory.  
 Given the simplicity of the DRT-task it might seem like the difference between 
the two types of memory is relatively trivial, and it may be hard to see what bearing 
working memory has on rationality and agency. In view of certain characterizations of 
PFC as “the region of the brain that is most essentially related to who we are, both as 
human beings and as individuals” (Rains, 2002, p. 378), one might expect its essence to 
be phrased in more suggestive terms than the seemingly dull “working memory.” 
However, working memory appears to me to be an extremely potent notion in accounting 
for our agency and relative freedom. To see this, note that, if Goldman-Rakic’ view of 
PFC is along the right lines, schizophrenics and subjects with PFC lesions may 
metaphorically be said to be hostages of their environment. To the extent that they are 
limited to using associative memory – which not improbably is evolutionarily older than 
working memory – they are also dependent on potentially random cues from the 
environment for initiating action. (After all, even simple creatures like fruit flies and sea 
slugs are capable of learning rudimentary associations between stimuli and response.) 
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Indeed, Goldman-Rakic speculated that “the brain’s working memory function, i.e., the 
ability to bring to mind events in the absence of direct stimulation, may be its inherently 
most flexible mechanism and its evolutionarily most significant achievement.” 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1995, p. 483) Perhaps, then we could view failure in working memory 
as one type of failure or breakdown in freedom of the will. Obviously, having a properly 
functioning PFC will not make me free in any libertarian sense, but it might still be a vital 
part of what provides me with the limited kind of freedom that is likely to be available to 
biological creatures like myself. 
 Goldman-Rakic’ use of neuroscience to rethink the nature of schizophrenia is 
another interesting illustration of an attempt to illuminate cognition by neuroscientific 
means. Methodologically she seems to have started from the above psychological 
characterization of PFC function, found support for this in lower-level neuroscience (see 
below), and noted that symptoms of schizophrenia are psychologically similar to those 
resulting from PFC lesions and that schizophrenia is also at a neuroscientific level 
associated with certain PFC deficits. This lead her to suggest that: “If, as these 
[neuroscientific] findings suggest, the prefrontal cortex is centrally involved in 
schizophrenia, perhaps we can begin to think of this disorder as comprising a breakdown 
in the processes by which representational knowledge governs behavior.” (Goldman-
Rakic, 1987, p. 404) Thus, neuroscience and psychology combine in an attempt to 
reconceptualize at least certain aspects of a psychological disorder that has been 
notoriously hard to define.  
 So far, I have only considered correlational, higher-level evidence in the shape of 
lesion and imaging studies to argue that both psychology and neuroscience take an 
explanatory interest in rationality, and that methodologically they are interdependent. 
This casts some doubts on Burge’s claim that they correspond to very different 
explanatory purposes (Burge, 1993, p. 116), and the assumption that the explanations 
must be somehow tightly related as demanded by (P1) does not seem that unreasonable. 
However, all this is in perfect accordance with Burge’s claim that “there are surely some 
systematic, even necessary, relations between mental events and underlying physical 
processes.” (Burge, 1993, p. 116)  
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 To counter Burge I therefore need to show that neuroscience offers explanations 
that combine productive mechanisms with an interest in mental causation, and that part-
whole relations are involved in offering mechanistic models for mental causation. I 
attempt to achieve this by examining relevant PFC research as it proceeds from 
behavioral studies to discovering productive mechanisms. It is interesting to note that 
Goldman-Rakic in a popular scientific paper took care to make the following 
methodological comment. “Whole-brain studies tell us only part of the story; to 
understand the details of how signals pass to and from the prefrontal cortex, one must 
scrutinize the brain on a cellular scale.” (Goldman-Rakic, 1992, p. 77)  
 A breakthrough in this lower-level search for a mechanism came with the use of 
single cell recordings in PFC and the discovery in the Seventies that cells in the principal 
sulcus of the dorsolateral primate PFC instantiate so-called “memory fields.” These fields 
are most conveniently studied in an oculomotor (ODR) version of the DRT. Here, the 
monkey is surgically prepared for single-cell recordings with its head fixated as it 
watches a TV screen. It is trained to maintain fixation at a spot at the center of the screen 
while a stimulus flashes somewhere the periphery (e.g. at 0º or 45º) and then disappears. 
The monkey’s task is to saccade – i.e., move its gaze quickly – to the remembered 
location where the stimulus appeared, but only when he receives a signal to do so. This 
signal is the disappearing of the central spot after a delay of several seconds. If the 
monkey responds correctly by saccading to the location of the target after the delay, it 
receives a small liquid reward. (Motivation is ensured by prior dehydration of the 
monkey.) Importantly, the absence of the target during the delay period requires the 
monkey to utilize an internal, working memory representation of the target location.  
 Recording from PFC neurons in the behaving monkey yields intriguing results. 
There are neurons whose firing rates (i) increase during the delay-period prior to a 
saccade to targets located at a specific direction (say 0º) or nearby directions and (ii) 
decrease prior to saccades to the opposite of this “preferred” direction (say 180º). In other 
words, these neurons are spatially tuned to a memory field consisting of the location(s) 
for which they fire maximally. Strong evidence indicates that these neurons are at least 
part of “the cellular basis” (Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1995, p. 572) or “cellular 
correlates” (Goldman-Rakic, 1995, p. 477) of spatial working memory. For instance, 
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failure in making the correct saccade is invariably correlated with failure in maintaining 
neural activity during delay. (Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1995) In this (admittedly 
highly controlled) laboratory setting it is therefore possible to predict whether the monkey 
has forgotten the target location or not, simply by measuring the activity of individual
neurons.
 This is a substantial result in its own right, and strongly suggests that these 
neurons play a role in representing memory locations. But most importantly, PFC 
research is beginning to reveal the mechanisms by which neurons give rise to working 
memories. So our correlational story is currently being supplemented with an equally 
interesting how-story, of which I shall briefly consider just one aspect. The aspect I shall 
consider is this. What sustains the pattern of increased firing of neurons which prefer 
locations in the remembered direction, and inhibited firing of neurons which prefer the 
opposite direction during the delay? That is, how are temporally stable memory fields 
implemented neurally? 
 Several anatomical and physiological assumptions enter into Goldman-Rakic 
(1995) hypothetical model to explain this. (Cf. fig. 1.) First, it appears that pyramidal 
PFC neurons are organized column-wise. Pyramidal neurons with similar preferred 
directions are gathered in vertical cortical columns, with the preferred direction changing 
as one moves tangentially across cortex from column to column. Pyramidal neurons with 
similar preferred directions (e.g. 90º) in the same and different columns may be 
connected directly and reciprocally by horizontal excitatory connections. (The majority 
of pyramidal PFC neurons appear to use excitatory amino acids as their 
neurotransmitter.) Additionally, PFC contains non-pyramidal interneurons that also 
exhibit preferred directions. The preferred direction of these neurons is often the opposite 
of nearby pyramidal neurons. Pyramidal neurons with opposite preferred directions (e.g., 
90º vs. 270º) appear to be connected indirectly and reciprocally via these inhibitory 
interneurons. This circuitry, where neurons are organized in what Goldman-Rakic calls 
“excitatory-inhibitory units” (Goldman-Rakic, 1995, p. 481), would neatly explain the 
opposite memory fields. A 90º pyramidal neuron forms excitatory connections with an 
interneuron, which in turn forms an inhibitory connection with a 270º pyramidal 
interneuron. For instance, increased firing of the 90º neuron during the delay after a 90º 
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stimulus would excite the inhibitory interneuron, which in turn reduces the firing of the 
270º neuron. Simultaneously the reciprocal excitatory connections between 90º neurons 
would ensure increased reverberating activity of many of these neurons over time during 
the delay. 
Fig. 1: Hypothetical circuitry that could maintain activity characteristic of working memory during the 
delay period. Only two cortical columns are included. Triangles = pyramidal neurons. Circles = non-
pyramidal interneurons. Solid arrows = excitatory connections. Dashed arrows = inhibitory connections. 
Text indicates a neuron’s memory field. (Adapted from Goldman-Rakic, 1995, fig. 5; Arnsten, 2003, fig. 
5B) 
 This of course is no complete explanation of the mechanisms underlying spatial 
working memory, and the monkey’s performance of the ODR-task. Another aspect, 
which has been the subject of much recent research, is how dopaminergic input to the 
pyramidal neurons contributes to memory fields. Investigations into this aspect have 
taken neuroscientists to the subcellular level, where various dopamine receptors are 
thought to play an important role. (Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1995, see also Arnsten, 
2003; Bickle, 2003, ch. 4) 
 What I have provided, then, is but a sketch of one aspect of one mechanism 
thought to underlie one cognitive function attributed to PFC. Nevertheless, it serves to 
underscore that current neuroscience offers promising models for how mental causation 
is implemented neurally. Realigning our gaze to the neural pattern of events described 
above, we can see how such mechanisms play a role in more complex control of 
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intelligent behavior, involving many mechanisms in many cerebral regions. The pattern 
of events leading up to the man’s running takes place within a structure of interrelated 
neural systems, which is summarized by figure 2. (Importantly, this figure is a simplified 
adaptation of the figure neuropsychologist Dennis G. Rains (2002) uses to introduce the 
neurophysiology of voluntary behavior in his text book.) 
Fig. 2: Interactions of neural systems in the control of behavior. (Simplified and adapted from Rains (2002, 
p. 229 fig. 9.1) 
4.4.3. Mental Causation, Mechanisms and Part-Whole Relations 
Sketchy as they are, these descriptions of the neural pattern of events and the mechanisms 
thought to underlie spatial working memory have the desired features for a response to 
Burge. Recall that Burge is skeptical that a tight relation between mental and physical 
causes is needed to ground the causal efficacy of the mental. In particular he doubts that 
part-whole relations can be used to bridge neurophysiology and psychology. (Cp. (P1)) 
Furthermore, he is skeptical about the need for a mechanism in models for mental 
causation. Indeed, he takes it to be unclear whether any model for mental causation is 
needed. (Cp. (P2)) The rationale for this skepticism appears to be that he doubts whether 
(P1) and (P2) can be motivated from within relevant explanatory practices. My central 
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contention is that this doubt is only well-founded if we follow Burge in treating 
psychology and neuroscience as strongly independent. But as my examples illustrate, this 
treatment is in fact deeply problematic, because in neuroscience the explanatory interests 
in mental causation and in mechanisms are combined. Constraints (P1) and (P2) can 
arguably be motivated from within neuroscientific explanatory practice, and this practice 
is relevant to understanding mental causation. 
 First, with respect to the need for a mechanism, I contend that neuroscience offers 
putative explanations of how mental causation occurs in a physical world. It does so by 
offering models for mental causation that are mechanistic in nature. Setting Davidsonian 
qualms about attributing cognition to animals and worries about non-sentential modes of 
representation aside, we know the monkey saccades to the left because it remembers that 
the target appeared to the left and because it wants its juice-reward. This is mental 
causation. How does it happen? In neuroscience this question calls for an answer 
involving neural mechanisms. Goldman-Rakic’ story about the mechanisms underlying 
working memory appears to be intended as a part of such an answer. Whether we as 
philosophers should interpret the answer as reductive or antireductive, I do not know. A 
reductionist might see a potential reduction here. She could say that by describing the 
neural mechanisms for mental causation we are simultaneously describing the neural 
process to which the mental causal process might reduce. An antireductionist would want 
to stop short of this, and claim that while the mental causal process involving working 
memory depends on, and occurs in virtue of, such mechanisms, it is not reducible to 
them. He would contend that the mechanisms are underlying mechanisms, perhaps 
endorsing some model of supervenient causation. But whoever is right, the call for a 
model of mental causation involving a mechanism arises naturally from neuroscientific 
explanatory practice. Indeed, to discover mechanisms in mental causation is a central part 
of neuroscience’s explanatory aims. 
 Second, with respect to the call for tight relations between mental and physical 
causes, we know that the monkey’s saccade has neural causes. The firing of PFC neurons 
which are presumed to have “left”-memory fields are likely to be prominent among these 
causes. Since we want to explain the causal role of the memory, it would seem that some 
tight relation between it and neural causes is required. The phrases “cellular basis” 
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(Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1995, p. 572) or “cellular correlates” (Goldman-Rakic, 
1995, p. 477) of working memory were presumably invoked partly for this reason. Again 
a reductionist might see in these neurons’ firing activity a potential partial reduction base 
for working memory, whereas an antireductionist might see a potential partial 
supervenience base to be used in a model of supervenient causation. It seems, then, that 
mental causes must bear some tight relation like supervenience to neural causes if 
Goldman-Rakic’ model is to help explain how working memory is possible and how it 
affects behavior. 
 Third, part-whole relations appear crucial to the mechanistic explanations we 
have been considering. Figure 1 offers a partial explanation of how stable memory fields 
could be maintained. But it is only explanatory because of what we know about relevant 
properties of the parts (e.g., that the relevant pyramidal neurons are excitatory) and how 
the parts are organized (e.g., how pyramidal neurons are interconnected via non-
pyramidal interneurons). This does not explain how firing rates of pyramidal neurons 
might come to represent or be about spatial locations, of course. For that a story about 
representation, perhaps something along the lines of Dretske’s teleological/functionalist 
account (1988, ch. 3) is required. But it does show that part-whole relations are required 
to explain how neural firing rates come to be reliably correlated with spatial locations. 
Such correlations are arguably a prerequisite for working memory representation in 
Goldman-Rakic’ model. Furthermore, part-whole relations surface again in figure 2, 
which offers a model of how different neural systems interact to produce intelligent 
behavior. Here the properties attributed to the parts are partly cognitive. The figure allows 
us to see the role of structures like PFC in producing behavior, because we have qualified 
beliefs about what kinds of cognitive functions these structure serve, what kind of 
information they receive from other structures, and what kind of information they convey 
to other structures. But again, part-whole relations – and anatomical connections – are 
crucial to the explanation of how the structures interact in the production of behavior. 
Pace Burge, mereology and mechanisms do seem to matter in low and high level 
neuroscience, even when the explanandum is cognitive. The importance of appeals to 
part-whole relations does not imply that mental events or entities are composed by 
physical events or entities, but it does show that the relations play an important role in 
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explaining how the brain serves cognitive functions. Burge can of course insist that these 
mereological models are “guesses as to what sort of relations may obtain.” (Burge, 1993, 
p. 116) But they are certainly qualified guesses, guesses that are supported by empirical 
evidence, and that yield prospective mechanistic answers to questions like why specific 
lesions cause specific psychologically characterized deficiencies.51   
 The familiar questions about mental causation remain. Does, for instance, the 
Exclusion Argument require us to identify mental causes with physical causes? Or will 
some tight, but antireductive relation like supervenience suffice to rule out exclusion? Is 
supervenient causation just epiphenomenalism in disguise? Though it may be beneficial 
to consider these questions anew and more concretely from the point of view of 
neuroscience, it is not clear how they should be answered. I only want to maintain against 
Burge that they do not appear to be misguided questions. They arise naturally from 
reflections on explanatory practice. Considerations of the neuroscientific explanatory 
practice of which Goldman-Rakic’ research is an instructive example appears to 
undermine Burge’s doubts about (P1) and (P2) for reasons he himself should accept. 
51 Curiously, Burge may not mind these “guesses” because they come from scientists as opposed to 
philosophers. Georges Rey reports an interesting discussion he has had with Burge on cognitive 
psychology. “In correspondence, Burge has claimed to be opposed only to ‘philosophical’ and not to 
‘scientific’ interpretations of physicalism and the ‘computer’ model [of the mind].” (Rey, 2001, p. 122n4) 
But if Burge were to take a parallel attitude to the questions we have been considering, his arguments 
would only threaten what we might call “armchair” physicalism. That is, as long as our endorsement of 
physicalist constraints on causal relevance is informed by science, Burge’s presumed distinction between 
scientific and philosophical physicalism would collapse. 
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5. Paper (#3): Is there a Binding Problem of 
Behavior? E.J. Lowe on Causal Closure 
ABSTRACT: The Causal Closure of Physics plays a central role in the Exclusion Argument for 
reductive physicalism, and even antireductive physicalists typically take it to express a strong 
physicalist claim to which they assent. However, E.J. Lowe argues that the principle is compatible 
with a dualistic view of mental causation, which few physicalists would accept. Mental events 
play an essential role in causing bodily movements, but this contribution is invisible from the point 
of view of neuroscience. He suggests that neuroscience faces a “binding problem” of behavior 
which likely requires such “invisible mental causation” for its solution. Finally, he thinks that 
invisible mental causation is immune to empirical refutation. As a response I argue first that 
Lowe’s motivations for invisible mental causation is insufficiently developed. Second, I show that 
Lowe’s argument for invisible mental causation does in fact depend on empirical assumptions 
about the nature of neural causation, which Lowe does not justify. So Lowe’s argument is 
inconclusive, and there are no principled obstacles to using empirical evidence to dismiss invisible 
mental causation. Third, I argue on empirical grounds that it is far from clear that there is any 
“binding problem of behavior” that cannot be solved using standard neuroscientific methodology. 
In the absence of a problem that cannot be solved by neuroscience, the case for invisible mental 
causation would collapse.  
Now I a fourfold vision see, 
And a fourfold vision is given to me; 
’Tis fourfold in my supreme delight 
And threefold in soft Beulah’s night 
And twofold Always.  May God us keep 
From Single vision & Newton’s sleep! 
– William Blake52
52 This quote, in which Blake complains about what he took to be the restricted, “single vision” of 
Newtonian physics is from a letter to Thomas Butts, November 22, 1802. (Blake, 1966, p. 818) 
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5.1. Introduction  
The Causal Closure of Physics is a central tenet of physicalism. To a first approximation 
it states that: 
(CCP) Any physical event that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical 
cause.53
This is a strong and important metaphysical claim in its own right, for it is intended to 
ascribe a radical causal self-sufficiency to the physical domain. It also plays an important 
role in the much discussed Exclusion Argument. This argument concludes that unless 
mental events reduce to physical events, they must be epiphenomenal or causally inert 
vis-à-vis the physical. If this threat of epiphenomenalism is real, philosophers should be 
strongly motivated towards reducing the mental. It is part of the commonsensical and 
scientific understanding of mentality that mental events, like the occurrence of beliefs and 
desires, cause bodily movements. But being physical, bodily movements must have 
physical sufficient causes, by CCP. Add to this some Principle of No Overdetermination, 
claiming roughly that physical effects like bodily movements are not generally 
overdetermined by more than one sufficient cause. Then, given their physical causes, 
there seems to be no room for additional and non-reducibly mental causes of bodily 
movements. (See, e.g., Kim, 1998, ch. 2; 2005, ch. 2)  
 Thus stated the use of CCP in the Exclusion Argument does not beg the question 
against antireductionists by ruling out the possibility of bodily movements being causally 
overdetermined by two sufficient causes, one mental and one physical. That job is left for 
the No Overdetermination Principle, with which some antireductionists, like Barry 
Loewer (2002), take issue. Perhaps for this reason, CCP is widely accepted among 
reductive and antireductive physicalists alike. However, acceptance of the principle is not 
53 As we shall see, closure principles can be formulated in many ways. To allow for indeterminism it is 
sometimes said that all physical events have their chances determined by prior physical events. (Papineau, 
2001, p. 8n2) This complication is not relevant to Lowe’s position, however, and Lowe formulates closure 
principles independently of it. 
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universal among philosophers at large. In particular E.J. Lowe, whose position is dualist 
and antiphysicalist,54 thinks that CCP is false. The reason is that he takes CCP to be 
incompatible with the freedom of the will, which he thinks cannot be rationally doubted. 
(Lowe, 2003, p. 145) More interestingly for present purposes, he argues that there is no 
empirically plausible version of CCP that will make the Exclusion Argument valid 
without begging the question against dualists. (Lowe, 2000; 2003) To demonstrate this he 
describes two dualistic scenarios – where physical causes really need “help” from mental 
causes to bring about bodily movements – that are nevertheless compatible with the 
principle. This argument, then, is not against CCP as such, but rather against its use in the 
Exclusion Argument. Since Lowe claims that the contribution of these mental causes 
would be invisible from a physical point of view (2000, p. 580), I call this doctrine 
“invisible mental causation.” While the doctrine appears to be intended primarily as a 
response to the Exclusion Argument, and hence to reductive physicalism, I doubt that 
many antireductionists would subscribe to it. The dispute, then, seems to be between 
dualism and physicalism in general. (Though I shall argue that it is also a dispute between 
dualism and science.)  
 CCP can at any rate be strengthened so as to rule out invisible mental causation, 
but Lowe does not think that would be empirically or philosophically warranted. In fact, 
he suggests that we should favor invisible mental causation over physicalist alternatives. 
For he takes it that neuroscience faces a binding problem of behavior – allegedly similar 
to the binding problem in perception – which requires something like invisible mental 
causation for its solution.55  While I think Lowe is right in demanding empirical evidence 
for physicalism, I shall argue that his argument for invisible mental causation is 
inconclusive at best. I show that this argument relies on an empirical assumption which 
54 For instance, he (1999) doubts mind-body supervenience, which is commonly taken to define the 
minimal commitments of physicalism. (Lewis, 1983; Jackson, 1998, ch. 1) It will also become clear from 
Lowe’s suggestions that he favors an outright dualistic conception of the mental causation that few 
physicalists, reductive or antireductive, would accept. 
55 I emphasize that Lowe does not explicitly commit himself to invisible mental causation rather than other 
dualist views of mental causation. He does, however, offer reasons to prefer it over physicalist alternatives.  
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he does not justify. Furthermore, I argue that it is far from clear that it can be justified. It 
is not clear that there is any binding problem of behavior, or at any rate, none that is 
likely to require anything but standard neuroscientific methods for its solution. 
Consequently, I do not think Lowe has provided us with sufficient reasons for favoring 
invisible mental causation over physicalist alternatives. Whatever problems there are with 
CCP and the Exclusion Argument, invisible mental causation does not appear to be one 
of them. 
5.2. The Case for Causal Closure  
Before considering Lowe’s argument I will briefly summarize the case that has been 
made for CCP. I do so because this is presumably the kind of arguments that Lowe thinks 
are insufficient to rule out invisible mental causation, but also because I am in a certain 
sense in agreement with Lowe. CCP is not an obvious or self-evident truth. Too often has 
it been accepted on the basis of very brief arguments that involve little or no explicit 
attention to empirical evidence. In an interview Jaegwon Kim (2000) actually claims that 
CCP “isn’t an empirical issue for the physicalists”, and suggests that CCP may be built 
into the nature of the concept of the physical. Donald Davidson (1980) makes some 
similar remarks. But as we shall see, the question of CCP is arguably a deeply empirical 
one. 
 It might, of course, appear that only few and relatively uncontroversial 
assumptions are needed to arrive at CCP. For instance, Kim (1992) contends that the 
failure of CCP would entail the violation of the laws of physics, so CCP must hold. This 
line of reasoning arguably fails. On closer inspection, and somewhat surprisingly, the 
truth of the laws of physics appears consistent with the failure of CCP. Briefly, the reason 
is that laws like Newton’s second – F = ma – are causally neutral, insofar as they do not 
care what causes there are.56 F = ma could remain true even if some accelerations were 
caused by (say) irreducibly vital and non-physical forces. (See McLaughlin, 1992 and 
Papineau, 2001 for details.)   
56 Cartwright (1979) uses a slightly different sense of “causal neutrality” to characterize laws like F = ma.
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 Similarly, Kim (1998, p. 40) argues that only CCP can guarantee that it is in 
principle possible to arrive at a complete physical theory, so again CCP must hold. But as 
David Papineau makes clear (2001), the scientific community has changed its mind about 
the completability of physics several times throughout history. So, even though physics 
likely aims at being as complete as possible, the possibility of an “absolutely” complete 
physics is not happily viewed as built into the nature of the enterprise of physics. 
Completability, then, cannot be assumed except by reference to significant empirical 
evidence. In fact, authors like Brian McLaughlin (1992) and Papineau (2001) suggest that 
what they take to be convincing evidence for CCP emerged only quite recently. (See 
below.) 
 CCP, then, is a deeply empirical claim, and one that likely requires some sort of 
inductive argument for its support. Lowe is therefore perfectly right to demand that our 
closure principle “must be one for which some measure of empirical support can 
plausibly be mustered”. (Lowe, 2000, p. 572) This empirical constraint is important, 
because, as we shall see, he thinks it prohibits the use of such principles in Exclusion 
Arguments. 
 What evidence, then, is available to the physicalist? McLaughlin and Papineau 
argue for principles like CCP on explicitly empirical and inductive grounds. They 
contend that while the epistemic situation at earlier points in history made it reasonable to 
postulate irreducibly vital, chemical and mental forces, it no longer does. Briefly, the 
quantum mechanical explanation of chemical bonding undermined a prime example of 
emergent forces, and contributed to the fall of classical emergentism. (McLaughlin, 1992) 
Furthermore, special forces like friction all appear to reduce to a few fundamental 
physical forces. This provides inductive evidence against mental or vital forces.57
(Papineau, 2001) Finally, Papineau offers a second argument for CCP, which he dubs 
57 I have sometimes encountered the following objection to this argument. Why should an argument against 
mental forces be an argument against mental causes? Lowe, for instance, makes no assumption that 
invisible mental causation involves mental forces. But if Papineau (2001) is right, effects like bodily 
movements can be fully accounted for by physical forces, or the physical circumstances that give rise to 
these forces. This is all that CCP requires. 
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“the argument from physiology,” In outline, this argument contends that the molecular 
revolution in biology has failed to reveal any effects within the nervous system that 
appear not to be products of physical causes. This would seem to add to the evidence for 
CCP. (Papineau, 2001)  
 Such arguments strike me as strong, but the empirical evidence for CCP has been 
questioned. (Cp., e.g., Hendry, 2005; Sturgeon, 1999) It will emerge, however, that, we 
can address Lowe’s specific problems by appealing to neuroscience, rather than physics, 
somewhat in the spirit of Papineau’s argument from physiology. 
 Lowe’s intriguing, but in my view ultimately ineffective, arguments are worthy of 
attention in their own right. But considering them is also beneficial for a second reason. It 
serves to underscore the thoroughly empirical nature of physicalism and physicalist 
claims like CCP. 
5.3. The Possibility of Invisible Mental Causation  
I turn now to Lowe’s arguments. His first invisible mental causation scenario explicitly 
takes into account the times at which events occur.58 (Lowe, 2000, pp. 575-576) 
(S1) It is true that any physical event E that has a sufficient cause must have a 
sufficient physical cause P at some earlier time. But this P causes E, at least in 
part, by causing an irreducibly mental event M occurring at some intermediate 
time. M is an ineliminable element in P’s causing E.  
The idea, then, is that there can be two causal processes by which P causes E. One is a 
purely physical process, which we can represent as follows: (i) P ĺ E. The second, 
however, involves the causing of an intermediate and irreducibly mental event, which in 
turn helps bring about E: (ii) P ĺ M ĺ E. (S1) is a dualist scenario, but is nevertheless 
consistent with CCP and the absence of overdetermination. First, P is sufficient for E, but 
only because it also causes M. Second, Lowe is quite explicit that the mental cause M is 
58 Here I can only offer a brief and simplified sketch of Lowe’s scenarios; see Lowe (2000; 2003) for more 
discussion. My objections do not depend on my simplifications, however. 
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not to be construed as an overdetermining cause. (Lowe, 2000, p. 576 & 577) That is, the 
causal contribution of M in process (ii) is not redundant given the purely physical process 
(i). 
 This, I take it, is not what most physicalists intend by CCP. Importantly, as Lowe 
describes the scenario, the essential contribution of the mental event would be invisible
from a physical point of view. It would seem to a physical scientist looking only at 
physical processes as if he had a complete physical explanation. (Lowe, 2000, pp. 580-
581) Anyway, Lowe thinks the possibility of (S1) requires exclusionists like Kim to 
strengthen CCP by introducing a temporal constraint prohibiting such intermediary 
mental causes. One way of doing this is as follows. (Lowe, 2000, p. 576) 
(CCP*) At every time t at which any physical event has a cause, it has a sufficient 
physical cause. 
But Lowe’s second scenario is intended to show that even this will not do. (Lowe 2000, 
pp. 576-577) 
(S2) It is true that every physical event E that has a cause occurring at time t must 
have a sufficient physical cause P occurring at t, but that physical event causes the 
effect E, at least in part, by instantaneously causing an irreducibly mental event M 
occurring at the same time t. M is an ineliminable element in the P’s causing E.  
Apart from the instantaneous causation, the scenario is the same as (S1). Here, then, we 
have a dualist scenario that is compatible even with the temporally constrained CCP*. If 
this possibility is to be ruled out further changes to CCP are necessary. Lowe suggests the 
following. (Lowe, 2000, p. 581) 
(CCP**) Every physical event contains only other physical events in its transitive 
causal closure. 
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An event’s transitive causal closure includes only its immediate causes, their immediate 
causes, and so on. (Lowe, 2000, pp. 581-582) This principle rules out both (S1) and (S2), 
which Lowe, as we shall see, takes to be real and interesting possibilities.  
 To sum up; Lowe’s challenge is this. (S1) and (S2) are dualist scenarios that are 
compatible with CCP and CCP* respectively. They cannot be dismissed as cases of 
overdetermination. To make the Exclusion Argument valid the exclusionist must 
strengthen the closure principle from CCP via CCP* to CCP**. The latter principle rules 
out (S1) and (S2). But the resulting Exclusion Argument begs the question against friends 
of invisible causation.59 Indeed, it would seem to beg the question against antireductive 
physicalists as well.60
5.4. Lowe’s Argument for the Plausibility of Invisible Mental Causation  
These scenarios raise important methodological and metaphilosophical questions about 
physicalism and dualism. How is the burden of proof to be distributed among these two 
positions? What is the role of empirical evidence? Physicalists should at least grant that 
invisible causation (and hence; dualism) seems to be a logical possibility given the 
empirical evidence offered in favor of CCP. Invisible mental causation, then, can be 
viewed as an interesting alternative interpretation of the scientific status quo, and it can 
explain why the physical domain seems to be closed. So invisible mental causation is 
consistent with scientific knowledge. Now Lowe sometimes argues as if this consistency 
were sufficient to undermine the Exclusion Argument. (Lowe, 2000, p. 572) I find this 
59 Lowe actually goes on to present a third and different scenario, according to which irreducibly mental 
events do not cause physical events, but rather cause the fact that a specific physical event causes another 
physical event. (Lowe, 2000, p. 582) This antireductionist scenario is supposed to be compatible even with 
CCP**. An even stronger version of CCP would, then, be required to rule out this sort of invisible mental 
causation of physical facts. I will only discuss the plausibility of the first two scenarios here, though I think 
my objections apply equally to the third. 
60 Note, though, that a proponent of the Exclusion Argument might rule out invisible mental causation in a 
different way. She could for example stipulate that sufficient physical cause means “physical through and 
through” as suggested by Montero (2003, p. 174n1). The resulting argument would still beg the question 
against proponents of invisible mental causation, but not against most antireductive physicalists. 
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surprising, and think that it clearly cannot be the case. In my view, arguments for the 
possibility of dualist scenarios do not cut any philosophical ice unless the dualist 
scenarios have independent motivation. In the absence of additional empirical evidence 
or over-arching theoretical constraints favoring invisible mental causation, the natural 
thing to do would be to dismiss Lowe’s suggestion as ad hoc. My view is therefore that 
the burden of proof is on Lowe. If he cannot offer empirical or theoretical evidence for 
his suggestion, I think it will be legitimate for physicalists to beg the question and rule 
out invisible mental causation by stipulation in their formulation of the closure principle. 
Indeed, I think it will be all right for them even to render the closure principle as CCP or 
CCP*, and grant that while the resulting Exclusion Argument is not deductively valid – 
because it leaves the logical possibility of invisible mental causation open – it is 
nevertheless a plausibility argument.  
 What makes Lowe’s challenge so interesting, however, is that he also offers an 
intriguing sketch of why theoretical or philosophical constraints might actually favor 
invisible mental causation. Here is a lengthy, but revealing, quote: 
[If invisible mental causation is real] physical science can present us with the semblance of a 
complete explanation of our bodily movements, and yet it will be an explanation which leaves 
something out, giving our bodily movements the appearance of being coincidental events arising 
from independent causal chains of events in our brains and nervous systems. But isn’t that 
precisely what current physical science does appear to do? As it traces back the physical causes of 
our bodily movements into the maze of antecedent neural events, it seems to lose sight of any 
unifying factor explaining why those apparently independent causal chains of neural events should 
have converged upon the bodily movements in question. In short, it leaves us with a kind of 
‘binding’ problem, not unlike the ‘binding’ problem associated with conscious perceptual 
experience […]. (Lowe, 2000, p. 581) 
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Lowe, then, suggests that there may be a binding problem of voluntary behavior,
allegedly analogous to the binding problem(s)61 of perception. We know for example that 
when we perceive, say, a moving car, different perceptual features – the car’s movement, 
shape, color etc. – are processed by different cerebral regions. How, then, do these 
processes combine to yield a unified percept of a moving, car-shaped and colored object? 
The quote attempts to raise a similar problem for behavioral neuroscience. Lowe seems to 
think there are too many, too messy and too independent processes leading up to a bodily 
movement, and that these processes must be bound somehow.  
 A hasty response might be: “So what? Messy and independent physical causes 
would still be physical causes!” The problem with this response is that it uncharitably 
fails to appreciate what is at stake for Lowe. And thereby it also misses out on what I 
presume to be a crucial background assumption he makes about mental causation. Lowe 
worries about binding because he worries that the independence of neurophysiological 
causal processes might make the bodily movement coincidental. (Lowe, 2000, p. 579) An 
event is coincidental “if its immediate causes are the ultimate effects of independent 
causal chains.” (Lowe, 2000, p. 579) As an example he offers a version of Aristotle’s 
story about the man walking to the well. As the man passes under a roof, the wind 
dislodges a slate from the roof; the slate hits the man and kills him. His death occurs by 
coincidence; because the causal chain leading up to the man’s being at the wrong place at 
the wrong time is causally independent of the chain leading up to the fatal slate’s ending 
up at that place. (Lowe, 2000, p. 579) Note that coincidental effects in this sense are not 
uncaused, neither need they be the outcome of probabilistic causal processes. The causal 
chains leading up to a coincidental effect can be as deterministic as you please.  
 Lowe later suggests that there is often “a strong intuition that the bodily 
movement in question was not an event which occurred ‘by coincidence’.” (Lowe, 2000, 
p. 584) Lowe’s binding problem of behavior then, is that of rendering bodily movements 
non-coincidental. Finally, he pictures a role for invisible mental causation in solving this 
61 As Anne Treisman (1996) makes clear there are several binding problems. Examples are the binding of 
the appropriate properties to the appropriate objects, the appropriate objects to the appropriate spatial 
regions and so on. 
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binding problem, and offers the following abstract example. Suppose we have two 
physical causal chains leading up to the same physical event E. (i) P1 ĺ P2 ĺ P3 ĺ E 
and (ii) P1* ĺ P2* ĺ P3* ĺ E. From a physical point of view E is coincidental, 
because events in the two chains are not linked. But suppose invisible mental causation 
involving an intermediate mental event M link the two chains, thus. (iii) P1 ĺ M ĺ P3*. 
That would make E non-coincidental after all. (Lowe, 2000, p. 580) In this connection it 
should be noted that Lowe does not explicitly demand that all bodily movements be non-
coincidental. He may think that only voluntary movements require binding by invisible 
mental causes. 
 Judging from Lowe’s technical definition of coincidental effects, and the abstract 
example of binding, it is, however, is a little hard to appreciate the nature of his binding 
problem, and what role precisely invisible mental causes are supposed to play. The 
binding of neural causal chains is supposed to explain “why those apparently independent 
causal chains of neural events should have converged upon the bodily movements in 
question.” (Lowe, 2000, p. 581) The problem is that it is not entirely clear what the 
“why”-question concerns here. But apparently a cause that links the chains, as M does in 
the above example, would be sufficient to answer the question.   
 Due to the relative unclarity of the binding problem and of its relation to the 
notion of non-coincidental effects I think Lowe is moving too quickly here. I am not 
convinced that there is such a strong intuition about bodily movements being non-
coincidental in Lowe’s technical sense. Neither am I sure why precisely our theory of 
mental causation would have to conserve this intuition if such there be. That being said, 
the idea that mental causes might be needed to bind neural or physical processes is 
interesting and worthy of further exploration. It suggests that mental causes are somehow 
needed to “integrate” or “organize” physical processes. There might therefore be some 
kind of necessary causal work to be done that physical causes do not do. So while I think 
Lowe’s binding problem needs to be made much more concrete before it is truly 
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challenging, I am willing to accept the requirement that bodily movements be non-
coincidental for the sake of argument.62
 Summing up; given Lowe’s view of what neuroscience tells us (or rather; does not
tell us) and his background assumption that bodily movements must typically or often be 
non-coincidental, I think a charitable interpretation of Lowe’s argument for invisible 
mental causation would be as an inference to the best explanation:  
(1) From a neurophysiological point of view, bodily movements appear 
coincidental  
(2) Bodily movements are typically non-coincidental  
(3) Invisible mental causation would make bodily movements non-coincidental 
and explain the appearance of coincidence  
 (4) Invisible mental causation occurs 
5.5. Against Invisible Mental Causation  
Suppose then, that Lowe is right about premise (2) in the above argument. There really is 
this binding problem of behavior, insofar as bodily movements must be rendered non-
coincidental. I shall argue first that the argument is inconclusive (5.5.1), because it rests 
on an empirical assumption he does not justify. Second, I shall offer some empirical 
reasons against invoking invisible mental causation. (5.5.2-5.5.3)  
62 Lowe (1999) offers some further considerations to motivate his binding problem, and indicates that 
binding is somehow necessary to make bodily movements intentional or perhaps voluntary. If the question 
“why” neural chains should converge on a bodily movement is intended as a call for some sort of 
intentional or cognitive answer it is not hard to sympathize with it. We are interested in explaining bodily 
movements as intentional behaviors. What is less clear is how the “why”-question relates to the notion of 
non-coincidentiality, and whether its solution requires mental causes to do extra causal work over and 
above that done by physical causes. But the important thing to notice is again that whatever the nature of 
the binding problem, Lowe takes its solution to hinge on bodily movements being non-coincidental, and his 
definition of such effects does not refer to intentionality. 
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5.5.1. Lowe’s Argument is Inconclusive 
It behooves me to first get clearer about the role of empirical evidence in Lowe’s 
reasoning and in my criticism. This will also reveal that the argument is inconclusive as it 
stands. As we saw, Lowe portrays dualism as an empirically respectable doctrine, 
because it is consistent with empirical data. But as I urged above, consistency with data is 
not sufficient to make a doctrine empirically respectable, for it could still be dismissed as 
ad hoc on empirical grounds. About this, we simply disagree. (Lowe, 2003, p. 152n10) 
But I will offer an argument against invisible mental causation which does not invoke 
complaints about its being ad hoc. (5.5.2) Suppose invisible mental causes are necessary 
to get complete explanations of the causal processes leading up to bodily movements. 
That would represent a major deviation from neuroscience’s explanatory aims and 
methods.  And the success story of neuroscience has given us reasons to doubt that that 
kind of deviation will be necessary. I do not expect that this argument would impress 
Lowe directly, but, if successful, it will show that his view does after all conflict with 
certain scientific views. It is not easy, I maintain, to square dualism with central 
theoretical assumptions of neuroscience. This point is important for present purposes, as 
Lowe appears eager to have no quarrel with science, for instance he characterizes his 
dualism as “naturalistic.” (Lowe, 2000, p. 572) 
 Anyway, my second argument against invisible mental causation is one that he 
should be more willing to accept. (5.5.3) I argue that it is far from clear that neuroscience 
must render bodily movements coincidental. So in fact, I think premise (1) above is likely 
to be false. This is a possibility that Lowe fails to consider, and it is instructive to see how 
it will, if sound, undermine his project of defending dualism on more or less a priori
grounds, while simultaneously claiming that dualism is consistent with empirical data. 
Lowe makes it clear that he takes the positive reasons for believing in invisible mental 
causation to be theoretical or philosophical assumptions – like (2), presumably – rather 
than empirical evidence: 
[The reasons for believing in invisible mental causation] could not be broadly empirical ones. The 
lesson of this is that we should be prepared to acknowledge that a priori metaphysical 
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argumentation may in the end provide the best, or indeed the only, hope for a resolution of the 
mind-body problem. (Lowe, 2003, pp. 153-154) 
I grant, of course, that known empirical data do not count as positive evidence for 
invisible mental causation. And though I am personally skeptical about the prospects for 
a priori methods in resolving the mind-body problem, I also grant that theoretical 
constrains like (2) might make it rational to invoke invisible mental causation despite its 
being in my view ad hoc. It is a familiar point that ad hoc strategies can be rational 
provided they are needed to defend theoretical assumptions that have previously proven 
successful for example.  
 But when Lowe claims that (2003, p. 153) neuroscience cannot provide evidence 
against invisible mental causation, he arguably misses an important point. For even 
assuming that (2) has a priori or theoretical motivation, his argument does depend on 
premise (1). This premise contends that bodily movements must appear coincidental from 
the point of view of neuroscience. Importantly, it is an empirical premise about the nature 
of neural causation. Now, notice that there is nothing in Lowe’s characterization of 
coincidental effects – as the outcome of independent causal chains – nor in his abstract 
example of binding by invisible mental causes that prohibits physical causes from 
rendering their effects non-coincidental. In principle, neural causal chains could be bound 
by neural causes. So, pace Lowe, neuroscience can in principle falsify a crucial premise 
in the argument motivating invisible mental causation. Unfortunately, Lowe does not 
appear to really argue for his empirical assumption about neural causation, rather he 
asserts that there do not appear to be any “unifying factors” in neural causal chains. 
(Lowe, 2000, p. 581) This is arguably not the kind of claim that should be made without 
explicit reference to empirical evidence. Lowe, then, needs to offer reasons – empirical 
reasons – for his crucial empirical premise.63
63 Alternatively, he could revise his characterization of coincidental effects and argue that physical causes 
are intrinsically unsuited for the job of rendering effects non-coincidental. But such a claim about the 
nature of physical causes would, presumably, again be in need of empirical justification. 
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 I am, however, skeptical that that can be done. And if (1) is – or is likely to be – 
false, (2) in no way counts in favor of invisible mental causation. So, unless Lowe wants 
to rely solely on his weaker claim that invisible mental causation is possible given 
empirical knowledge, his case for invisible mental causation would collapse. I turn now 
to positive reasons for skepticism about invisible mental causation. 
5.5.2. Invisible Mental Causation Fits Ill with Neuroscientific Practice   
In this section I make to claims about Lowe’s binding problem. (i) Invoking invisible 
mental causation to solve the problem would involve a drastic departure from 
neuroscientific method as it is currently practiced. (ii) Neuroscience would also suffer a 
major defeat vis-à-vis its explanatory aims. For it is arguably part of those aims to 
understand voluntary behavior, that is, not mere bodily movements, without invoking 
dualistic notions like invisible causation. In both of these cases I contend that 
neuroscientists would be entitled to strong skepticism about the suggested deviation from 
their aims and methods. Their success so far entitles them to that.64 Obviously, these 
claims cannot be fully justified here, but I contend that they are at least as plausible as 
Lowe’s dualist alternative. 
 (i) Deviation from Method. It is revealing to see how neuroscience approaches the 
traditional binding problems of perception, which appear hard enough in their own right. 
I admit at the outset that my knowledge here is cursory and stems from review articles, 
rather than the primary experimental literature. But I think even a brief glance at the 
standard proposals for solutions; will confirm what I want to claim. Consider for example 
64 This argument sounds disturbingly similar to Kim’s argument that CCP must hold (because unless it 
does, a complete physical theory will be in principle impossible), an argument which I questioned above.  
However, I only criticized Kim for assuming the possibility of a complete physical theory on more or less a
priori grounds. Below I will briefly sketch why I think neuroscientists enjoy an a posteriori entitlement to 
their explanatory confidence. If Lowe questions this entitlement he should accuse neuroscientists, and not 
just physicalist philosophers, of explanatory hubris. Perhaps he is willing to do that, but as I have said does 
not appear to want his quarrel to be one with science.  
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the solutions discussed in an issue of the prestigious65 journal Neuron that was dedicated 
largely to reviewing binding problems. Binding might be produced by a traditional 
neurocomputational processing hierarchy where neurons with less specific receptive 
fields feed information to neurons whose receptive fields are increasingly specific 
conjunctions of features. And/or it may arise from the synchronous firing of potentially 
distal neurons that code for the features to be bound. And/or it may depend on neural 
mechanisms of attention.66 (Where “attention” is something that, e.g., parietal cortex, 
rather than invisible mental causes, commands.) This illustrates to me that even in the 
face of an extremely recalcitrant set of problems; mainstream neuroscientists do not turn 
to dualistic methods.  
 Why this confidence in neural methods? It was not always so, indeed the history 
of neuroscience involves the postulation of non-physical causes to explain phenomena 
like neural signaling. (See, for instance, Finger, 1994) Though I cannot argue it fully here 
I think most neuroscientists treat their domain as closed vis-à-vis the mental domain. This 
may be viewed as an expansion of Papineau’s above-mentioned argument from 
physiology to the closure of the physical domain in general. (Papineau, 2001) But 
considerations of the more limited neurobiological domain are, as we shall see, sufficient 
to warrant skepticism about invisible mental causes. 
 My claim is not the obviously false one that neurophysiology suffers no causal 
input from the outside. But fixing these causal inputs, letting temperature and pressure be 
normal, letting there be no strong electromagnetic fields nearby and so on, neural events 
65 Here and elsewhere in this paper I appeal to sociological factors like “prestige” and “influence.” Insofar 
as my claims are descriptive and concern the nature of neuroscientific practice this should be non-
tendentious. Insofar as the claims are normative and evaluative it will perhaps be found more problematic. 
It is, however, my hope and belief that the sociological mechanisms that determine what research counts as 
prestigious also reliably – though obviously not infallibly – select for good research. 
66 See, e.g., Roskies (1999) and Treisman (1999), which are general reviews. Reynolds & Desimone (1999) 
argue for a role of attention in binding. Singer (1999) focuses on neural synchrony as a binding mechanism. 
von der Malsburg (1999) discusses binding from a general computational perspective. Treisman (1996), an 
earlier general review, also discusses binding from the point of view of non-dualistic methods. Robertson 
(2003) is a recent discussion of the role of attention and parietal regions. 
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have sufficient neural causes.67 This claim may sound trivial, but it is not. Its plausibility 
derives from the detailed knowledge neuroscientists have about neural causation. 
Furthermore, we have little reason to believe that invisible mental causes are lurking in 
the ceteris paribus conditions under which neural causation take place, which is a non-
trivial additional assumption. While much remains unknown about the nervous system, 
neuroscientists have a good grasp of what kind of events are important for motor output, 
for cognition and for sensation. Here, events like neurons firing with certain frequencies 
(or perhaps in certain more complex patterns) figure prominently. And they know a lot 
about how – that is, through which mechanisms –causes must work in order to bring 
about this privileged kind of effects. Certainly, electro-magnetic, chemical and other 
causes that affect how ions flow across neural membranes are neural causes par
excellence. This point is forcefully made by John Bickle.  
If action potential rate is the currency of neural causation and information exchange, then the only 
way an event can elicit neural change is by affecting the processes that underlie action potential 
generation in individual neurons. That is where the rubber meets the road. (Bickle, 2003, p. 59) 
This causal picture of the kinds of causes that are relevant to neural interactions and the 
mechanisms, through which they must work, is painted by influential text books like 
Kandel et al.’s Principles of Neural Science (2000). Such text books arguably play a 
sociological role in defining scientific fields. (Schaffner, 2006) As such the causal picture 
probably also shapes the kind of hypotheses working neuroscientists form and are willing 
to take seriously. It would of course be naïve to believe that the picture cannot, or will 
not, change or be revolutionized in certain ways. It may turn out, say, that glial cells are 
more than a “support team” for neurons, and perform hitherto unheard of functions. 
(Bullock et al., 2005) But revolutions of this kind are one thing, invisible mental 
causation is quite another.  
 Just to appreciate the kind of, I think legitimate, explanatory confidence 
neuroscientists appear to have, consider a recent argument for “ectopic 
67 For a more details about the claims I make in this section, see paper (#4). 
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neurotransmission.” It is a well-established fact that neurons communicate via specialized 
synapses, where neurotransmitter is released from presynaptic “active zones” onto 
“postsynaptic densities.” But it has also been suggested that in some cases “ectopic” 
release of neurotransmitter at sites distinct from the above-mentioned specialized regions 
might play a role in neurotransmission. To investigate this Coggan et al. (2005) 
developed a biologically realistic computational model of a specific type of excitatory 
synapse in chicks. They found that the simulated postsynaptic effect did not conform to 
the actually measured effect, unless ectopic transmission was included in the model. The 
interest of this for present purposes lies not in whether Coggan et al. are ultimately right, 
nor in their scientific details, but rather in the reasoning behind their argument. Unless we 
assume that two kinds of neurophysiological causes are at play, we cannot explain the 
effect we measure. Reasoning in this way requires a significant amount of confidence in 
one’s knowledge of the causal factors that are at play in neurotransmission, and in how 
these causal factors must work in order to bring about the measured postsynaptic effect. It 
is not the kind of research that would reliably pass as good science unless it reflected a 
real grasp of the kinds of causes that matter in neuroscience. 
 (ii) Deviation from Explanatory Aims. I do not think it is an accidental feature of 
neuroscience that its explanatory toolbox includes the broad kind of causes and 
mechanisms I have just sketched. I think it is, or has become, an explanatory aim of 
neuroscience as it is conducted at the cellular and molecular levels to explain by using 
that kind of explanatory tools. So when these explanatory tools are taught to 
neuroscientists in text books, the aims of neuroscience are simultaneously being laid out. 
If I am right, having to invoke mental causation to fully explain bodily movements would 
represent a major failure of neuroscientists in reaching their explanatory aims. But the 
reader need not take my word for this, as I shall offer two brief appeals to authority to 
support my claim.  
 First, explanations by mechanisms have received much attention in philosophy of 
neuroscience recently. In a much-discussed paper, Peter Machamer et al. (2000), argue 
that such explanations are more or less the heart and soul of neuroscience. They view 
mechanisms as organized complexes of “entities” like ion-channels, neurons and neural 
circuits, and “activities” of these entities. Activities are things that entities do. Ion-
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channels, for instance, can open, and neurons can fire. Machamer et al. illustrate how 
such complexes give rise to causal processes, e.g., in the mechanisms underlying neural 
signaling. Most importantly for present purposes, they invoke an interesting notion of 
“bottoming out:”  
Nested hierarchical descriptions of mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest level mechanisms. 
These are the components that are accepted as relatively fundamental or taken to be unproblematic 
for the purposes of a given scientist, research group, or field. (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 13) 
Molecular neuroscientists, for instance, currently want their mechanisms to bottom out in 
the activities of molecules and ions. (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 14)68 Whatever the level 
of bottoming out, I do think this has implications for invisible mental causation. If 
ascending to the level of acts of invisible mental causes is necessary to fully explain the 
causal chains leading up to bodily movements, that would seem to conflict with the 
explanatory aim of descending to the level of parts and explaining neural causation in 
terms of complex neural mechanisms. 
 The reader may have been worrying for a while that this is all irrelevant to my 
case against Lowe. Would not the contribution of invisible mental causes be a matter of 
cognition and mentality, and thus fall outside the explanatory interests of neuroscience? 
Could not neuroscientists complete the neuroscientific explanatory task of discovering 
mechanisms and leave mentalistic explanations for psychologists and philosophers? I 
68 Notably, Machamer et al. (2000) claim that the level of bottoming out varies across different branches of 
neuroscience, and may change over time. For the explanatory purposes of studying how neural systems 
interact for instance, descending to molecular mechanisms may not always be taken to be necessary. 
However, I take it to be a background assumption of neuroscience as a whole that there is some story to be 
told at this level. (Cp. the discussion of the neural causal picture above.) In fact, Machamer et al. do say 
that the activity of potassium channels for instance is ultimately a component of “most higher-level 
mechanisms in the nervous system.” (2000, p. 13) Anyway, I do not think much hinges on which level is 
taken to be the bottom level, since invisible mental causation is not likely to appeal to neuroscientists 
working at higher levels either. (It should also be noted that Machamer et al. are not claiming that complex 
mechanisms reduce to what they call “lowest level mechanisms.”) 
126
think this objection rests on a misunderstanding of the neuroscientific enterprise. Many 
neuroscientists are interested in understanding mentality and cognition and furthermore in 
doing so in terms of mechanisms. Neuroscience takes an interest in behavior, not just in 
mere bodily movements. I shall return to this below. For now consider my second appeal 
to authority. Here is the late neuroscientist Patricia Goldman-Rakic, famous for her work 
on the role of prefrontal cortex in voluntary behavior, explaining her aims to a popular 
audience. 
Until recently, the fundamental processes involved in […] higher mental functions defied 
description in the mechanistic terms of science. Indeed, for the greater part of this century, 
neurobiologists often denied that such functions were accessible to scientific analysis or declared 
that they belonged strictly to the domain of psychology and philosophy. Within the past two 
decades, however, neuroscientists have made great advances in understanding the relation between 
cognitive processes and the anatomic organization of the brain. As a consequence even global 
mental attributes such as thought and intentionality can now be meaningfully studied in the 
laboratory. 
 The ultimate goal of that research is extraordinarily ambitious. Eventually researchers 
such as myself hope to be able to analyze higher mental functions in terms of the coordinated 
activation of neurons in various structures in the brain. (Goldman-Rakic, 1992, p. 73) 
I do not think my appeal to explanatory successes and aims of neuroscience would 
impress Lowe. What we know about the nervous system does, after all, appear consistent 
with invisible mental causation, and Lowe thinks there are independent grounds for 
believing in such causation. I will question those grounds in the next section, but even if 
my arguments there fail, I think I have arrived at something interesting. Lowe’s quarrel 
appears to be as much a quarrel with neuroscience as it is a quarrel with philosophical 
physicalism. Science and physicalism are perhaps not easily divorced. 
5.5.3. Bodily Movements Do Not Appear to Be Rendered Coincidental.   
It is important to note that Lowe might be perfectly right to quarrel with neuroscience.  
Indeed, he would be, if there is a real binding problem of behavior that neuroscience 
cannot solve nor legitimately set aside. But as we saw, whether neuroscience can explain 
the binding of neural processes leading up to bodily movements is an empirical question. 
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We can look at neuroscientific models and see whether they appear to render movements 
coincidental.  In this connection I would like to note that there might be a disanalogy 
between Lowe’s problem of coincidentiality and the traditional binding problems. For in 
the case of behavior, there is a kind of causal convergence of causal processes on 
structures like motor cortex that cause muscle contractions. In contrast, it is part of the 
binding problem in perception that there apparently are no “Grandmother Neurons” on 
which different perceptual pathways converge.69
 More importantly, Lowe thinks that physical science fails to find any “unifying 
factor” as it tracks causes of bodily movements into the “maze of antecedent neural 
events”. (Lowe, 2000, p. 581) We have seen that he takes a unifying factor to be one 
which connects the causal chains leading up to bodily movements and thus explains “why 
those apparently independent causal chains of neural events should have converged upon 
the bodily movements in question.” (Lowe, 2000, p. 581) This linking or connecting is 
supposed to be along the line of Lowe’s abstract example. (Lowe, 2000, p. 580) 
According to one estimate there are about 100 billion neurons in the brain, so it is easy to 
see how one might get lost if one were to trace the  causes of individual neurons’ firing 
backwards from, say, primary motor cortex. This is, presumably, how Lowe views neural 
causation. From this point of view it would perhaps be hard to tell whether there any 
“linking” causes that ensure proper binding. 
 But tracing causes in this way, is arguably but one part of the neuroscientific 
enterprise. Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary practice which studies the nervous system 
using a wide variety of techniques like: imaging studies, lesion studies, behavioral and 
psychological tests, anatomical studies, computer simulations, pharmacological studies, 
single-cell recordings, microstimulation and so on and so forth. This is philosophically 
significant. In the neuroscience of voluntary behavior these kinds of techniques have 
allowed scientists to impose considerable causal structure on Lowe’s neural maze. In fact, 
the operative understanding of how the central nervous system controls movement is 
quite fine-grained and includes: strategy (the goal of movement and choice of movement 
69 Though interestingly a proposed “Jennifer Aniston Neuron” in one human subject has recently received a 
lot of attention. See, e.g., Quiroga et al. (2005) 
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strategy in order to reach that goal), tactics (implementing movement strategies by way 
of spatial and temporal coordination of muscle contractions and relaxations) and 
execution (direct causing of contractions/relaxations). (Rains, 2002, p. 228) See, e.g., 
Kandel et al. (2000, ch. 33) for a similar description of how the nervous system organizes 
muscle-contractions to give rise to goal-related behavior.  
 Given this kind of characterization, I take it that the following are among the most 
central concerns of neuroscience. To identify structures or systems involved in the various 
levels of control, to investigate how – that is, by way of which mechanisms – the systems 
perform these functions, and to see how the systems act together and communicate to 
produce overall intelligent behavior. These are obviously not trifling tasks. The 
conclusions so far are partial and may be subject to revisions. But significant progress has 
been made, especially with respect to identifying structures which play different roles in 
the production of behavior, and with tracing out the anatomical connections through 
which these systems communicate. The figure G. Dennis Rains uses to introduce the 
neurophysiology of behavior is revealing with respect to what kind of knowledge 
neuroscientists are beginning to gather in this area: 
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Fig. 1: Adapted from Rains (2000, p. 229, fig. 9.1) 
This figure is accompanied by an overview of what the different structures are believed to 
do, and what they are thought to communicate to other structures. It is important to notice 
that these beliefs are not mere “boxological” speculations without empirical grounding. 
The neuroscientific techniques just mentioned have contributed strongly towards 
anchoring the model in biological knowledge. The interplay among structures depicted is 
complex, as one would expect, and the model is partial – much being known about some 
structures, less about others. We cannot be delayed by the interesting details here.70 I 
hope the figure conveys its message anyway. The arrows, indicating simplified 
anatomical connections, are really what matters to us now. They illustrate how the 
interactions of different systems serving different functions, can implement the strategy, 
tactics and execution of bodily movements.  
70 I describe what I take to be the nature of neuroscientific explanations of behavior more fully in paper 
(#2).
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 So it is far from clear that neuroscience cannot offer an explanation of “why […] 
chains of neural events should have converged upon the bodily movements in question” 
(Lowe 2000, p. 581), even if the “why”-question is interpreted as a call for a cognitive or 
intentional answer. The perspective of the figure is, after all, cognitive. In fact, the figure 
would hardly have been available if research had not been guided by a cognitive-
representational perspective. But this perspective is not one of invisible mental causation. 
The underlying theoretical assumption is that cognitive functions and control of voluntary 
behavior is implemented by underlying neural causal chains, without any invisible mental 
links. And these causal relations ultimately boil down to the principles of 
neurotransmission discussed above. This is very important. Physicalists and 
neuroscientists need not deny that cognitive perspectives and concepts are needed to see 
bodily movements as behaviors. What separates Lowe from most reductive and 
antireductive physicalists is that he thinks extra causal work done by mental causes is 
necessary to get sufficient causes of some effects like bodily movements, or at least to 
link the neural chains leading up to such effects.71 Physicalism and neuroscience make no 
such assumption, and the knowledge embedded in the figure was arguably arrived at 
without assuming invisible mental causes. 
 But even setting aside the point that neuroscience offers putative explanations of 
behavior, and not just bodily movements without invoking mental causes that do extra 
work, there is a weaker point to be made against Lowe. His concept of non-coincidental 
effects is not inherently mental or cognitive. Accordingly, just the large number of 
interconnections between processes leading up to bodily movements should be sufficient 
to make plausible the claim that bodily movements are not rendered coincidental, even 
without invoking a cognitive perspective.  
 With this figure as a model for neural causation in place I can therefore conclude 
with what has perhaps been clear for a while. I do not think the neural system it is a 
71 Lowe (2000, p. 577) explicitly suggests that the causal chains running via invisible mental causes are 
needed to get the relevant effect. On the other hand, Lowe (1999) suggests that effect might occur even in 
the absence of invisible chains, but that occurrence of the effect would then be coincidental. But again, in 
both cases invisible mental causes do some kind of causal work that is not done by physical causes. 
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model of is like Lowe’s neural maze. It is at best unclear whether we, by adopting a 
neuroscientific perspective on bodily movements, render bodily movements coincidental. 
The causal chains leading up to muscle contractions are interconnected, and non-
independent. Furthermore, since each chain plays a role in a carefully orchestrated whole, 
it does not appear arbitrary that they should converge on the bodily movement in 
question. What we know about the neurophysiology of behavior, then, makes it far from 
clear that  bodily movements are in need of invisible mental causes.  
5.6. Conclusions 
I have argued that Lowe fails to make a sufficient case for invisible mental causation. 
First, his description of the nature of the “binding problem of behavior” and its relation to 
the notion of non-coincidental effects is not sufficiently developed to motivate invisible 
mental causation. Second, and most importantly, while Lowe thinks invisible mental 
causation is immune to empirical refutation, his argument for it does depend on an 
empirical premise to the effect that neural causes do render bodily movements 
coincidental. Lowe does not justify this premise, so his argument is inconclusive. His 
characterization of the binding problem is compatible with its being solved by physical 
causes. Finally, I have offered reasons why neural causes do not appear to render their 
effects coincidental. Hence, it appears that Lowe’s empirical premise might be false, and 
if it is the motivation for postulating invisible mental causes would not just be unclear, 
but also absent. 
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6. Paper (#4): What Is Closed in Causal Closure? 
ABSTRACT: The Causal Closure of the Physical Domain (Closure) is a central tenet of 
physicalism, and plays an important role in what is known as the Exclusion Argument for mind-
body reductionism. While (Closure) is widely accepted, there are potential problems with it. First, 
judging from the mental causation literature it is not clear what the physical domain considered to 
be closed is, nor why precisely we should believe in (Closure). Second, Scott Sturgeon has argued 
that the Exclusion Argument is invalid because it equivocates between a broad and a narrow sense 
of “the physical domain.” Finally, Sturgeon and others think that given the current state of science 
we cannot tell whether (Closure) holds for any physical domain. I review these problems and 
argue that for the purposes of debating the Exclusion Argument they can be avoided by 
formulating an alternative “quasi-closure” pertaining to the neurobiological domain. 
Looking for causal closure? eBay has great deals on new & used electronics, cars, apparel, collectibles, 
sporting goods and more.  
If you can’t find it on eBay, it doesn’t exist 
– Sponsored link, encountered by the author during online research 
6.1. Introduction 
Subtleties aside, the Causal Closure of the Physical Domain – henceforth “(Closure)” – 
claims that all physical events have sufficient physical causes. If this is right, the physical 
domain contrasts sharply with the mental domain, as mental events often depend on 
physical causes. To assent to (Closure), then, is to ascribe a radical causal self-sufficiency 
to the physical domain. It is therefore not surprising that (Closure) is a central assumption 
shared by most reductive and antireductive physicalists alike. As such, it may be said to 
be a part of the substance of physicalism. But as we shall see, it also plays a role in the 
argumentative foundations of various forms of physicalism. In particular, it figures in the 
so-called Exclusion Argument for reductive physicalism, according to which mental 
events are identical with physical events. But what is the “physical” domain that 
physicalists take to be closed? Is it the broadly physical domain consisting of ordinary 
medium-sized objects? Or is it the narrowly physical domain of microphysics? Or is it 
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something else again? These questions are important not only because the content of a 
central physicalist claim turns on them, but also because of a challenge due to Scott 
Sturgeon (1998). Sturgeon argues that reflection on the empirical plausibility of (Closure) 
for the narrowly and the broadly physical domains undermines the Exclusion Argument. 
He also questions whether any physical domain is closed. I review this challenge and 
argue that more work has to be done to settle the domain question. However, for the 
purpose of the debate over the Exclusion Argument, Sturgeon’s challenge can be met by 
shifting our attention from the science of physics to neuroscience. I show how the 
Exclusion Argument can be reformulated with a more limited, but empirically plausible, 
“quasi-Closure” pertaining to the neurobiological domain. To this end I adopt a historical 
approach and trace the emergence of current models of neural causation. 
6.2. The Significance of Causal Closure  
For our purposes (Closure) can be formulated as follows. Any physical event that has a 
sufficient cause at t, has a sufficient physical cause at t.72 Why should we care about this 
principle? For one thing, it is a central tenet of physicalism, which is perhaps the most 
widely held world-view in contemporary analytic philosophy. By assenting to (Closure) 
we ascribe a radical causal self-sufficiency to the physical domain. Whereas there 
plausibly are mental events like perceptions that lack sufficient mental causes, we will 
never have to leave the physical domain to find sufficient causes of physical effects. 
(Kim, 2005, p. 16) On the other hand (Closure) does not rule out the possibility of some 
72 The closure principle, a.k.a. the completeness principle, has attracted a variety of formulations. 
According to Sturgeon “Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical history.” (Sturgeon, 
1998, p. 413) To allow for indeterminism it is sometimes said that physical events have their probabilities
fixed by prior physical events or states. (Papineau, 2001) Kim at one point considers a stronger version 
according to which physical events have only physical causes. (Kim, 2005, p. 50) But as he notes (2005, p. 
51) this formulation has the disadvantage of saddling antireductionists with epiphenomenalism at the 
outset. An even stronger version demands that physical events also have only physical effects. While this 
principle may be relevant to understanding physical-to-mental causation in phenomena like perception, it 
can be set it aside for present purposes, as I will be focusing on mental causation in actions. See Lowe 
(2000) or Montero (2003) for more discussion of closure principles.  
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physical events like bodily movements also having irreducibly mental causes. As such, it 
can figure as a shared assumption for reductive and antireductive physicalists alike. In 
fact, (Closure) plays an important role both in arguments for physicalism as such, and in 
arguments for reductive physicalism. It is commonly assumed that the minimal 
commitments shared by reductive and antireductive physicalists are defined by some 
form of supervenience. (Jackson, 1998, ch. 1; Kim, 1998, ch. 1; Lewis, 1983) 
Supervenience is perhaps best viewed as a technical way of saying that all non-physical 
facts obtain in virtue of physical facts. (Witmer, 2001) Basically, supervenience means 
that worlds (or perhaps objects or regions)73 that are indiscernible in physical respects are 
also indiscernible in all respects, including mental respects.74 If physicalism is defined in 
this minimal way, it does not require (Closure). But even though physicalism is a broad 
church, most believers in physicalism are also believers in (Closure). In fact, (Closure) 
plays an essential role in a popular argument for supervenience. (Loewer, 2001a; 
Papineau, 1990) So if physicalism is understood in terms of supervenience, its fate may 
turn at least partly on that of (Closure). Anyway, Jaegwon Kim comes close to saying that 
only heretics would doubt (Closure), as “no serious physicalist could accept” the 
possibility of its failure. (Kim, 1998, p. 40) I shall follow Kim in taking (Closure) to be 
part of the physicalist orthodoxy, while bearing in mind that the status of the principle is 
interesting even if physicalism is characterized independently of it.  
 (Closure) also figures prominently in most formulations of what goes under the 
name of the Exclusion Argument for reductive physicalism.75 This argument, on which I 
73 See Kim’s “strong” and “weak” supervenience for two formulations in terms of indiscernible objects.
(Kim, 1984a) Horgan’s “regional” supervenience appeals to indiscernibility of spatiotemporal regions.
(Horgan, 1982) Jackson (1998, ch. 1) and Lewis (1983) offer definitions of supervenience in terms of 
indiscernible worlds. This latter type of formulation, sometimes called “global supervenience,” appears to 
be the most widely accepted one. 
74 There are reasons for doubting whether supervenience in itself is sufficient to capture the idea that 
everything non-physical obtains “in virtue of” claim of the physical. (See, e.g. Kim, 1998, pp. 9-15) 
75 Although Sturgeon (1998) treats the Exclusion Argument as an argument for physicalism per se, he 
formulates the argument as yielding the reductive conclusion that mental events are physical events, thus 
implicating that he has what I call reductive physicalism in mind.  
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shall focus here, starts from the plausible assumption that mental events like the 
occurence of beliefs and desires have physical effects like bodily movements. By 
(Closure), these bodily movements must have sufficient physical causes. Since bodily 
movements are – typically at least – not causally overdetermined by more than one 
sufficient cause, the mental cause must be identical with the physical cause.76 (Cp. Kim, 
1998, ch. 2; 2005, ch. 2; Papineau, 2001) Here is one way of formulating this argument: 
(Closure) Any physical event that has a sufficient cause at t, has a sufficient 
physical cause at t.77
(Impact of the mental) Mental events have physical effects.78
(No Overdetermination) The physical effects of mental events are not generally 
overdetermined.79
(Reductionism) Mental events are physical events.80
Summing up, not only is (Closure) a strong physicalist claim in its own right; it also plays 
a role in the foundations of both reductive and antireductive physicalism. It therefore 
becomes a matter of some importance to find out (a) whether (Closure) holds and (b) if it 
does hold, what is the physical domain that is closed. 
76 Strictly speaking Kim’s version of this argument contends that mental events are either physical or 
epiphenomenal. This argument nevertheless serves to motivate reductionism, as epiphenomenalism is 
typically taken to be an immensely unattractive option. 
77 As indicated above, this is not Sturgeon’s formulation. 
78 The phrase “Impact of the mental” – henceforth “(Impact)” – as well as the present formulation is due to 
Sturgeon (1998, p. 414). As is often remarked, the Exclusion Argument’s reductive conclusion does not 
apply to mental events that do not cause physical events, if such there be.  
79 This formulation originates with Sturgeon (1998, p. 414). The “generally” phrase allows for occasional 
overdetermination, and strictly speaking the reductionist conclusion would not apply to mental events 
involved in such cases. 
80 This could be interpreted either as a token-identity claim (every token mental event is identical with some
token physical event), or as a type-identity claim (every type of mental events is identical with some type of 
physical events). If Kim’s (1976) theory of events as property instantiations is assumed, token-identity 
entails type-identity. 
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6.3. The Empirical Status of Closure  
What evidence is there for (Closure)? Somewhat surprisingly, given its almost universal 
acceptance by physicalists, the mental causation literature is relatively unforthcoming on 
why we should believe in the principle. This is unfortunate, as it is not an obvious truth. 
Arguments for (Closure) appear to fall into two classes. Some appeal explicitly to 
empirical evidence, whereas others construe (Closure) as following more or less 
straightforwardly from abstract explanatory features attributed to physics. According to 
the former type of argument (Closure) is far from obvious, and robust evidence for the 
principle only became available quite recently. According to the latter, “simpler” type, 
(Closure) turns out to be a relatively obvious truth which can be arrived at without much 
reflection on empirical evidence.  
 There are at least two simple arguments for (Closure).81 First, Kim (1992) thinks 
that if (Closure) is violated by irreducibly mental causes, the laws of physics, too, would 
be violated. He takes such violation to be intolerable. Second, Kim frequently tells us that 
unless (Closure) holds, physics will not be “completable.” Again, he takes this to be an 
unacceptable consequence. (Cp., e.g., Kim, 1993; 1998, p. 40) Now most physicalists 
would probably – and unlike antiphysicalists like Nancy Cartwright (1980) –  follow Kim 
in taking the truth of the laws of physics for granted. Furthermore, physicalism is, 
perhaps, by its very nature wedded to the idea that physics is in some sense completable.
Kim’s arguments therefore appear to provide simple and relatively a priori routes to 
(Closure).
 However, such simple arguments are probably not successful unless 
supplemented with substantial empirical evidence. For Brian McLaughlin (1992) and 
David Papineau (2001) argue persuasively that the laws of physics could remain true 
even if some physical effects lack sufficient physical causes. Briefly, laws like Newton’s 
81 In addition to the two arguments I mention here, Donald Davidson (1980) might be taken to argue that 
unless (Closure) holds, the laws of physics cannot be maximally general and deterministic, as he thinks 
they must be. (See Ramberg (1999) for discussion of Davidson’s concept of the physical and its connection 
with generality and determinism.) Davidson’s argument faces basically the same problems as those 
mentioned below. 
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second, F = ma, appear to be “causally neutral”82 insofar as they are indifferent to what 
forces or causes enter into them. F = ma, then, could remain true even if some 
accelerations were due to non-physical causes or forces.83  If there are such causes, 
physics would presumably not be completable in the sense envisioned by Kim either. The 
problem with just asserting completability, as Kim appears to do, is this. As McLaughlin 
(1992) and Papineau (2001) make clear, causes like irreducibly vital forces have been 
proposed by scientists until quite recently. We shall encounter something similar when 
we considering the history of theorizing about neural signaling below. Scientists, in fact, 
appear to have changed their minds about the completability of physics several times over 
history. (Papineau, 2001) What is needed is therefore some sort of inductive argument 
from current theories to the effect that physics must be completable. We are left, then, 
with the first type of arguments for (Closure). 
 McLaughlin and Papineau offer such arguments. In outline they contend that 
irreducibly mental or vital causes of physical events are not needed because: (1) the 
quantum-mechanical explanation of chemical bonding historically undermined a prime 
case of emergent, non-physical forces. (McLaughlin, 1992) (2) The reduction of forces 
like friction to more fundamental physical forces inductively supports the claim that all 
forces reduce to fundamental physical forces. (Papineau, 2001) (3) Detailed and 
successful investigations of biological systems have not revealed any events that cannot 
be attributed to physical forces or causes. (Papineau, 2001)  
 Non-physicalists may harbor worries about this evidence. Some like Robin 
Hendry (2005) and Sturgeon (1998) doubt that there is conclusive evidence for (Closure). 
Others, like Cartwright (1999, ch. 1) think of scientific theories as models with limited 
scope, and are skeptical to any claims about theoretical completeness outside the models’ 
current scope. I am not convinced that these problems cannot be effectively countered by 
physicalists. In fact, I am inclined to believe that authors like McLaughlin (1992) and 
Papineau (2001) make a strong empirical case for the claim that some (Closure) principle 
82 Cartwright (1979) uses a slightly different sense of “causal neutrality” to characterize laws like F = ma.
83 Admittedly, this argument may turn out to depend on whether we chose to reify forces or not. See 
McLaughlin (1992, pp. 64-65) and Papineau (2001, p. 17n11; 2002, pp. 242-243) for discussion. 
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must hold. Nevertheless, the problems suggest that detailed considerations of empirical 
evidence are needed to fully assess the principle. And quite independently of this, we still 
need to consider empirical evidence to get clear about what “the physical domain” that is 
supposed to be closed is.84  This question is interesting in its own right, but also because 
it is the starting point of Sturgeon’s (1998) challenge to the Exclusion Argument. 
6.4. Sturgeon’s Challenge  
The Exclusion Argument mentions the physical domain both in the (Closure) and (No 
Overdetermination) premises as well as in (Impact), the premise stating that mental 
events have physical effects. Ours and Sturgeon’s central question is: what does 
“physical” mean in these premises? Under the plausible assumption that the premises 
must be supported by explanatory practice or common sense (1998, p. 412), Sturgeon 
argues that the Exclusion Argument equivocates. (Closure) and (Impact) are only 
plausible under different readings of the “physical.” (1998, p. 415). According to 
Sturgeon (1998, pp. 415-416), the physical domain could mean the “narrowly physical” 
or microphysical domain, which he takes to be that of quantum mechanics. But it could 
also mean the “broadly physical” domain containing in addition to microphysics, macro 
objects like tables and rocks. I call the corresponding premises “(Broad-Closure),” 
“(Narrow-Closure)” and so on. Sturgeon argues that only (Broad-Impact) and perhaps, 
but only perhaps, (Narrow-Closure) are supported by current science or common sense. 
Hence, the alleged equivocation. These, then, are Sturgeon’s central claims: 
(S1) (Broad-Impact) is supported by science/common sense 
(S2) (Narrow-Impact) is not supported by science/common sense 
(S3) (Broad-Closure) is not supported by science/common sense 
84 This problem is related to, but different from, the one posed by “Hempel’s Dilemma” to the effect that 
physicalism is either false or trivial, depending on how physicalists characterize the physical domain. 
(Crane & Mellor, 1990) Even assuming, as I do, that one or more of the proposed solutions to this dilemma 
will work – see, e.g., Melnyk (1997); Papineau (2001); Smart (1978) and Stoljar (2005) – it is still 
interesting to determine which physical domain is closed. 
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(S4) (Narrow-Closure) may or may not be supported by science/common sense 
Consider briefly (S1) and (S2) first. Sturgeon contends that “everyday experience” and 
“macro science” indicate “that mental events have macrophysical effects”, so (Broad-
Impact) seems solid. (Sturgeon, 1998, pp. 416) However, he finds (Narrow-Impact) 
dubious. “No working scientific theory postulates a pervasive causal link between mental 
events and quantum events. Neither does commonsense.” (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 415)
 What about (S3) and (S4)? Sturgeon thinks that 
[(Broad-Closure)] is not part of extant science; nor is it part of everyday experience. No working 
scientific theory says broadly physical effects have fully revealing broadly physical histories. And 
neither does commonsense. Quite the contrary: both macro science and everyday experience rely 
upon mental causes for broadly physical effects. (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 416)
He portrays the evidence presented in favor of (Narrow-Closure) as follows: “[Quantum 
mechanics] says quantum events have their chances fully determined by quantum states. 
This is said to render the scientific bona fides of [(Narrow-Closure)] beyond question.” 
(Sturgeon, 1998, p. 415). However, Sturgeon also believes that, given what we currently 
know about quantum mechanical theory, (Narrow-Closure) might be false. As he (1998, 
p. 426) – and, as far as I can tell, most popularized expositions – describes quantum 
mechanics, the development of a quantum system is subject to two rules. First, as long as 
the system is not being measured, its state evolves in accordance with the so-called wave 
function. This function can be obtained by solving the Schrödinger equation for the 
system. Strangely, the wave function allows the system to be in a “superposition” of 
several states. For instance, “if a particle can be located at P1 or P2 or P3, then it can also 
be characterized by a combination such as (1/3P1 + 1/3P2 + 1/3P3).” (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 
425) Second, there is a “projection” rule stating that during measurement the wave 
function collapses into one of the superposed states, yielding a definite measured state, 
e.g., P1 or P2 or P3. Put briefly, the “measurement problem” in quantum mechanics is to 
say what happens to the system when it is being measured. Sturgeon argues that some, 
but not all, proposed solutions to this problem render (Narrow-Closure) false. For 
instance, according to Eugene Wigner’s and Niels Bohr’s interpretations, the collapse of 
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the wave function is due to an interaction between quantum mechanical systems and 
consciousness or classical/macro physical systems, respectively. But if any of these 
interpretations are correct, the collapse into a quantum state is caused by something that 
is not itself quantum mechanical. Hence, (Narrow-Closure) would fail under these 
interpretations. Since it is still an open question which interpretation is right, there is no 
conclusive evidence for (Narrow-Closure). (Sturgeon, 1998, pp. 427-428)85
 Summing up, Sturgeon poses a two-fold challenge to the Exclusion Argument. 
First, there is the Equivocation Problem. If (S1)-(S4) are right, the Exclusion Argument is 
not valid as it stands, because it equivocates between the narrowly and the broadly 
physical. Second, if (S4) is right, there is also what we might call the No Closure 
Problem. That is, it is not even obvious that (Narrow-Closure) holds, so there might be no
empirically plausible closure principle. This is a threat to any physicalist – reductive or 
antireductive – who endorses (Closure).  
 With respect to the Equivocation Problem, Sturgeon is well aware that even 
though (Broad-Closure) is not postulated by science or common sense, it might 
nevertheless be argued that broadly physical events have sufficient physical causes. 
(Sturgeon, 1998, p. 416) He therefore offers a revised Exclusion Argument, only to 
dismiss it.86 This argument contains two additional assumptions. First, there is 
(Composition). Broadly physical events are mereologically composed by narrowly 
physical events, that is, have narrowly physical events as their parts. (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 
417) In addition, one might think that to cause the parts composing an event is to cause 
the event itself. For instance, if you cause the bricks constituting a wall to fall down, 
would you not eo ipso also cause the wall to fall down? The argument’s second 
assumption therefore provides a kind of mereological bridge from the micro to the macro, 
85 However, as Paul Noordhof (1999, p. 371n4) notes, Bohr’s interpretation is consistent with (Broad-
Closure), as the collapse would be caused by a broadly physical event.  
86 He actually offers two revised arguments. The second argument aims to show that mental events do have 
narrowly physical effects after all, as demanded by (Narrow-Impact). Sturgeon considers this argument, but 
dismisses it as invalid. (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 425n13) I shall set this aside, as the basic problems raised by 
Sturgeon can be appreciated from the first argument. 
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across which causal influence can flow. I call this (Upward Causation). If C causes E and 
E composes into E*, then C causes E*. (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 417)  
 The argument then runs as follows.87 By (Broad-Impact), mental events have 
broadly physical effects. By (Composition), these effects have narrowly physical events 
as their parts. Assuming (Narrow-Closure), these parts have sufficient narrowly physical 
causes. But, according to (Upward Causation), these narrowly physical causes are also 
causes of the broadly physical events. By (No Overdetermination) these events are not 
causally overdetermined by their narrowly physical and mental causes. So mental events 
must be – not broadly physical events – but quantum mechanical events. (Sturgeon, 1998, 
p. 417) 
 I can only provide an outline of Sturgeon’s attempt to refute this argument here. 
This will nevertheless be instructive, as it shows what difficulties formulating the 
Exclusion Argument in terms of physics rather than neuroscience may lead to. Briefly, 
Sturgeon thinks that (Upward Causation) is false, because he holds a (Cause & Essence) 
principle. C causes E iff C is sufficient to bring about what is essential to E.88 (Sturgeon, 
1998, p. 422) This idea can be brought out by considering one of Sturgeon’s 
counterexamples to (Upward Causation). 
1000 ducks are on a lake. All are normal save Duck10. Duck10 is deaf. As it happens, Duck10 is 
bitten by a turtle just as a shotgun is fired nearby. The flock takes flight en masse. (Sturgeon, 
1998, p. 419) 
Sturgeon contends that, contrary to (Upward Causation), the turtle bite does not cause the 
flock’s flight, even though it causes a part of that flight, namely the flight of Duck10.
(Sturgeon, 1998, p. 369)  The explanation is that to cause the flock’s flight is to cause the 
essential number of individual duck flights. We do not treat the turtle bite as a cause, 
87 See Sturgeon (1998, p. 418). He subsequently revises the argument (1998, p. 424), but the differences do 
not matter for our purposes. 
88 As Noordhof (1999, p. 369n3) notes this may be a bit too strict, because C might qualify as a cause even 
though it only brings about a part of E’s essence. (Provided, presumably, the remainder of the essence is 
brought about by other causes.) 
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because the flight of Duck10 is inessential to the flock’s flight. On the other hand we 
accept the claim that the shot causes the flock’s flight, because it causes “enough salient 
duck-movements” (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 421), in accordance with (Cause & Essence).  
 As Paul Noordhof points out in his critique of Sturgeon, this does not at first blush 
seem like much of a problem for the Exclusion Argument. For quantum events might 
well be sufficient to cause “a certain minimum number of quantum events” (Noordhof, 
1999, p. 371) that are essential to broadly physical events like bodily movements. 
However, Sturgeon’s (1999) rejoinder makes it clear that the problem he was originally 
trying to raise was that quantum events may compose into broadly physical events and 
yet be inessential to them. That is, we have no  
[…] right to assume micro phenomena are essential to macro phenomena. Maybe they are. Maybe 
they aren’t. It’s an open scientific issue. […] A systematic account of macro movements may 
ultimately see quantum events as compositional tag-alongs, inessential dust on irreducibly macro 
shoes. (Sturgeon, 1999, p. 378, see also 1998, p. 422)  
The putative reason why quantum events may be inessential to bodily movements is that 
there is a huge “conceptual gap” between the quantum mechanical domain and the 
broadly physical domain. (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 422)  And the reason why there is such a 
gap is that the spatial realities of the domains differ. The quantum mechanical image 
contains strange phenomena like superposed positions and projection. Particles can be in 
a superposed combination of several positions. Measuring them can project them into a 
definite position. Things like that do not happen in macro spatial reality.89 (Sturgeon, 
1998, p. 426) Summing up, the micro and macro levels are conceptually so far apart that 
we do not know whether the former is essential to the latter. But if it is not essential, there 
are no sufficient microphysical causes of broadly physical events. Thus, this version of 
the Exclusion Argument would collapse. 
89 Sturgeon may be taken to supplement this idea with some brief modal considerations about what kinds of 
counterfactual dependencies are relevant to micro causation and macro causation. I set this issue aside. 
(Sturgeon, 1998, pp. 428-429) 
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6.5. Lessons from Sturgeon’s Challenge  
There is a lot to be learnt from Sturgeon’s challenge. Most importantly, his Equivocation 
Problem puts two constraints on the formulation of the Exclusion Argument. (i) The
Matching Constraint. A valid Exclusion Argument requires that we find some way of 
matching the physical domains mentioned in (Closure) and in (Impact). Physical and 
mental causes had better cause the same events. (ii) The Empirical Constraint. A sound 
Exclusion Argument requires that domain to be such that (Closure) and (Impact) are 
empirically plausible. In hindsight, (i) may appear obvious, but Sturgeon’s important 
contribution is to show that domain matching is not necessarily a trivial thing to achieve. 
The Empirical Constraint is supported independently by the apparent failure of simple 
explanatory arguments for (Closure), e.g., the argument that the failure of (Closure) 
would lead to the violation of physical laws. (Section 6.3 above)  
 In my view the Empirical Constraint should be read strongly, because it would be 
preferable to avoid the Cartwrightean worries about completeness claims mentioned 
above. (Section 6.3, Cartwright, 1999, ch. 1) One may of course have little patience with 
these worries. There is a fine line between sensitivity to the limitations of scientific 
models and inductive skepticism. Barry Loewer (2001a) argues that Cartwright crosses 
this line. But the Exclusion Argument would nevertheless be stronger if it could be run 
within actual scientific models or plausible expansions thereof. To be sure, a certain 
amount of induction is always involved when we claim that a theory – or some plausible 
expansion thereof – can actually, or in principle, explain what we have not already 
explained. But to make the Exclusion Argument’s contention that effects like bodily 
movements can in principle be explained by physical causes plausible, we should as far 
as possible appeal to detailed considerations of extant theories of bodily movements. 
Now, there do not appear to be any extant quantum mechanical models of causes of 
bodily movements around, and I doubt whether they will be available any time soon. As 
we shall see, there are, however, good neurobiological models available. This motivates 
realigning our gaze from physics to neuroscience. At the very least, neuroscience may 
provide a supplemental approach to causal exclusion. 
  A second lesson from the challenge is this. Reductive and antireductive 
physicalists all need to debate the question of the domain of (Closure) more explicitly. 
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For on closer inspection there is striking disagreement as to whether (Broad-Closure) or 
(Narrow-Closure) or perhaps even both hold.90 Consequently, it is not clear whether 
philosophers assent to the same thing when they assent to (Closure). Take (Broad-
Closure) first. If it holds, the Equivocation Problem would vanish. And whereas Sturgeon 
argues that (Broad-Closure) is not supported by current knowledge, others disagree. 
Papineau (2001, p. 12), for instance, defines the physical as the “non-mental”, thus 
implying that his Exclusion Argument can be run with a wide reading of “physical” in 
(Closure). And in a later criticism of Sturgeon he explicitly says that “The version of 
[(Closure)] that I take to be defensible, as I said, is the [(Closure)] of the inanimate.” 
(2002, p. 44, my italics)91 Similarly, Noordhof (1999, p. 372n4) questions whether the 
Exclusion Argument should be formulated in terms of the “more specific claim” 
(Narrow-Closure) rather than (Broad-Closure). Kim in one place contends that 
“Physicalism need not be, and should not be, identified with micro-physicalism.” (Kim, 
1998, p. 117) He also seems to imply that (Broad-Closure) holds because he assents to 
(Closure) (1998, p. 40), while simultaneously claiming that the physical domain includes 
things like “tables,” “computers” and “biological organisms”. (Kim, 1998, p. 113) The 
widespread talk about bodily movements – which appear paradigmatically broadly 
90 There are many logical possibilities here. Sturgeon defines the broadly physical as “the macrophysical 
plus the quantum mechanical.” (1998, p. 415, my italics) This turns the narrowly physical into a proper 
subset of the broadly physical. Thus (Broad-Closure) need not entail (Narrow-Closure), nor the other way 
round. One could hold without the other, or they might both hold. One could even in principle define the 
“purely broadly physical” as the broadly physical minus the narrowly physical, and claim, e.g., that, (Pure-
Broad Closure) holds without (Narrow-Closure) holding. 
91 This quote may be taken to imply that Papineau denies that (Narrow-Closure) holds. And indeed he goes 
on to say that “I don’t think of quantum mechanics per se as asserting completeness, since the basic 
assumptions of quantum mechanics leave it open what forces (Hamiltonians) there are.” (Papineau, 2002, p. 
43n14) As we have seen, he (2001) nevertheless argues that there are no non-fundamental forces. 
Accordingly, he may be taking the failure of (Narrow-Closure) to be a mere possibility.  In fact, he suggests 
that the Exclusion Argument could be sharpened to apply to, e.g., the biological and the chemical by 
defining “the physical” first as “the non-mental,” then as “the non-biological” and finally as “the non-
chemical”. See, e.g. (Papineau, 2001, p. 11) This would ultimately reduce every domain to the purely 
physical domain, and suggests that he does endorse (Narrow-Closure).  
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physical – in the exclusion debate suggests that many others share this view. On the other 
hand a more recent claim of Kim’s only adds to the confusion about the plausibility of 
(Broad-Closure): “It is only when we reach the fundamental level of microphysics that 
we are likely to get a causally closed domain.” (Kim, 2005, p. 65) Here, then, Kim 
appears to deny (Broad-Closure). 
 With respect to (Narrow-Closure), some physicalists do seem to appeal primarily 
to this domain in their discussions of (Closure). For instance, McLaughlin (1992) and 
Loewer (2001a) both appeal to microphysical forces or causes. Andrew Melnyk, too, 
indicates that he is operating with a “strict sense of the ‘physical’” (2003, p. 158) in his 
discussion of (Closure), thus apparently endorsing (Narrow-Closure).  
 This brief review of closure principles at play in the literature, then, reveals that 
people discussing, to a large extent, the very same (Closure)-related problems (e.g., the 
Exclusion Argument), appear to operate with different versions of (Closure). This will 
have to be amended. Furthermore, there is significant disagreement as to what the 
evidence for (Closure) actually shows, that is whether it supports (Narrow-Closure), 
(Broad-Closure), both, or no (Closure) at all. This calls for more detailed, and more 
explicit discussion of the empirical evidence presented by authors like McLaughlin 
(1992), Papineau (2001) and Sturgeon (1998). Like, I suspect many other philosophers of 
mind, I am in no position to assess this evidence, as it involves difficult questions from 
the philosophy of physics. It nevertheless seems safe to say that it is still early days with 
respect to these questions. As philosophers of mind we can apparently not take it for 
granted that (Broad-Closure) or (Narrow-Closure) can figure in an Exclusion Argument. I 
am not saying that the difficulties involved in formulating the Exclusion Argument in 
terms of physics cannot be sorted out, but they do suggest that it would be useful to 
supplement this approach with a different one. This is especially true, since we, as we 
shall see, can bypass the difficulties by appealing to neuroscience instead. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Sturgeon is surely right about one thing. 
There is a huge conceptual gap between mental causation and bodily movements on the 
one hand, and quantum mechanics on the other. Most current scientific approaches to 
mentality seem to disregard quantum mechanics. It is highly instructive to note that 
Sturgeon has taken us from the relatively simple Exclusion Argument into hairy 
146
questions about the metaphysics of part-whole relations and quantum mechanics. What is 
the correct account of superposition and the measurement problem? Can the parts of 
something be inessential to that thing? Do you have to cause something’s essence in 
order to cause that thing? The first question continues to plague trained philosophers of 
physics. The latter two are likely to keep metaphysicians engaged for years to come. I 
contend that what allowed Sturgeon to raise these problems is that we started out with a 
(Closure) principle formulated in terms of physics. In what follows I suggest a different, 
neurobiological approach that respects both the Matching Constraint and the Empirical 
Constraint. 
6.6. Neurobiological quasi-Closure  
Interesting as the challenging to (Closure) discussed in Sections 6.3-6.5 are, I shall argue 
that there is a version of the Exclusion Argument that does not turn on how they are 
resolved. In fact, I suspect that appealing to general (Closure) principles is not the most 
intuitive or plausible way of motivating exclusion. Picking up a neuroscience text book, 
and considering what we know about neural processes leading to bodily movements, is,
however, arguably a good way of intuitively motivating exclusion. Given these neural 
causes, where do irreducibly mental causes enter the picture? Is there any room for them? 
Accordingly, I shall be arguing that the Exclusion Argument can be run with a much 
more limited “quasi-Closure” pertaining to the neurophysiological domain.92 The rough 
idea is that setting aside perceptual causal input, and letting circumstances be “normal,” 
neural events have sufficient neural causes. Since what counts as “normal circumstances” 
arguably does not depend on the presence of irreducibly mental causes, we can formulate 
the exclusion problem as follows. Mental causes compete with neural causes of bodily 
92 Others have also attempted to motivate exclusion by reference to neuroscience and without invoking a 
general closure principle. John Bickle (2003, ch. 3) argues that causal exclusion is an implicit part of 
current cellular/molecular neuroscience. Kim (2005, pp. 154-155) also offers a brief appeal to neural 
causes, and claims that this way of formulating exclusion does not presuppose a general (Closure) 
principle. However, there is clearly a need to look more closely at what such an Exclusion Argument looks 
like, and what evidence there is for it. This is what I propose to do. 
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movements. This may appear to render the resulting Neural Exclusion Argument trivial, 
but as we shall see it does not. The rest of this paper will be dedicated to spelling out and 
defending this idea. 
6.6.1. Neurobiological quasi-Closure and a Neural Exclusion Argument 
Notice first that the principle we might call “(Neuro-Closure)” – which results from 
substituting “neurobiological” for “physical” in (Closure) – is obviously false. It is false 
because the neurobiological suffers causal influence from the outside that may be divided 
into at least two (possibly overlapping) kinds: first, in phenomena like perception, non-
biological entities like photons impinge on sensory receptors, thus working as “causal 
input” to neural events at the body’s periphery. Second, there are “background 
conditions” like the presence of oxygen and the absence of ultra-strong electromagnetic 
fields on which normal biological processes depend, and, we may wish to say, causally
depend.93 Perhaps this is part of the reason why so much of the exclusion debate has been 
formulated in terms of physics rather than biology. But by adding a ceteris paribus clause 
indicating that circumstances are “normal” for organisms like ourselves, we can 
formulate a very different, and more limited closure principle, claiming roughly that: 
those neural events that are not directly caused by non-neural input have neural causes. 
These causes are not absolutely sufficient for their effects, but they are nevertheless 
sufficient in the circumstances. As Jerry Fodor once remarked in a different context, 
ceteris paribus laws “necessitate their consequents when their ceteris paribus conditions 
are discharged”. (Fodor, 1990, p. 152, my italics) Let us cast these ideas into a principle. 
93 Is the division of non-neurobiological factors into causal input and background conditions ultimately 
pragmatic and tuned to an explanatory interest in phenomena like perception? Perhaps. But even if it is, all 
that matters to my argument is that the non-neurobiological factors on which neural causation depends do 
not include irreducibly but necessary mental factors, however the factors are classified.  
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(quasi-Closure) Assuming that background conditions are normal, neurobiological 
events that are not immediately caused by organism-internal or organism-external 
input to the nervous system have neurobiological causes that are sufficient (in the 
circumstances).94
The formulation of this principle may sound unnecessarily complicated, and a simpler 
formulation claiming that neural causation does not depend on irreducibly mental causes 
might do the same job. I shall nevertheless use the present formulation, because I think it 
mirrors the pattern of explanation in the neural models we shall consider. The principle 
may also appear to render the Neural Exclusion Argument I will develop in the following 
trivial. But as will become apparent when we consider the empirical evidence, it does not. 
Also note that in order for (quasi-Closure) to figure in this argument, the principle’s 
neurobiological domain should be read as including the muscle contractions that 
constitute bodily movements. After all, in the philosophy of mind, the Exclusion 
Argument’s primary target has been mental causes of bodily movements. Finally, 
neuroscience also draws on causes from other scientific fields like biochemistry. To the 
extent that such causes are included in neuroscientific explanations I shall count them as 
belonging to the neurobiological domain. 
 Before arguing for (quasi-Closure) I will clarify it and its role in the Exclusion 
Argument by making three points. (1) (Quasi-Closure) is weaker than (Closure) in three 
ways. First, no neurobiological event has absolutely sufficient neurobiological causes. 
This is due to the necessary but non-neurobiological background conditions mentioned 
above.95 For instance, if my arm is restrained, the firing of motor neurons enervating it 
94 The distinction between organism-internal and organism-external input is needed because the nervous 
system also receives causal input from other bodily systems like the endocrinal or hormonal system. 
95 As will be recalled, Papineau (2001) also appeals to biology in his argument for a general closure 
principle. My more detailed considerations of neuroscience may therefore be taken to support his general 
principle. Especially so if the physical is understood extremely widely as the “non-mental” as Papineau 
suggests. So, note again that I am not denying that a more general closure principle holds. However, using 
[Footnote continued on next page]
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may not cause a bodily movement, even if they normally would. Second, some 
neurobiological events lack neurobiological causes. Perceptual input at the body’s 
periphery is again the most natural example.96 Third, even the neurobiological events that 
have neurobiological causes do not have such causes at all prior times. Tracing the effects 
of a neurobiological event backwards will eventually take one outside the neurobiological 
domain, whereas (Closure) demands there be a physical cause occurring at any time t at 
which there is a sufficient cause at all.  
 (2) (Quasi-closure) can figure in a Neural Exclusion Argument. Provided the 
Empirical Constraint and the Matching Constraint are satisfied, the relative weakness of 
(Quasi-Closure) poses no problems to its use in a Neural Exclusion Argument. For the 
Empirical Constraint will be satisfied if: (a) there is empirical evidence in favor of the 
principle’s claim that ceteris paribus (and setting aside causal input) neural events have 
sufficient neural causes. (b) The ceteris paribus conditions do not include irreducibly 
mental factors. Of course, the presence of mental states will “normally,” perhaps even 
necessarily, accompany many neural states. So strictly speaking irreducibly mental events 
are in fact likely to figure in the ceteris paribus conditions for neural causation. However, 
there should be a minimal set of ceteris paribus conditions in which they do not figure. In 
a word, their inclusion is not necessary. Now, the function of (Closure) in the traditional 
Exclusion Argument is to ensure that there are sufficient non-mental causes of bodily 
movements that do not include mental events. But switching from the “physical” to the 
“neurobiological” by substituting (quasi-Closure) for (Closure) does nothing to change 
this. For in conjunction conditions (a) and (b) entail that there are neural causes of bodily 
(quasi-Closure) we can see how exclusion can be formulated in terms of more limited, but actual scientific 
models. Furthermore, the background conditions under which neural causation takes place are likely to be 
of a theoretically heterogeneous nature, so (quasi-Closure) does not entail that any particular theory is 
absolutely closed. 
96 By perceptual input I mean the events that trigger signaling from sensory receptors to the central nervous 
system, not the actual perception, whatever that is. Note that such triggering depends on the receptors’ 
being ready to signal. Such “readiness” arguably involves biological factors, like the presence of ions that 
can flow through the receptor when it opens. Strictly speaking, then, even perceptual input depends on 
some neurobiological causes.  
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movements that do not include – or depend on as background conditions – mental events. 
So (quasi-Closure) can figure as our closure principle, even though it does not provide us 
with absolutely sufficient neural causes.  
 The Matching Constraint requires that mental and neural events cause the same 
events. Focusing on behavioral output from the system, it requires that neural events 
cause bodily movements, just as we and Sturgeon take mental events to do. Now if the 
Empirical Constraint is satisfied, neural events surely cause muscle contractions.  Do 
they also cause bodily movements? Yes. Here Sturgeon’s objections appear to have no 
bite. Bodily movements can be complex and involve multiple muscles. But the way 
contractions of individual muscle fibers compose into contractions of the muscles that 
pull on our bones is well understood. This understanding was arrived at empirically, to be 
sure, but there is no huge conceptual gap between contractions/relaxations and bodily 
movements. This contrasts sharply with the relation between quantum mechanical events 
and bodily movements. If Sturgeon’s (Cause & Essence) principle is right, to cause a 
bodily movement is to cause enough contractions and relaxations of individual fibers. 
Neural events do that. Since some individual fiber contractions and relaxations are 
essential to bodily movements, bodily movements fall squarely within the explanatory 
domain of neuroscience.97 The Matching Constraint is satisfied. In conclusion, whatever 
difficulties there are with the Neural Exclusion Argument, they do not appear to be 
problems with the use of (quasi-Closure).  
 That is not to say that the Neural Exclusion Argument is ultimately sound. I am 
not claiming that. After all it must also include some principle of (No Overdetermination) 
to ensure that mental events compete with neural events for the status of being causes of 
bodily movements. For all I have said overdetermination of bodily movements by mental 
and neural events might be perfectly acceptable. But this difficulty is unrelated to (quasi-
Closure), which is my focus here. 
 (3) The domain to which the mental is reduced will be different. If the argument is 
sound, the mental will thereby be reduced to the neurobiological, and not to the narrowly 
97 Of course, some fiber or muscle contractions caused by neural events may be inessential to a bodily 
movement.  (Sturgeon, 1998, p. 420) 
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physical domain.98 This is in my view something to be welcomed. My point is not that 
the conclusion that mental events are quantum events would not be philosophically 
interesting. It would indeed. But given the current state of science, neuroscience’s claim 
for relevance to mental causation is arguably stronger than that of physics. 
Neuroscientists are currently trying to establish correlations between mental functions 
and neural regions with the aid of functional imaging techniques, lesion studies, single-
cell recordings and the like. They are interested in how neural systems interact to produce 
behavior and in how specific neural circuits implement cognitive functions. A sound 
Neural Exclusion Argument would therefore imply that an actual, and much debated, line 
of research is reductive. I doubt whether the same can be said of the Exclusion Argument 
which appeals to physics properly construed, e.g., to quantum mechanics. There does not, 
after all, appear to be any developed science called “behavioral quantum mechanics.” In 
many ways, the traditional Exclusion Argument, as it was formulated above, is a very 
simple solution to the question of reductionism. If sound, this Exclusion Argument would 
provide a convenient and simple way to reductionism from just three premises. But the 
simplicity has a down-side. The argument contends that the mental must reduce, without 
really indicating specifically to what it might reduce. On the other hand a Neural 
Exclusion Argument could be taken to support the claim that correlations between mental 
and neural phenomena currently studied by neuroscience are actually identities. 
 Summing up, (quasi-Closure) can figure in the following Neural Exclusion 
Argument. 
98 Given (quasi-Closure) it would strictly speaking be more correct to say that the mental reduces to 
something neurobiological or to something in the non-neurobiological background conditions. The latter 
alternative appears unmotivated, however. 
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(quasi-Closure) Assuming that background conditions are normal, neurobiological 
events that are not immediately caused by organism-internal or organism-external 
input to the nervous system have neurobiological causes that are sufficient (in the 
circumstances) 
(Non-Mental Background) A minimal characterization of the normal background 
conditions does not include irreducibly mental events 
(Neural Impact) Mental events have neurobiological effects 
(No Overdetermination) The physical effects of mental events are not generally 
overdetermined 
(Reductionism) Mental events are neural events 
6.6.2. Arguing for quasi-Closure 
As indicated above, I need to argue (a), that there is empirical evidence in favor of (quasi-
Closure), and (b), that its minimal ceteris paribus conditions do not contain irreducibly 
mental conditions. With respect to (a), the plausibility of (quasi-Closure) hinges on what 
is meant by “neurobiological,” just as the plausibility of (Closure) will hinge, if Sturgeon 
is right, on whether the “physical” is given a broad or narrow reading. “Neurobiological” 
might of course mean many things, partly because neuroscientists study the nervous 
system at many levels of analysis. These levels include inter alia cellular/molecular 
neuroscience, which studies nerve cells and their chemical components, systems 
neuroscience, which focuses on complex neural circuits and cognitive neuroscience,
which studies the neural processes underlying higher cognition. (See, e.g., Bear et al. 
2001, pp. 13-14) I will focus on cellular/molecular neuroscience, and to a certain extent 
systems neuroscience, for which I do think (quasi-Closure) is empirically plausible. In 
contrast, cognitive neuroscience often relies on concepts from the cognitive/intentional 
vocabulary in its explanations, and hence does not appear to be even quasi-closed vis-à-
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vis the mental.99 One might think that we ought to formulate the argument in terms of 
cognitive neuroscience, since that may be the best currently available biological approach 
to behavior and mentality. However, the neural causes invoked in the Neural Exclusion 
Argument need not be those that provide us with the best biological explanations of 
behavior. All that matters is that they are ceteris paribus causally sufficient for them. 
 My argument for (quasi-Closure) consists of three steps. Taken together they 
indicate that we have relatively detailed models of neural causation that do not implicitly 
or explicitly rely on mental causes. First, I outline a “connectionist” view of the 
anatomical causal structure within which neural causation takes place. This causal 
structure is part of neuroscience’s theoretical backbone, and fits well with the formulation 
of (quasi-Closure). Second, I argue that we currently know enough about the kinds of 
causes that are at play within the causal structure to exclude the contribution of 
irreducibly mental causes. Over history a theoretical picture of the kinds of causes and 
mechanisms that are relevant to neural causation has emerged, from what was once an 
empty, or very loosely filled canvas. It is the amount of detail that relatively recently 
filled the picture that turns (quasi-Closure) into more than an off-hand appeal to future or 
idealized explanations of bodily movements. Third, I argue more briefly that we have no 
reason to believe that irreducibly mental factors are included in the minimal background 
conditions. My exposition will in many ways be simplifying, but should be sufficient to 
render (quasi-Closure) plausible given extant science. 
Step 1: The structure of neural causation. I begin, then, by arguing that, while (quasi-
Closure) may seem like an ad hoc philosopher’s construct, its view of neural causation is 
99 Notably, there is also representational lingo at play in cellular/molecular neuroscience, for instance the 
action potential (see below) is frequently referred to as a “signal,” and there is also talk of intracellular 
“second messengers” and the like. Unless we find some way of naturalizing representation, such 
descriptions may perhaps be taken to be inherently mental. Thus (quasi-Closure) might be jeopardized even 
for the cellular/molecular domain of neuroscience. But at this low level it nevertheless seems clear that the 
representational descriptions of causes could be substituted with non-representational (e.g., biochemical 
and cellular) descriptions. We might not want to do so, but (quasi-Closure) only requires that we can.
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mirrored in neuroscience’s broad theoretical perspective on the nervous system. This is 
related to the picture, familiar even from the popular press, of the brain as a kind of 
“neural network.” I will follow Kandel et al. (2000, pp. 7 & 23) in referring to this 
network theory as “connectionism.”100 More precisely, connectionism as I portray it 
involves two theoretical assumptions, early evidence for which is often attributed largely 
to Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852-1934). In revised forms they still constitute parts of the 
backbone of neuroscientific thinking.101
 First, Cajal provided important microscopic evidence for the Neuron Doctrine.
This doctrine has been interpreted in many ways (Mundale, 2001), but we can view it as 
making two claims. (i) Anatomically, neurons are discrete entities that do not fuse with 
one another. (ii) Physiologically, they are fundamental signaling units of the brain. In 
contrast, the “reticularists” of the time, like Camillo Golgi (1843-1926) – whose staining 
technique Cajal paradoxically relied on – believed that the brain forms a continuous web 
or reticulum. (Finger, 1994, ch. 3; Jones, 1999) In effect, reticularists denied that the Cell 
Theory, proposed by Mathias J. Schleiden (1804-1881) and Theodor Schwann (1810-
1882) in the 1830s, applied to the brain. According to this theory, cells are the 
fundamental functional building blocks of organisms. (Coleman, 1971, ch. 2)  The 
Neuron Doctrine, then, appears symptomatic of – and may well have directly shaped – 
the theoretical focus on the structure and function of neurons in much of Twentieth-
Century neuroanatomy and physiology.  
 From the point of view of neural causation and (quasi-Closure) the doctrine’s 
impact is this. One neuron’s becoming active (“firing”) and signaling to another neuron 
becomes one of the most important neural events to be causally explained. In short, the 
firing of individual neurons becomes a privileged kind of causal-explanatory event that is 
located at the center of our theoretical picture.  
100 Care should however be taken to distinguish this network theory from the more abstract and less 
biologically realistic “connectionist” models in computer and cognitive science.  
101 As witnessed by their explicit introduction in, e.g., Kandel et al.’s influential Principles of Neural 
Science. (2000, ch. 2)
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 Second, Cajal also held a Law of Dynamic Polarization, constraining the flow of 
information in neurons. Basically, neural signals travel only one way, from the receiving 
sites of neurons (e.g., its dendrites or soma) to the end of its outgoing projection or axon 
through which it affects other neurons. In contrast, some reticularists like Golgi thought 
that information could flow in several directions. (See, e.g., Berlucchi, 1999; Rapport, 
2005, ch. 9.) The physiologist Charles Scott Sherrington (1857-1952) proposed that this 
kind of neural communication happens at specialized regions he in 1897 called 
“synapses.” (Finger, 1994, ch. 3) We now know that at synapses neurons are typically, as 
Cajal predicted, separated by a small “synaptic cleft.” Interneuronal communication is 
typically mediated by chemicals called neurotransmitters. Such transmitters can have an 
excitatory or an inhibitory effect. That is, the release of neurotransmitter from the first, 
“presynaptic” neuron can either stimulate the second “postsynaptic” neuron to fire, or it 
can hinder it from doing so.  
 All in all, this outline of a connectionist theory constrains how neural causation is 
to be traced within neural networks. First, it tells us that one neuron’s firing constitutes a 
privileged kind of event. Second, it indicates that – setting aside spontaneous firing – 
both efficient and preventing causes of this privileged firing-effect are to be found in the 
firing of other, presynaptic neurons. This view of the direction of neural causation is 
mirrored in the analysis of neural circuits, where a standard functional taxonomy divides 
neurons into sensory, motor and interneurons. (Kandel et al., 2000, p. 25) Sensory 
neurons carry sensory information – in particular from sensory receptors at the body’s 
periphery – into the nervous system. Motor neurons synapse on muscle fibers and convey 
commands about movements to be executed. Interneurons mediate between sensory 
neurons, other interneurons and motor neurons. It is not a far leap from this 
connectionism to view the nervous system as largely an input-processing-output device. 
Information arrives through sensory neurons, is processed and sometimes stored (largely 
by interneurons), and may ultimately give rise to various sorts of output from the nervous 
system. The output which will concern us here is of course bodily movements.102
102 The nervous system can also output to other bodily systems like the endocrinal system when it causes 
the release of hormones. 
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 Returning to the Neural Exclusion Argument, this is pretty much what (quasi-
Closure) tells us. Tracing the effect of a neuron’s firing backwards will typically take us 
via sensory neurons to the outside of the neurobiological domain – as suggested in the 
“input” part of (quasi-Closure). Tracing them forwards may take us via motor neurons 
and muscle contractions, and once again, to the non-neurobiological domain. There are of 
course also background conditions on which such neurobiological causal chains depend. 
Some biological conditions – like the presence of normal cerebral blood flow and 
properly functioning glial cells – are among neuroscience’s explicit explanatory concerns. 
Others, like the presence of normal pressure and the absence of bullets hitting the brain, 
are normally not of explanatory interest, and can be lumped into non-neurobiological 
ceteris paribus conditions. In spite of the necessary non-biological ceteris paribus
conditions, neuroscientists go about explaining neural events – in particular neural 
signaling – in terms of neural events.  
 (quasi-Closure), then, appears to be in accordance with neuroscience’s 
explanatory aims as they are exercised at the levels of individual neurons and neural 
circuits built out of these. Within certain limits, neural events are explainable by neural 
events. This pattern of explanation is likely to be widespread in the special sciences 
generally, and will perhaps not be perceived as very special. It is certainly true that 
specifying ceteris paribus conditions in any special science will typically take you 
outside the vocabulary of that science. (Fodor, 1990, p. 147n10) But as we shall see 
shortly, at least in the case of neuroscience the pattern of explanation is supplemented 
with a detailed theoretical grasp of the mechanisms by which neural causes must work. 
Furthermore, neuroscientists also have a partly quantitative grasp of how these 
mechanisms must act together to yield their effects. This lends support to the claim that 
neural causes are really sufficient in the circumstances, and that we have good models of 
how such causes work. 
Step 2: Causation within this structure does not depend on irreducibly mental causes.
The connectionism just sketched provides a framework – pitched largely at the 
cellular/circuit levels – within which neural events, including bodily movements, can 
hopefully be explained by other neural events. But this neuroscientific explanatory 
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ambition should of course not be confused with a neuroscientific achievement. There are 
two reasons why this ambition should be rendered plausible. First, even though neurons 
cause other neurons within the network to fire, the mechanisms underlying such neural 
communication might not be neural through and through. Historically, special vital or 
mental causes have been proposed to explain neural communication. Such causes are not 
taken very seriously today. But even after the demise of vitalism it is important to provide 
a sketch of what is known about the mechanisms, to make sure that (quasi-Closure) is 
plausible given current scientific knowledge, and not just an appeal to future or idealized 
explanations. Second, it would be foolish to believe that our understanding of neural 
causation is currently complete and immune to revision. (Indeed, I shall briefly consider 
ways in which it may currently be changing below.) It is therefore important to 
emphasize that we know enough about neural mechanisms to believe that changes in our 
conception of these mechanisms are not likely to include the addition of irreducibly 
mental or vital causal factors.  
 To render the above-mentioned explanatory ambition plausible I return to the 
metaphor of a causal picture. Such pictures can do three things. First, they depict the 
kinds of events that are of central explanatory interest. Second, they provide scientists 
with a grasp of what kinds of causes are relevant to these events. Finally, really good 
pictures include representations of the mechanisms through which causes depicted therein 
bring about their effects. A causal picture, then, can figure both as a causal-explanatory 
toolbox, and help scientists constrain and develop hypotheses. If we want to explain a 
phenomenon, we can delve into the picture/toolbox for possible causes and mechanisms 
and check whether they can be made to fit with the explanandum. Or we may look for 
something different, but similar to what is in the box. Causal pictures need not be static. 
If thinking outside the box works, we can take whatever we were thinking of and add it to 
the box. If it works much better and is very different, we may want to throw away the old 
box and start off with a new one. As we shall see the causal picture behind current 
theories of neural signaling is to an increasing extent specified at the molecular level, and 
includes things like neurotransmitters, receptors and ion channels as crucial causal 
players. This kind of causal picture is introduced in text books such as those of Bear et al. 
(2001) and Kandel et al. (2000), which arguably play a sociological role in shaping 
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scientific research. (Schaffner, 2006) The picture, then, can be used to explain what goes 
on within the causal structure I just sketched. In my view, it is the picture’s explanatory 
strength which ultimately lends credence to (quasi-Closure) and its contention that we 
have good neural models of neural causation. 
 It is, however, a picture that is relatively new, and throughout history it has not 
always been obvious whether one could understand neural causation by purely 
neural/chemical means. As philosophers know, Descartes’ biology offered putative 
explanations of nervous signaling – if I may use that word in a Cartesian context – in 
terms of a kind of hydraulic system involving the flow of “animal spirits.” (Finger, 1994, 
ch. 2) In fact, to explain human actions he thought the immortal Soul had to move the 
pineal gland, thus changing the flow of the spirits. (See, e.g. Descartes, 1985, p. 340/AT 
XI 352, and McLaughlin, 1993, for historical discussion.) (quasi-Closure) and (Non-
Mental Background) would definitely not apply to a causal picture which includes 
Cartesian Souls.  
 However, neuroscientist Eric Kandel (2006, ch. 5) appears to describe the history 
of theorizing about neural signaling as involving the gradual exclusion of such mental or 
vital causes from our picture. This should interest us presently not only because it 
supports (quasi-Closure), but also because if Kandel is right, that history may be an 
example of causal exclusion in scientific practice. And yet it certainly does not involve 
any appeal to absolutely sufficient physical causes, as in the traditional Exclusion 
Argument for reductionism about the mental. Rather, it is based on actual, but limited 
scientific models of neural communication.  
 The historical and empirical emergence of this “soulless” and non-vital causal 
picture includes: (i) the discovery that signaling within neurons is electrical in nature, (ii) 
quantitative measurements of this signal’s properties, (iii) mechanistic explanations of the 
signal, and finally (iv), a chemical understanding of communication among neurons. I 
shall provide a rough outline of these developments, which jointly support (quasi-
Closure). I have adopted a historical approach, here, because this serves to underscore 
that the Neural Exclusion Argument is not trivial or obvious. It has not always been clear 
that we have good neural models of neural causation, as (quasi-Closure) contends. 
Neither has it always been clear that neural causation does not depend on irreducibly 
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mental or vital factors, as (Non-Mental Background) contends. These are both empirical 
and non-trivial discoveries. 
 (i) There was an accumulation of evidence that the signal traveling down the axon 
of individual neurons is electrical in nature. This evidence includes Luigi Galvani’s 
(1737-1798) discovery in the late Eighteenth Century that electrical stimulation of a 
frog’s leg could cause the frog’s leg to move. The discovery lead Galvani to suggest that 
muscle contractions are caused by naturally occurring “animal electricity” even outside 
the experimental situation. (Kandel, 2006, ch. 5; Finger, 1994, ch. 29) The idea that 
electricity occurs naturally in animals was for a while opposed by Alessandro Volta 
(1745-1827) and others, but ultimately, Galvani’s basic ideas where accepted. (Piccolino, 
1998; Schuetze, 1983) Marco Piccolino makes the point in a language friends of the 
Exclusion Argument might appreciate. “Galvani’s work swept away from life sciences 
mysterious fluids and elusive entities like “animal spirits” and led to the foundation of a 
new science, electrophysiology.” (Piccolino, 1998, p. 381)  
Discoveries made by Nineteenth Century scientists like Emile du Bois-Reymond 
(1818-1896) and Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) added significantly to the 
acceptance of the electrical nature of the nervous signal. (Kandel, 2006, ch. 5; Piccolino 
1998) This means that at least some aspects of the signal we now call the action potential 
can be – and was – made subject of physical investigations.  
 (ii) The electrical signal’s properties and form were uncovered, and a view of 
how it encodes information emerged. With the arrival of better technology, scientists 
were able to subject neural signaling to quantitative analysis. Helmholtz, for instance, 
managed to measure the speed of the nervous signal in 1859. (Kandel, 2006, p. 75; 
Piccolino, 1998) Most interestingly for our purposes, Edgar Douglas Adrian (1889-1977) 
recorded and amplified the action potential so that it could be visualized with the aid of 
an ink writer. At rest (see below) the inside of a neural membrane is more negative than 
the outside, yielding a “membrane potential” of approximately -65 mV. During the action 
potential this difference is reversed, and the membrane potential rises to approximately 
+55 mV before the resting potential is restored. Adrian’s measurements of action 
potentials in sensory neurons revealed inter alia that the shape and amplitude of the 
resulting “spike”-shaped curve is highly similar independently of the intensity and nature 
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of the sensory stimulus. Action potentials are “all-or-none” rather than graded 
phenomena, and, furthermore, they look more or less the same across neurons. This 
stereotypicality is the feature of action potential that will concern us here, as it presents us 
with a puzzle about how action potentials encode information. If their shape and 
amplitude do not differ, how is the nervous system able to distinguish between different 
messages conveyed by them? The answer appears to be that information is encoded in 
firing rates – that is, in the number of action potentials per time unit – rather than in their 
amplitudes. For instance, Adrian found that the firing rates in sensory neurons increases 
with the intensity of the sensory stimulus. (Kandel, 2006, p. 78) 
 The discoveries of researchers like Helmholtz and Adrian have three implications 
for (quasi-Closure). First, neural signaling can be studied quantitatively, which many 
view as a hallmark of natural science. Quantitative measurements may therefore be 
viewed as demystifying signaling (but see below). Second, the discoveries serve to 
sharpen an important neurophysiological explanandum. We have already seen that, given 
the Neuron Doctrine, the signaling of individual neurons becomes a privileged kind of 
event. Given the further assumption that neural information is encoded in firing 
frequencies, the more specific event of neurons’ firing with certain frequencies is given a 
special causal/explanatory status within our causal picture. Third, given the 
connectionism sketched above, where neural causation is portrayed as occurring within a 
neural network, this constrains what events are causally relevant in cellular/molecular 
neuroscience. For if an event is to affect what happens in a neural network, it must work 
through a mechanism that allows it to change the firing rates of neurons. As John Bickle 
makes the point: 
If action potential rate is the currency of neural causation and information exchange, then the only 
way an event can elicit neural change is by affecting the processes that underlie action potential 
generation in individual neurons. That is where the rubber meets the road. (Bickle, 2003, p. 59) 
 Now, developments (i) and (ii) may, perhaps, as a historical fact, have contributed 
to the demise of irreducibly vital or mental causes in neuroscience. But when taken in 
isolation, I do not think they should worry dualists much. Provided they have theoretical 
reasons for doing so dualists could still maintain that the electrical signal depends on 
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mental or vital causes for its initiation. In fact, the contemporary dualist E.J. Lowe 
suggests on theoretical grounds that neural processes need invisible “help” from 
irreducibly mental events to cause voluntary bodily movements. (Lowe, 2000)103
Furthermore, such causes might perfectly well be described mathematically, or give rise 
to a mathematically describable phenomenon.  To lend support to (quasi-Closure) 
developments (i) and (ii) must therefore be supplemented with evidence that the action 
potential can be accounted for by neurobiological causes without invoking such factors. 
In other words, the picture should be supplemented with depictions of neural 
mechanisms. Mechanisms add significantly to the explanatory power of causal pictures. 
The third and fourth theoretical developments involve the filling-in of mechanisms to the 
causal picture. 
 (iii) Neurobiological models for the generation and conduction of nervous 
signaling were developed. Julius Bernstein (1839-1917) described in 1866 the action 
potential as a “wave of negativity” traveling along the nerve. (Boring, 1950, ch. 2) 
Several questions had to be answered in order to provide a mechanistic explanation of 
this signal, now known as the action potential. As mentioned above, the inside of the 
neural membrane is negative relative to the outside when the neuron is at rest. How does 
this resting membrane potential arise? During the action potential, the membrane is 
briefly depolarized, that is its outside becomes negative relative to the inside. What 
causes this depolarization? How is it conducted down the axon without decreasing or 
failing? The membrane hypothesis, made famous by Bernstein, was an important first 
step toward answering these mechanism-related questions. (See Boring (1950, ch. 2); 
Kandel (2006, ch. 5) and Piccolino (1998) for discussions of Bernstein’s hypothesis.) In 
1902 Bernstein suggested that the resting potential could arise from an uneven 
distribution of ions in intra and extra cellular space. He knew the inside is dominated by 
negatively charged organic ions, and positively charged potassium (K+) ions, whereas the 
outside is dominated by positive sodium (Na+) ions and negative chloride (Cl-) ions. 
Bernstein proposed that at rest, the membrane contains open ion channels that only allow 
103 Cp. paper (#3). 
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potassium to pass through. He then explained the resting potential in terms of potassium 
flow across the membrane. Initially, a diffusion force would push potassium from the 
inside through the potassium selective channels to the outside, because the concentration 
of potassium is lower there. But as the inside grows more negative due to the potassium 
efflux, an electromagnetic force would begin to pull the positive potassium ions back 
inside. The balancing of these forces would yield a membrane potential of -70 mV. 
Bernstein also suggested a mechanism explaining how the membrane could be 
depolarized during the action potential. When stimulated sufficiently, the membrane 
would become permeable to all ions, and the potential would change from -70 mV to 0 
mV, yielding an action potential with an amplitude of 70 mV. While Bernstein’s model 
turned out to be flawed in many ways, the important point for present purposes is that 
only physical and chemical causes are at play in it. The all-important flow of potassium is 
due to the physical influences of diffusion and electromagnetic forces. The balancing of 
these influences can even be modeled mathematically, using a principle from physical 
chemistry, called the Nernst Equation. (See, e.g., Bear et al., 2001, p. 64) 
 This explanation of the action potential was revised and supplemented by the 
ionic hypothesis, which is largely due to the work of Alan Hodgkin (1914-1998) and 
Andrew Huxley (b. 1917). (Kandel, 2006, ch. 5; Piccolino 1998) Working on the 
experimentally convenient giant axon of squids, Hodgkin and Huxley developed a precise 
and quantitative model of the action potential. Their measurements confirmed Bernstein’s 
suggestion of -70 mV for the resting potential, but they found that the action potential 
rises to +40 m, yielding an amplitude of 110 mV, rather than Bernstein’s 70 mV. This 
called for a revision of Bernstein’s model.  
 Nevertheless, the revised explanation was fundamentally in terms of the flow of 
ions. The characteristic shape of an action potential recording suggests two phases. First 
there is a rise or upstroke, when the membrane’s inside becomes positive relative to the 
inside, followed by a fall or downstroke, where the original resting potential is ultimately 
restored. Hodgkin and Huxley’s measurements suggested that the upstroke could be due 
to the influx of positive sodium ions, whereas the downstroke is caused by the efflux of 
potassium ions. To explain this mechanism, they postulated the existence of voltage gated 
sodium and potassium channels. These channels would work as switches, allowing 
163
sodium and potassium, respectively, to pass through the membrane at just the right times. 
They were called “voltage gated,” because they were supposed to open as the result of the 
electrical field resulting from nearby depolarization. First, voltage gated sodium channels 
would open, and the influx of sodium ions would depolarize the membrane. Slightly later, 
these channels would close, and the efflux of potassium would take the membrane 
potential back to a negative level. (Specialized ion pumps transport sodium out and 
potassium back in to maintain the ionic concentrations necessary for the resting 
potential.) Once a portion of the axon is depolarized the field thereby created would open 
sodium channels further down the axon, thus explaining how the signal is conducted 
down the axon. The predictions of the model fit well with most measurements, provided 
biological parameters are appropriately set. Furthermore, the existence of voltage gated 
ion channels has since been confirmed. The details of these mechanisms are beyond the 
scope of this paper, but can be found in text books like Bear et al. (2001, ch. 3-4) and 
Kandel et al. (2000, ch. 7-9). 
 Returning to (quasi-Closure), the emergence of this model has two important 
consequences. First, it strongly supports the contention of (quasi-Closure) that neural 
signaling can be accounted for by neural causes found at the cellular/molecular level, and 
neural mechanisms involving these causes. Indeed, the model would seem to remove the 
theoretical need to postulate vital or mental causes of neural signaling. Such causes are, 
as it were, pushed out of our causal picture. In this connection it is very interesting to note 
that Eric Kandel’s remark about Bernstein’s historical contribution is also exclusionist in 
spirit: 
In a larger sense, Bernstein’s formulation joined those of Galvani and Helmholtz in providing 
compelling evidence that the laws of physics and chemistry can explain even some aspects of how 
mind functions – the signaling of the nervous system and therefore the control of behavior. There 
was no need or room for “vital forces” or other phenomena that could not be explained in terms of 
physics and chemistry. (Kandel, 2006, p. 83, my italics.) 
164
There is, presumably, no need to invoke irreducibly mental or vital forces, because 
physical causes are sufficient in the circumstances to explain the phenomenon.104
(Provided, that is, they are not needed in the background conditions, see below.)  But 
dualists like Lowe will hardly be convinced. Irreducibly mental causes might still be at 
play even though their contribution is invisible from the point of view of neuroscience. I 
shall discuss this problem in step 3 of my argument below. 
 The second implication of Hodgkin and Huxley’s model is this. Not only are vital 
causes excluded as necessary from our causal picture, the picture is also made even more 
precise as the model tells us what kinds of causes are relevant to the generation of action 
potentials. Certainly the factors that affect whether ion channels open and the forces that 
determine how ions flow through these channels become neural causes par excellence.
This specification of the causal picture is all the more important given that neurons’ 
action potential rate is depicted as a privileged kind of effect. Finally, the model provides 
neuroscientists with a precise quantitative grasp of how such causes yield their effects. 
Gutkin & Ermentrout go so far as to say that the model’s formalism “is the closest that 
neurophysiologists have to Newton’s laws of motion, and it underpins almost all modern 
models of how neurons work.” (Gutkin & Ermentrout, 2006, p. 999) The Hodgkin and 
Huxley model, then, is the kind of model that inspires great explanatory confidence. 
 (iii) An understanding of the chemical nature of interneuronal communication 
emerged. So far I have focused on signaling within neurons and the electrophysiological 
104 This, then, may perhaps – in retrospect at least – be construed as a case of causal exclusion within 
explanatory practice. Putative causes of neural signaling like vital forces are excluded on the grounds that 
there is no need to invoke them. And as Kandel’s quote suggests, there might be no room for them either, 
perhaps because they would yield a different effect. (See paper (#1) for further discussion.) But to repeat: I 
am not saying that the Neural Exclusion Argument as applied to mental causes in actions is ultimately 
sound. Mental causes of voluntary bodily movements need not be analogous with the mental or vital forces 
once postulated to explain neural signaling. We have independent reasons for believing that mental events 
cause bodily movements, whereas the postulation of mental/vital forces to explain neural signaling may 
well have lacked independent motivation. Furthermore, as discussed in paper (#1) and (#2) it is far from 
clear whether mental causes could be excluded on the grounds that they distort the effect, because it is far 
from clear that mental causes must be “productive” causes. 
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understanding of this phenomenon. But how does the action potential affect other neurons 
when it arrives at the end of the axon? I shall be briefer here than with the exposition of 
signaling within neurons. Electrophysiologists like John Eccles (1903-1997) long 
assumed that communication between neurons also had to be electrical. In contrast, 
physiologists working on the autonomic nervous system brought pharmacology into the 
debate and argued that neurons communicated with the aid of chemical signaling 
molecule – the above-mentioned neurotransmitters – that were dumped into the synaptic 
cleft. At the time, these scientists were jokingly referred to as “soups” since they believed 
that what I call a causal picture had to be supplemented with chemical “soup.” The 
former scientists were called “sparks,” because they thought that the picture could be 
painted using only electrical causes of neurotransmission. (See Kandel, 2006, ch. 6; 
Valenstein, 2005, ch. 8.) We now know that the sparks where right about certain synapses 
called “gap junctions” or “electrical” synapses. Here an electrical signal passes through a 
specialized channel linking the pre and postsynaptic neurons. Interestingly, this discovery 
can be viewed as a partial vindication of Golgi-style reticularism. (Bullock et al., 2005; 
Rapport, 2005, ch. 10) Nevertheless, as Kandel and Elliot S. Valenstein explain, 
arguments from soups like Otto Loewi (1873-1961) gradually made the soups’ theory of 
chemical transmission the accepted view for most synapses. Chemical neurotransmission 
has since been the subject of intense research. The details cannot concern us here, except 
to note that the arrival of the action potential at the axon’s terminal causes the release of 
neurotransmitter molecules into the synaptic cleft. These diffuse across the cleft and bind 
to specialized receptor molecules on the postsynaptic neuron’s membrane. In “fast” or 
“ionotropic” receptors, this causes the receptor to open and allow certain ions to flow 
across the membrane, producing a change in the membrane potential. Excitatory 
neurotransmitters cause a depolarization of the membrane, known as an Excitatory 
Postsynaptic Potential (EPSP). On the other hand, inhibitory neurotransmitters cause a 
hyperpolarization – where the membrane potential becomes more negative – called an 
Inhibitory Postsynaptic Potential (IPSP). Notably, these changes in the postsynaptic 
membrane potential are graded, i.e., vary in amplitude, which contrasts with the all-or-
nothing action potentials. The postsynaptic neuron integrates excitatory and inhibitory 
inputs and “determines” whether it should fire or not by spatial and temporal summation 
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of incoming IPSPs and EPSPs. (The activation of so-called “slow” or metabotropic 
receptors can initiate a series of intracellular events leading, e.g., to changes in the 
strength of synapses.)  
 Abstracting from these details, pharmacological or biochemical causes are added 
to our causal picture. These soupy causes bring with them a bewildering array of soupy 
mechanisms that directly or indirectly affect neurons’ behavior. Central in the 
composition of the picture is now the all-important event of neurons’ firing at certain 
rates. It is surrounded by other events that contribute towards it, like the release of 
neurotransmitters, and the opening of ion channels, as well as sparky and soupy 
mechanisms connecting such events. But as important as what the picture contains, is 
what it does not contain. The picture is exquisitely complex, but neurobiological and 
chemical through and through. 
Step 3: Non-mental Background Conditions. We have, then, ample reasons for believing 
that in normal circumstances neural events like bodily movements have sufficient neural 
causes. Whereas Sturgeon may be right that it is an open question whether quantum 
mechanical events cause bodily movements, it is not an open empirical question whether 
neural events do so. For this claim is grounded in extant, and detailed scientific models. 
(That is the primary reason why we waded through all this detail in the first place.) But 
unlike the Quantum Mechanical Exclusion Argument, the Neural Exclusion Argument 
offers no hope at all of finding absolutely sufficient causes of bodily movements within 
the domain considered. Accordingly, we must now briefly consider whether the minimal 
conditions under which neural causation takes place include irreducibly mental factors. 
 Offering a demonstrative argument for the absence of such causes seems 
practically impossible. For one thing it is in the nature of ceteris paribus generalizations 
that their ceteris paribus conditions cannot be listed. Second, as Lowe (2000) plausibly 
argues, there is always a logical possibility that the sufficiency we seem to find at the 
neural level is only apparent. Irreducible, but necessary, mental causes might be at play, 
even though their contribution is invisible from the point of view of neuroscience, or 
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from physics for that matter. Nevertheless I shall offer a brief plausibility argument to 
rule out such causes.105
 First, what we do know about the ceteris paribus conditions does not suggest that 
any irreducibly mental causes must be included. We know that neural causation depends 
on things like normal temperature, blood flow, the presence of properly functioning glial 
cells etc. These factors are not mental in nature. The problem with claiming that mental 
causes must be included in addition is that neural causation appears to run normally in 
systems where we are not inclined to believe that mentality is present at all, e.g. in 
primitive animals, or even in tissue cultures. Why would they be needed in humans? 
Second, given that there is no direct empirical evidence for the presence of such 
irreducibly mental events – a point Lowe (2000) for one, agrees to – their postulation 
seems wholly ad hoc. The same reasoning applies to perceptual input to the 
neurobiological domain.106
6.6.3. Extrapolating from these Models  
One final challenge to (quasi-Closure) remains to be addressed. Our interpretation of 
extant neuroscientific models should avoid the extreme of claiming that we now have 
arrived at the ultimate truth. Given the unfortunate fate to which such claims have fallen 
over history, it would be naïve to believe that the causal picture we have been considering 
will not be revised and expanded in a variety of ways. Indeed, even my own relatively 
cursory reading of contemporary scientific and popular journals suggests that the picture 
is currently being challenged and changed.  
 Here are a few examples. The Neuron Doctrine does not imply that glial cells are 
nothing more than a support team for the more important neurons. Nevertheless, it 
appears to have carried with it a highly “neuron-centric” theoretical outlook on neural 
signaling. However, some scientists now argue that the interneuronal communication-
105 I provide some further details in paper (#3). 
106 In fact, we have a good understanding of how perceptual input works, and what kinds of input can 
activate sensory receptors. (See, e.g., Kandel et al., 2000, ch. 21) A distinguishing feature of good models is 
arguably that they include details about the nature of input to the system. 
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system we have been considering both interacts with, and is supplemented by a different, 
slower, kind of communication system involving glial cells. (Bullock et al., 2005, Fields, 
2004) Others have suggested that the standard model of interneuronal communication 
where neurotransmitter is released at specialized synapses must be supplemented with so-
called “ectopic release.” Here, neurotransmitters can be released at sites remote from the 
synapses and diffuse along neural membranes. (Coggan et al., 2005) Furthermore, 
electrical synapses, the “exception” to the Neuron Doctrine noted above, have been 
thought to be relatively primitive devices, invoked by nature primarily when speed and 
safety of transmission are crucial. But there is now evidence that electrical synapses, like 
their more famous chemical cousins, are capable of plasticity or changes in synaptic 
strength. They may therefore play more sophisticated roles than was originally thought. 
(Bullock et al., 2005). Finally, even the celebrated Hodgkin and Huxley model of the 
action potential may not fit the behavior of all neurons. This has lead some scientists to 
propose a more sophisticated model including a kind of “cooperation” between ion 
channels, as discussed by Gutkin & Ermentrout (2006). These brief sketches of 
hypotheses under current discussion, then, suggest ways in which the causal picture may 
be modified, and supplemented with novel causes and mechanisms.  
 While we must be sensitive to hypotheses like these, as well as to the possibility 
of even more radical changes, our interpretation of current models need not fall into the 
alternative extreme of skepticism about scientific progress. Although changes and 
revolutions most likely will recur in the future, some doors are closed as science moves – 
more or less unwaveringly – forward. I contend that necessary but irreducibly mental 
causes of neural events are likely to be left on the outside for good. Consider the 
hypotheses I just mentioned. While some of them may change the causal picture 
significantly, they bear a certain family resemblance to it. For one thing the additional 
causes and mechanisms proposed are still firmly located within the biological domain. 
And even if standard interneuronal communication requires in addition a different kind of 
communication involving glial cells, there is still communication going on between the 
components of the nervous system. On the other hand, the proposed additions to the 
picture seem nothing like the mental or vital forces once invoked. Will further research 
on these or other, perhaps more radical hypotheses that may be forthcoming, lead to the 
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return of (say) vital causes of neural signaling? Given its empirical nature, this question is 
likely beyond the scope of conclusive arguments. Nevertheless, based on the 
neuroscientific causal picture just sketched, and the ways in which it appears to be 
changing, I believe the answer must be in the negative. 
6.7. Conclusions 
What is closed in causal closure? This seemingly innocent question is interesting in its 
own right, and we have witnessed how it appears to threaten the Exclusion Argument if 
this argument is formulated in terms of physics. More work probably needs to be done, 
and should be done, on the domain of (Closure). However, I have argued that the 
difficulties for the Exclusion Argument can be avoided by appealing to neuroscience and 
(quasi-Closure) instead of physics. (Quasi-Closure) may appear to render he Neural 
Exclusion Argument trivial. But trivial or not, it will, if I am right, remove the important 
problem Sturgeon has raised for the Exclusion Argument. This certainly speaks in its 
favor. Furthermore, I do not take it to be trivial. It is not an off-hand appeal to in-
principle explanations of an idealized future neurophysiology. After all, its plausibility 
derives from extant models of causal processes leading up to, inter alia bodily 
movements. Accordingly, even philosophers like Cartwright (1999) and Tim Crane & 
D.H. Mellor (1990), who are in general skeptical to claims about in-principle 
completeness should find (quasi-Closure) worthy of their attention. While the impact of 
(quasi-Closure) is the same as that of the traditional version of (Closure) – there are 
sufficient non-mental causes of bodily movements – the Neural Exclusion Argument is 
not wedded to the idea that any particular, privileged science is credited with absolute 
completeness. The background conditions under which neural causation takes place, may 
after all be of a theoretically quite heterogeneous nature. In short, if the remaining 
premises of the Neural Exclusion Argument are sound, causal exclusion could be run 
within actual, but limited causal models. 
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